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Chapter One
This chapter reports the results of an in-lab experiment to test two design features of two
round elections. (1) uncertainty about round two participants and (2) the flexible threshold for
first round victory. The chapter finds experimental evidence of the existence of Duverger’s Law
equilibrium (predominance of two candidates) and the sincere equilibrium in two round divided
majority election games with uncertainty and flexible thresholds. The effect of flexible thresh-
olds and uncertainty on the occurrence of these two equilibrium are tested. The chapter finds
that the flexible threshold has a greater effect than uncertainty when it comes to Duverger’s Law
type effects. It is found that in general the effects of threshold and uncertainty are complemen-
tary but with a large interaction effect. The Duverger Law equilibrium exists and is more stable
than alternative equilibria including the sincere equilibrium. Elections with a lower threshold
and or uncertainty have higher levels of minority candidate victory. While coordination levels
are in general high enough to mitigate these effects, the lower threshold and uncertainty reduce
the room for error and magnify the effect of error. The secondary findings of this chapter are the
existence of non-symmetric equilibrium in the experiment that voters do not take dominated
strategies in the experiment under these new parameters of uncertainty and a lower threshold,
therefore supporting the assumptions necessary for the other results. The second if these is not
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claimed as a contribution to the literature as others have made the same findings though not
under these specific election rules. The non-symmetric equilibrium suggest further study as it
questions the assumption of symmetric voting in equilibrium.
Chapter Two
This chapter presents a three candidate election model with the key feature of two ’large’
candidates and one ’small’ candidate. This design mimics many political systems for example
the US and Uk. with two large parties and a number of small parties. under these conditions
two voting rules, Plurality and Instant run-off, are analysed. The analysis starts with the sincere
equilibrium. It is found to exist for all voter distributions (under the basic conditions of two
’large’ candidates) in this model for the instant run-off rule. The plurality rule is found to only
have a sincere equilibrium under a set of restrictions. As such the instant run-off is a better
system for those that want incentivise sincere voting. It is also found that when sincere voting
gives different outcomes for the two rules the instant run-off is preferred by a strict majority of
voters. The second part of this chapter is the main contribution to the literature. The application
of level-k thinking to the model described above with the assumption of bounded rationality.
These finds also support the argument that the instant run-off is a preferable system. It always
gives and outcome that is weakly preferred by a strict majority of voters and when the two
voting rules give the same outcome the instant run-off reaches this with a weakly lower level
of necessary thinking. The sincere equilibrium is found to be the only equilibrium at higher
levels of thinking for instant run-off while plurality has 3 possible equilibrium based on the
voter distribution: the sincere equilibrium, the Duverger’s Law equilibrium and the non-pivotal
equilibrium. The chapter gives supporting evidence for ’wasted’ votes that go to candidates
that can not win the election coming from voters who are bounded by their rational and have
not worked out that they should be strategic.
Chapter Three
The final chapter links the first two together somewhat but primarily aims to give support-
ing evidence for the assumptions made in the first two chapters. It presents a three candidate
election with entry. Two candidates have a first move advantage and a third candidate enters
after them. This simple candidate model is analysed for the 4 rules used in the first two chapters.
The spatial equilibria that are found under the four rules fit to the assumptions about candidate
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policy position in the other two chapters with varying success. The plurality rule that is inves-
tigated in chapter two fits well and the entry model creates two ’large’ candidates who get the
first mover advantage. This suggest one rationale for the set up of chapter two is a first mover
advantage that creates the ’large’ candidates. This rationale is less clear for the instant run-off
where the results of the entry game is for the entrant to copy one of the first movers and this
creates two ’small’ candidates. The two round elections with and without flexible threshold do
not fit well into the equilibrium of the entry game. The interesting thing about the two round
election with and without a flexible threshold though is that they fit very well with such a game
where an entrant makes a small error in their strategy. So the entry game in disequilibrium could
explain in part the divided majority set up. This raises questions in the divided majority espe-
cially with a flexible threshold; why does the minority candidate not get slightly more moderate
to try to win enough votes to win as a minority?
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1Chapter 1
Does the Runoff Election Solve the
Coordination Problem?
1.1 Introduction
Run-off elections with majority requirement are the most prevalent system of presidential elec-
tions in the world. Of the 111 countries that directly elect a president, 87 use a system with some
form of run-off. Of these elections, 78 are absolute majority rules without additional conditions1
Understanding how this election rule works and how voters respond to this rule is therefore
essential to a wide range of countries and their people. Such voting rules are also applicable
to committee decision making at board level, panel interviews, and any other situation where a
group must make a collective decision.
The multi-candidate run-off election can require up to two rounds of voting. In round one,
voters cast a vote for a single candidate. The candidate with the most votes wins if they pass a
predefined share of the vote. This share is the victory threshold. When no candidate passes the
victory threshold the election moves to round two. The two candidates with the most round one
votes contest this run-off election. Due to the nature of a two-candidate election, the winner of
round two will have a majority of the votes in round two2.
With the range of applications and the prevalence at a presidential level, it is unsurprising
that literature in this area has expanded in recent years. Theoretical work is the area that has
1Information compiled with additional research from IDEA electoral system design database. For a summary of
these results and details on other systems worldwide, see appendix A.
2This ignores 50/50 ties, I discuss this in the model section.
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expanded most with work by, Bouton (2013), Bouton and Gratton (2015), Bordignon, Nannicini,
and Tabellini (2016, 2017), Callander (2005) Haan and Volkerink (2001) among others. I discuss
these contributions and other related work in section 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. From an experimental
perspective, this includes work by Morton and Rietz (2007), Blais, Laslier, Laurent, Sauger, and
Van der Straeten (2007), and Van der Straeten, Laslier, Sauger, and Blais (2010). This literature is
expanded on in 1.2.3.
The absolute majority run-off rule for better or worse stops the victory of minority candi-
dates. As Morton and Rietz (2007) among others have argued the historic motivation of the
run-off rule was in part to disenfranchise ethnic minorities in the southern states of the USA.
When used instead to defeat political extremes it is framed more positively, for example in the
French presidential elections since 19653. This type of run-off election is also predicted to be
more conducive to preference revelation compared to one round elections. Allowing for sincere
revelation in both rounds without the risk of an upset victory where a Condorcet Loser4 wins
the election. Morton and Rietz (2007) finds that the run-off election does lead to higher sincere
voting in round one followed by coordination to defeat the minority candidate in round two.
The analysis of the run-off election however is incomplete. This chapter will aim to address
some of the unanswered questions in this area. Firstly, by running two election rounds uncer-
tainty seeps in. Voting in round one does not necessitate voting in round two. Equally, a voter
can vote in round two without voting in round one. There is then uncertainty over who votes in
each round. If a Condorcet loser (minority candidate) can become a Condorcet winner in round
two, how will players in round one act? Will they continue to treat the minority candidate as
though it cannot win?
Secondly, the majority requirement is just one feasible threshold level. While previous analy-
sis has compared plurality and the majority run-off, it has ignored the pros and cons of the other
alternatives. Specifically a threshold between plurality and absolute majority runoff.
Bouton (2013) have modeled these questions theoretically but a gap exists regarding experi-
mental evidence to support their findings, and other questions around uncertainty and threshold
3 Specifically the second round defeats of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen in 2002 and 2017 respectively.
4A candidate that would lose a head to head election against all other candidates
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level in runoff elections.
In considering alternative thresholds, it is necessary to understand why an election designer
might wish to change the threshold. At its heart, there is a trade-off when setting a threshold
between cost and upset risk. The lowest possible threshold (plurality5) never requires a second
round of voting and is therefore cheaper to run but has a large round one upset risk. A minority
candidate must only exceed the vote tally of each of the majority candidates to win the election.
Super majorities6(any threshold above 50%) and the majority threshold often require a second
round7 and therefore cost more to run but eliminate round one upset risk. One objective of
this chapter is to test if this trade-off exists for a threshold between plurality and majority. The
uncertainty over populations is important not in understanding the actions/outcome in round
two but in understanding how this affects decision making in round one.
The certainty in the existing analysis on run-off elections is pivotal to the results regarding
sincere revelation in round one and coordination in round two. How voters respond to this
uncertainty is important in understanding runoff elections. Will voters respond to uncertainty
by entrenching their vote, aiming to remove uncertainty in the area they can control, or will they
respond to uncertainty by trying to be strategic and insincere?
To answer these questions I present in section 1.3 a run-off election model with variable
thresholds and uncertainty. This model follows the standard divided majority literature with
three voter types and three candidates. Two types represent a divided majority while the third
represents a unified minority. The majority both prefer candidate A and B to candidate C but
are divided over their preference between A and B, while the minority prefer candidate C to A
and B and are indifferent over these two. There is then a flexible threshold for round one.
Following the model section 1.5 details the experiment. The experiment will test the absolute
majority threshold and a double threshold of 40% threshold and absolute majority threshold. In
the second case a candidate wins if they get above 40% of the vote and no other candidate gets
5Under plurality, the most votes wins without considering a threshold. This is equivalent to there being no thresh-
old. In practice with 3 candidates this is any threshold from 0 to 1/3
6There can only be a super majority in round one, in round two it must revert to plurality or the election result
has an existence problem.
7Of the 10 French elections run with a majority threshold all have required the second round.
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40% but if two candidates get above 40% one can still win if they get an absolute majority.
The main departure from Bouton (2013) is that where he uses a Poisson distribution to calcu-
late group size in each round I fix the group size at 13 or 14 depending on treatment. This allows
the experiment to run with a fixed number of real participants. The model then randomly se-
lects the voters in round two to generate uncertainty. There will be five participants in round
two under uncertainty.
A second change that needs to be discussed is the decision to exclude abstention as an option
in the main election. As abstention is the primary motivator for uncertainty over who partici-
pates in each round it was necessary to control this to effectively measure the effect of uncer-
tainty. The experiment exogenously creates uncertainty in specific treatments to compare them
to treatments without uncertainty. If the experiment allowed abstention, this clear distinction
would be removed. Section 1.2.4 includes a discussion of the possible causes of abstention.
I find that the changes to the generation of uncertainty and the exclusion of abstentions does
not effect the predictions of Bouton (2013). The theoretical results for this model are presented
with their proofs in section 1.4 and are in line with the findings of Bouton (2013).
The theoretical section of the chapter finds the same results as Bouton (2013). Both the Du-
verger Law equilibrium and the sincere equilibrium should occur in all 6 treatments in this
experiment. This finding is supported by the results in the chapter. Using the same method as
Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993) to compare a Duverger’s Law type effect against
random voting the chapter finds that a Duvergers Law type effect occurs in 32.10% of all elec-
tions in the experiment. This effect is found to occur most often in treatments FC6 , FU6 and
FU5. Therefore the flexible threshold seems to increase the occurrence of the Duverger’s Law
equilibrium. This supports the conjecture in this chapter that a lower threshold creates a greater
cost to no reaching the Duverger’s Law equilibrium and therefore incentivises participants to
try to reach it.
When we test the effect of the flexible threshold on the occurrence of Duverger’s Law equi-
librium we find the effect to be a 27.8% increase in occurrence. This effect goes up when the
interaction effect with uncertainty is included. Uncertainty also has a significant effect of the
occurrence of Duverger’s Law equilibrium but only when the interaction effect is taken into ac-
count. This suggest that of the two variables changing the threshold has a dominant effect. The
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effect of uncertainty, 17.3%, is smaller than the interaction effect, 33.3%, which is negative. So the
flexible threshold and uncertainty effect the Duverger’s Law equilibrium in the same direction.
Both variables have a positive effect on the occurrence of the Duverger’s Law equilibrium.
The second Symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is predicted by the theory to exist is
the sincere equilibrium. The findings of the experiment support this prediction. Using the same
method as Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993) but now to compare random voting
with sincere voting it is found that the sincere equilibrium occurs in 9.26% of elections. This
is less than the Duverger’s Law equilibrium but still a significant percentage of the time. The
effect of threshold and uncertainty on the existence of the sincere equilibrium is also significant
but smaller. The effect of the flexible threshold on the occurrence of the sincere equilibrium is
14.8% which rises to 23.5% when the interaction effect is considered. Unlike the Duverger’s Law
equilibrium uncertainty does has a significant effect, 11.1% without the interaction effect. The
effect of uncertainty rises to 12% with the interaction effect, 17.3%, which again is negative. So
the flexible threshold and uncertainty effect the sincere equilibrium in the same direction. Both
variables have a negative effect on the sincere equilibrium
It is hard to test the third of these claims without data on plurality for compassion so I will
not make any claims for that prediction. The findings of the chapter support both prediction one
and two. The Duverger equilibria is the most prevalent outcome in the experiment and exists
for all treatments. By design of the experiment, the sincere equilibrium is predicted to exist in all
treatments. As predicted, the sincere equilibrium does always exist though it is less prevalent
than the Duverger equilibria. Finally, the expectation that the sincere equilibrium is less likely
with a lower threshold and uncertainty is found in the results of the experiment.
The benefit of testing the theory using an experiment is we can control for factors that it is
impossible to control for in the real world including true voter preference, which is not fully
reported by analysis of voting decisions. It is also possible to test multiple thresholds where
in the real world any given election only has one. Finally, it is possible to decide to introduce
uncertainty where in the real world data the level of uncertainty or its existence is not known
and cannot be isolated.
The experiment has been able to report the effect of an intermediate threshold. This helps
in analysing the trade-off inherent in selecting a threshold. Its limit is that there are still only
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three thresholds considered in the literature and this makes finding an ’ideal’ threshold if one
exists still very difficult. Additionally the experiment makes no claims to predict difference in
populations between rounds just report the effect the existence of such difference can cause.
1.2 Literature Review
The review of the literature is broken into 4 parts.
1. An overview of key theoretical topics
2. The theoretical work on the run-off system
3. The experimental work on the divided majority
4. A brief review of the abstention literature
1.2.1 Theoretical Frame work
This chapter is focused on the voting decisions of a population of voters. One key theory in
this literature is the Duverger law. Initially proposed by Duverger (1959) it states that plurality
rule elections within single winner takes all elections tend to favour two party systems and
the Duverger Law equilibrium is a voting equilibrium where only two candidates receive a
positive vote share in the election. For a mathematical proof of Duverger’s Law see Palfrey
(1988). Riker (1982) extends the Duverger law and defines Duverger’s hypothesis. Duverger’s
hypothesis states that double ballot majority systems (hereafter called the run-off system) and
Proportional Representation tend to favour multiparty politics. This hypothesis has been called
into question often, in the first instance by Riker himself who stated that in its deterministic
form it can be abandoned. Callander (2005) considers two party and multiparty systems and
finds that two party systems can be stable under run-off systems. This chapter fits into this
literature by testing the Duverger Hypothesis equilibrium under an experimental framework
and calling it into question in the run-off system under uncertainty and with lower thresholds.
In understanding the actions of voters, it is necessary to consider the equilibria that can exist
within voting models. The first stage of such an analysis is the work by Nash (1950, 1951) and the
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formulation of the Nash equilibrium. A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can
do better by unilaterally changing his or her strategy fixing the strategies of other players. This
equilibrium concept is insufficient for the work in this chapter as it is with other such group
voting models. With just a small number of voters it is possible for any candidate winning
to be a Nash equilibrium including Condorcet losers8 and candidates that are every voter’s
strict worst option. Besley and Coate (1997) apply elimination of weakly dominated strategies
to the plurality system. In doing so the strategy of voting for the least preferred candidate is
eliminated. In two candidate elections this just leaves sincere voting. This chapter will use the
same process. An extension of this work conducted by Dhillon and Lockwood (2004) gave the
conditions under which a plurality voting game is dominance-solvable. This work refines the
set of strategies in the plurality election system but leaves questions about the run-off election
system and what these refinements mean for the run-off system. The next section explores the
work done in the theoretical literature on the run-off system.
1.2.2 Run-off literature
In terms of this chapter the two most important papers in this literature are Bouton (2013) and
Bouton and Gratton (2015). These papers present the two key theoretical questions that this
chapter investigates in its experiment. They prove that the Duverger equilibrium must exist for
any threshold level and with uncertainty and give the conditions for the existence of the sincere
equilibrium. The hypotheses of Bouton (2013) and Bouton and Gratton (2015) are supported by
the results of the experiment conducted under similar conditions in this chapter.
Haan and Volkerink (2001) shows that with run-off elections parties take median voter po-
sitions in a downs-Hotelling environment9. As such the run-off rule induces centrist politics.
This supports the idea that the majority will win in the run-off election. It does not address
the divided nature of the majority. Bordignon, Nannicini, and Tabellini (2016, 2017) support the
Duverger hypothesis that there will be more viable candidates in a run-off election. They allow
for party formation with many parties and find that while there are more parties in the run-off
election the power of the extremes is reduced as they have less bargaining power in forming
8A candidate that would lose a head to head election against all other candidates
9 for details on the downs-hotelling model see Downs (1957), Hotelling (1929)
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coalitions. They also find that the moderate parties prefer to run alone. This supports the find-
ings that run-off rules see coordination between voters instead of between parties. Additionally,
the failure of the extremist supports the idea that the minority is less likely to win in run-off
elections.
1.2.3 Divided Majority literature
There is limited real world capacity to test the concepts proposed in these papers as there is
limited scope for changing election rules and too many unknowns. A solution to this is to run
controlled experiments. This method has been applied to many of the theories above in different
contexts. This section will focus solely on the work done to understand the divided majority
problem.
Myerson and Weber (1993) presents the structure of the divided majority in the first example
of their paper. This paper framed the questions regarding the divided majority and gave a clear
structure to test the question experimentally though it did not run an experiment.
The first papers to use this theoretical work were Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993,
1996) in a set of experiments that formalized the divided majority experimental design. These
papers gave evidence for pre-election polling and election histories as coordination methods for
the divided majority. They showed that the divided majority problem can be reduced by polling
and election histories but that the Condorcet loser still wins a significant number of elections.
They find that the outcome of coordination is the emergence of the Duverger’s Law equilibrium
where the divided majority coordinate on a single candidate. Following this work Reitz, My-
erson, and Weber (1998) used the same structure to test the signaling effect of financing. Their
findings were similar, showing financing reducing the Condorcet loser winning occurrence by a
similar amount to polls. Using the same design Gerber, Morton, and Rietz (1998) considers mul-
timember districts. Their findings support the idea that proportional representation is preferable
for minority candidates and that allowing for cumulative voting benefits the minority candidate.
As this election is not a winner takes all election it applies less well to the work in this chapter.
More recent work on the divided majority by Bouton, Castanheira, and Llorente-Saguer (2016,
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2017) have also found a Duverger’s Law type effect under the conditions of aggregate uncer-
tainty for plurality and approval voting.
The first attempt to understand the run-off election using the divided majority was con-
ducted by Morton and Rietz (2007). They showed that the run-off election system was very
successful in coordinating the voters of the divided majority. The level of sincere voting in-
creases by a large amount and the probability that the Condorcet loser wins is greatly reduced.
The candidate with the most votes in round one, generally the minority candidate, rarely won
in the second round. This contradicts real world evidence found in Bullock and Johnson (1992).
They find that primary leaders usually win in run-offs and that larger primary leads usually
lead to stronger wins in the run-off. They call this the "leader-loses" myth. This contradiction
between the theory and experiment and the real world data can be explained in a number of
ways. Most obviously that Bullock and Johnson (1992) elections are not divided majorities in
the same way that Morton and Rietz (2007) experiments are. An alternative though is that there
is some level of coordination in run-off elections. This chapter helps to explain the contradiction
by considering the effect of uncertainty and suggests this could be one reason why there is this
difference.
Alternative methods of studying the divided majority have been presented in papers by
Blais, Laslier, Laurent, Sauger, and Van der Straeten (2007) Blais, Labbé-St-Vincent, Laslier,
Sauger, and Van der Straeten (2011) Van der Straeten, Laslier, Sauger, and Blais (2010) using
the downs-Hotelling model, with more than 3 candidates. In using alternative structures my
work does not fit into these sections as clearly. Blais, Labbé-St-Vincent, Laslier, Sauger, and Van
der Straeten (2011) and Blais, Laslier, Laurent, Sauger, and Van der Straeten (2007) find that there
is less difference than expected between plurality and run-off. Though they do support the idea
that run-off leads to 3 viable candidates it does not appear to help extremists. As they give sym-
metrical voter distribution they make no statement about a divided majority as there is no clear
majority group. Van der Straeten, Laslier, Sauger, and Blais (2010) add to these findings to show
that under run-off and instant run-off election rules voters take heuristic voting methods as the
strategic decisions are found to be harder. Then Bouton, Castanheira, and Llorente-Saguer (2016)
uses a state of the world signal to compare the two systems to compare information aggregation.
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1.2.4 Abstention Literature
A central question in this chapter is how voters in round one respond to uncertainty over partic-
ipation in round two. For such a question to arise it must be the case that voters will abstain in
one or both elections. There are many reasons this happens and this is by no means an exhaus-
tive list. The first reason to consider is an external shock that occurs on one of the election days.
For example, Gomez, Hansford, and Krause (2007) investigate the effect of weather on voting
level and find that rain reduces participation in presidential elections at 1% per inch of rain.
Snow shows a smaller but equally significant effect. Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) investi-
gated the importance of social pressure on voter turnout and found a profound effect on turnout
when participation is public. This social pressure can change between the rounds and based on
the perceived importance of the round. Myatt (2015) makes similar theoretical predictions about
the effect of election importance on turn out. The importance of each round can vary based on
perceived victory margin and the likelihood of selecting a winner. The importance of perceived
victory margin has been well documented in among others Shachar and Nalebuff (1999). Finally,
Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, and Hutchings (2011) presents an analysis of the
effect of emotion on voting decision using experiments, national surveys, and pooled data from
1980-2004 to argue that anger is a stronger motivator than anxiety or enthusiasm. Obviously,
people’s emotions can vary between election days.
This chapter does not make a claim to predict abstention or explain it but uses its existence, as
seen in one way or another in these papers, to motivate uncertainty that is implied by abstention
in run-off elections.
1.3 Model
The model in this paper is an altered version of the model in Bouton (2013) of two round elec-
tions with runoff. In Bouton (2013) the electorate,N, is distributed according to a Poisson dis-
tribution of mean n : N ∼ P(n). This distribution lends itself to large electorates as shown by
Myerson (1998, 2000). These large electorates do not lend themselves to laboratory experiments.
Instead the model will consider a fixed electorate. The details of this electorate are defined later
in this section. The subsequent equilibria are solved in 1.4.
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1.3.1 Players, Candidates, and Preferences
The model here is an extensive form game with two voting rounds. Voting in each round is
simultaneous. The finite set N represent the players, hereafter called voters. The number of
individual voters, i, will equal n.
i ∈ N = {1, 2, ...n}
The election has three candidates and the set of candidates is Ω. An individual candidate is ω.
ω ∈ Ω = {A, B, C}
There are a set of types, T10. A type defines the utility, U, a voter gets from the outcome, O,
which is the candidate that wins. The focus of this chapter is the divided majority. As such, the
voter’s type , t, will be one of three specific utilities. U(O|t) equals the utility a voter of type t
gets from an outcome O. There are three outcomes, O = (A), (B) or(C)
t ∈ T = {α, β,γ}
α : U(A|α) > U(B|α) > U(C|α)
β : U(B|β) > U(A|β) > U(C|β)
γ : U(C|γ) > U(A|γ) = U(B|γ)
Value ti, is a player’s type. The number ηt, represents the number of voters of a given type ,t,
in the electorate. The types will be distributed in a similar way to the first example from Myerson
and Weber (1993)11. The γ type voter will represent a strict minority of the electorate. The α
and β type voters will represent an equal 50/50 split of the remaining voters and collectively
represent a majority. Finally the γ type voters will represent a larger proportion of the electorate
than α and β type voters do on their own. This information is common knowledge.
ti ∈ T
ηt = (#i|ti = t)
ηγ <
n
2
ηα = ηβ
ηγ >
n
3 > ηα, ηβ
10These are the same types as in the stylized model in Bouton and Gratton (2015)
11The example in their paper uses proportions 0.3,0.3,0.4, the theory here is more generalised
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The election consists of two rounds r ∈ R = {1, 2}.
1.3.2 Histories
H is a set of finite sequences. Each member of H is a history and is terminal if a candidate
wins the election; the set of terminal histories is denoted Z. The set of actions available at some
non-terminal history h is denoted A(h).
The function P assigns to each non-terminal history a subset of players from N ∪ {c} and a
subset of candidates from the set Ω. P(h) is then the set of players who take an action after h. If
P(h) = c then chance determines the action.
All players participate in round one. All candidates are on the ballot. A voter then casts a
first round vote, v1i , for one of the three candidates. The set of actions are a vector of first round
votes,V1.
P(∅) = N , Ai(∅) = Ω ∀ i ∈ N
ai(∅) = v1i
V1 = (v11, v
1
2, ...v
1
n)
At any history h = (V1), there is a threshold τ ∈ [0, 1]. If in round one exactly one candidate
gets more than τ ∗ n votes, the outcome O of the election is victory for that candidate. The history
is terminal. If two candidates are above the threshold and one candidate has a strict majority the
outcome is victory for the candidate with a strict majority.
If no candidate wins in round one the game continues. For all histories h = (V1) ∈ H\Z; the
player is P(h) = c and a function fc draws a set of voters K, of size k ≤ n and a linear order of
set Ω from a uniform distribution on all such pairs.
For any non-terminal history, h = (V1, fc) (after any first round vote count that does not lead
to a terminal history and after the function fc), P(h) assigns the set K to vote and selects two
candidates ω′ and ω′′ to be on the ballot.
P(V1, fc) = K , Ai(V1, fc) = {ω′,ω′′} ∀ i ∈ K
ω′ and ω′′ are chosen such that neither is the unique candidate with the lowest vote share
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in the first round. When two candidates have the equal lowest vote share, ω′ will be neither
of these candidates. Then ω′′ is the higher ranked candidate, among the candidates tied with
minimal vote share, according to the random draw generated by fc12.
In round two, the outcome, O, of the election is that the candidate with the most votes wins
the election. If there is a tie, then the candidate ranked higher by fc wins.
1.3.3 Strategy
A voter’s mixed strategy, σi, is a probability measure over the set of player i’s pure strategies,
for each non-terminal history for voters when i ∈ P(h).
σi : T × {H\Z} → ∆{A, B, C} s.t.

σi(t, (∅))→ ∆{A, B, C}
σi(t, (V1, fc))→ ∆{ω′,ω′′}
(1.1)
1.3.4 Equilibrium Concept and Refinements
The equilibrium concept used is a symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with elimination of
weakly dominated strategies.
The beliefs of the voter here are over the probability attributed to each possible voting pop-
ulation in round two. Voters are selected at random as defined above so with a known n and k
the probability of different voting populations can easily be calculated13.
The strategies must be sequentially rational (optimal in expectations given the beliefs) and
consistent (updated according to the strategies and Bayes’ rule on any path that has a positive
12 This chapter excludes a three-way tie in round one as in no treatment of the experiment is n3 a whole number so
a three-way tie is not possible. This condition is not necessary for the results.
13An example of this calculation for the values of n and k used in the experiment are given in appendix B
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probability).
The symmetry refinement means that players of the same type will choose the same strate-
gies in equilibrium. Then equation 1.1 is defined by the player’s type:
σ : T × (H\Z)→ ∆{A, B, C} s.t.

σ : T × (∅)→ ∆{A, B, C}
σ : T × (V1, fc)→ ∆{ω′,ω′′}
The third refinement will be the indifference refinement: that when a voter is indifferent
over two actions their strategy will be to mix these strategies equally e.g. if a voter is indifferent
between candidates A and B their strategy will be (0.5, 0.5, 0). From this sincere voting can be
defined.
Definition 1.1. A voting strategy can be defined as sincere at any given non-terminal history.
A strategy of sincere voting is pure strategy (e.g. (1, 0, 0)) voting for the candidate that, if they
win, maximises utility. When a voter has multiple candidates that maximise their utility a sincere
voting strategy is a mixed strategy where all candidates that maximise their utility have an equal
probability of being voted for (e.g. (0.5, 0.5, 0)).
Two equilibria of specific interest in this chapter are the sincere voting equilibrium and the
Duverger Law Equilibrium.
Definition 1.2. A sincere voting equilibrium round is a round of voting where the strategy of
sincere voting is an equilibrium for all voters in that round.
Definition 1.3. The Duverger Law Equilibrium round is an equilibrium in which only two can-
didates get a positive proportion of the votes cast in a given round.
As weakly dominated strategies are eliminated, it is only necessary to consider cases when a
voter can change the outcome of an election. This will be defined as a pivotal vote.
Definition 1.4. A voter is pivotal if changing the probability with which they vote for the set
of candidates changes the probability of an outcome in the game. A voter can be pivotal in
changing the candidate that wins the election in either round one or round two. A voter can also
be pivotal if they change one or both candidates that progress to round two.
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1.4 Theoretical Results
1.4.1 Second Round equilibrium
Theorem 1.1. All subgames that start at history h ∈ H\(∅) have a unique equilibrium
In round two there are two candidates and the election is a winner takes all plurality. It has
been shown in Besley and Coate (1997) that when weakly dominated strategies are eliminated
the only strategy that remains for all players is the sincere voting strategy. This is a pure strategy
for the candidate that maximises their utility of the remaining candidates. For voter γ when A
and B remain due to the indifference refinement their strategy is (0.5, 0.5, 0).
At the history h = (V1) where h ∈ H\Z the function fc randomly picks the set of voters, K,
to participate in the next round. These voters all vote sincerely therefore the winner depends
only on P(V1, fc). If the two candidate that remain are ω and ω′ then ω wins if the function fc
selects more voters that prefer ω to ω′ to be part of the set K than those who prefer ω′ to ω. The
probability that a given distribution of types is drawn is known. As such the probability that an
outcome occurs is known.
After the voting in round one either one of three outcomes occur, O = (A), (B), (C) or one
of three second round sub games occur (AB), (AC), (BC) and each has a unique equilibrium14.
For the first three there is a known outcome and for the last three a lottery over two winners
with known probabilities.
The table below gives the strategy taken by each type in the unique symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with elimination of weakly dominated strategies for each possible round
two.
TABLE 1.1: Voting strategy by type in the unique symmetrical Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in round two
Type, t, Second round candidates
A against B (AB) A against C (AC) B against C (BC)
α (1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
β (0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0)
γ (0.5, 0.5, 0) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1)
14(A), (B) and (C) are all outcomes at terminal histories and have no subgame
16 Chapter 1. Does the Runoff Election Solve the Coordination Problem?
As each subgame that follow on from the (∅) history has a unique equilibrium the rest of
the results will focus on the normal form game that arises from the first round choices and the
equilibrium that follow them.
1.4.2 The equilibrium strategy for γ type voters
Theorem 1.2. At h = (∅) all γ type voter’s have a unique equilibrium strategy of (0, 0, 1).
Proof: In all cases a γ type voter is pivotal; voting C is a best response. With elimination of
weakly dominated strategies (0, 0, 1) is the only strategy that remains. All pivotal cases are now
presented15.
Case 1: When two candidates, ω and ω′, are above the threshold the election moves to
subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′}. Both candidates have a strictly positive
probability of winning16, O = (ω) or O = (ω′). A voter is pivotal when a deviation takes a
candidate ω′ below the threshold leading to candidate ω winning, O = (ω) in round one.
1A) When ω = C and ω′ = A, B the outcome with the deviation, O = (ω), gives a higher
utility than without deviation where the game moves to the sub game h = (V1, fc). In a posi-
tive proportion of the sub games the outcome is O = (ω′) and this outcome is worse than the
outcome O = (ω). When ω = C the best response of the γ type voter will be to vote for ω.
1B) When ω = A, B and ω′ = C the outcome with the deviation, O = (ω), gives a lower
utility than without deviation where the game moves to the sub game h = (V1, fc). In a positive
proportion of the sub games the outcome is O = (ω′) and this outcome is better than the out-
come O = (ω). When ω = A, B and ω′ = C the best response of the γ type voter will be to not
vote for ω.
1C) When ω,ω′ 6= C. The outcome with deviation, O = (ω), gives the same utility as the
outcome without the deviation, where the game moves to the sub game h = (V1, fc). When
ω = A, B and ω′ 6= C the γ type voter is indifferent between all actions. In summary of case 1
15When pivotal a voter can choose to deviate. It is assumed that candidate ω′ is the candidate the voter deviates
away from for readability and ω is the candidate deviated to
16unless K = N in round two then candidate A or candidate B win with certainty against candidate C who loses
with certainty
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the best response of the γ type voter is to change their vote to ω when ω = C and to not change
their vote toω when ω = A, B.
Case 2: When one candidate, ω′, is above the threshold the outcome is victory for this can-
didate; O = (ω′). A voter is pivotal when a deviation takes ω′ below the threshold and the
election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′}.
2A) When ω = C and ω′ = A, B deviation leads to subgame h = (V1, fc), there are are a
positive proportion of subgames where ω and ω′ win the election. This gives a higher utility
than the outcome without the deviation, O = (ω′). When ω = C the best response of the γ type
voter is to vote for ω.
2B) When ω = A, B and ω′ = C deviation leads to subgame h = (V1, fc), there are are
a positive proportion of subgames where ω and ω′ win the election. This gives a lower utility
than the outcome without the deviation, O = (ω′). When ω = A, B and ω = C the best response
of the γ type voter will be to not vote for ω.
2C) When ω,ω′ 6= C deviation leads to subgame h = (V1, fc), there are are positive a propor-
tion of subgames where ω and ω′ win the election. This gives the same utility as the outcome
without deviation, (ω′). When ω = A, B and ω′ 6= C the γ type voter is indifferent between all
actions. In summary of case 2 the best response of the γ type voter is to change their vote to ω
when ω = C and not change their vote to ω when ω = A, B.
Case 3: As with case 2; one candidate ω′ is above the threshold. A voter is pivotal if can take
another candidate, ω, above the threshold. In such a case the deviation to ω takes that candidate
above the threshold and the same subgame as case 2 occurs, h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) =
{ω,ω′}. Without deviation the same outcome as case 2 occurs therefore the same results as
before follow17.
Case 4: When no candidates are above the threshold the top two candidates, ω, ω′ move to
the second round and this leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′}. A voter
is pivotal when a deviation takes a candidate, ω, above the threshold leading to ω winning,
17A deviation away from ω′ to ω can take ω′ below the threshold and take ω above the threshold at the same time,
in this case the outcome changes from (ω′) to (ω) and if (ωω′) is preferred to (ω′) then (ω) is preferred to (ω′). The
same results then follow.
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O = (ω). This has the same results as case 1.
Case 5: When deviation away from ω′ puts that candidate last the election leads to subgame
h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′′} where ω′′ is the third candidate.
5A) When ω′′ = C, deviation leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′′},
there are a positive proportion of subgames where ω and ω′′ win the election. Not deviating
leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′}, there are a positive proportion of
subgames where ω and ω′ win the election. As outcome ω′′ is preferred to the outcome ω and
ω′ for the γ type voter then their best response is to vote for ω′′.
5B) When ω′′ = A, B and ω′ = C deviation leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that
Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′′}. There are a positive proportion of subgames where ω and ω′′ win the
election. Not deviating leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′}, there are
are positive proportion of subgames where ω and ω′ win the election. As outcome ω′ is pre-
ferred to the outcome ω and ω′′ for the γ type voter then their best response is to not change
their vote.
5C) When ω′′ = A, B and ω = C deviation leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that
Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′′}, there are a positive proportion of subgames where ω and ω′′ win the
election. There are a positive proportion of subgames where ω and ω′′ win the election. Not
deviating leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′}, there are a positive
proportion of subgames where ω and ω′ win the election. As candidate ω wins in the same
proportion of subgames with and without deviation and the utility from the outcomes ω′ and
ω′′ are equal the γ type voter is indifferent between deviating and not deviating.
When a γ voter’s best response is to deviate from a strategy it is away from voting for A or
B to vote for C. With elimination of weakly dominated strategies the γ type voter’s strategy at
h = (∅) is (0, 0, 1). 
1.4.3 Dominated Strategies for the α and β type voters
Theorem 1.3. At the empty set voting for candidate A weakly dominates voting for candidate C for all
α type voters. At the empty set voting for candidate B weakly dominates voting for candidate C for all
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β type voters. In equilibrium all α type voters and β type voters will vote for candidate C with zero
probability. σ((∅), α, C) = 0, σ((∅), β, C) = 0.
Proof: In the proof to theorem 1.2 it was shown that the γ voter votes for C in all equilibrium
as they strictly prefer candidate C to candidate A and candidate B. This proof did not consider
cases where voting for C effected the probability that candidate A or candidate B win when
the probability that candidate C winning did not change. e.g. When candidate C is one of two
candidates in round two and a deviation can change if candidate A or candidate B are the other
candidate. As in such cases the probability that candidate C wins is unchanged and the γ type
voter is indifferent between candidate A and candidate B. The proof to theorem 1.2 proves that
the γ type voter will vote for C as such a vote increases the probability that candidate C wins.
The same logic can also be used to prove that the α and β type voters will prefer to vote for A and
B respectively as in doing so they decrease the probability that candidate C wins. To compete
the proof that voting C is weakly dominated by voting for A and B respectively it is necessary
to consider the cases where deviation to or from C does not increase or decrease the probability
that candidate C wins but does effect the probability that A or B win.
Firstly, when ω = (C), if a deviation to or from C changes candidate ω′ in the subgame
h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′} this could improve the utility of the α or β type
vote18. Secondly, if deviation to or from C changes from the outcome O = (A) to the outcome
O = (B) or the sub game h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, B}, or from the outcome
O = (B) to the outcome O = (A) or the sub gameh = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, B}, or
finally from the subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, B} to the outcome O = (A) or
O = (B). 19. Using the fact that all γ voters vote C and that the γ voters represent strictly more
than one third of the population; it is shown that these two additional cases either never occur
or that deviating to C is weakly dominated by an alternative deviation.
As the γ voters represent over one third of the population and all γ voters vote C candidate
C will get at least 13 of the votes cast and they can never be last. The subgame h = (V
1, fc)
18the γ voter is indifferent between the subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C} and the subgame
between h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {B, C} as the probability that the population drawn gives C a majority
is the same in both cases. The α type voter prefers the sub game h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C} to the
subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {B, C} and the beta voter has the opposite preferences
19 the γ type voter is indifferent between these two outcomes and the subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) =
{A, B} but the α and β type voters are not
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such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, B} can not occur. This eliminates the second cases that needed to be
considered.
When ω = (C) for a deviation to C to change ω′ in the subgame h = (V1, fc) such that
Ai(V1, fc) = {ω,ω′} it must change the candidate that comes second. When two candidates
are above the threshold this is not possible as C is already above the threshold so deivation to
C can not take another candidate above the threshold. Assume the subgame prior to deviation
is ω′ = A. A deviation from A to C takes candidate A below the threshold but it will not
take candidate B above the threshold and the outcome is O = (C) as candidate C is the only
candidate above the threshold. The outcome of the deviation, O = (C), gives a lower utility
than the outcome without the deviation for an α or β type voter.
Alternatively, no candidate is above the threshold20. Assume the outcome prior to deviation
is that candidate A and C are the candidates with the most votes but neither passes the threshold
this leads to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C}. A deviation from A to C leads
to candidate A having fewer votes than candidate B (or equal). The outcome is now candidate B
and candidate C having the most votes, subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {B, C}. For
a β type voter this is better than subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C}. However,
this outcome can also be achieved by deviating to B which is strictly better in one or more of the
other cases discussed. Therefore voting for C is weakly dominated by voting for B for the β type
voter. The same logic holds for the α voter.
Using elimination of weakly dominated strategies; the best response of the α and β type voter
is to never vote C at h = (∅). 
At this point the strategies of the γ type voter have been fully characterised; all γ type voters
always vote for C. The α and β type voters will only choose between A and B. There are 4
feasible Symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibria to analyse. 1) all α and β type voters vote for A,
2) all α and β type voters vote for B, 3) all α type voters vote for A and all β type voters vote
for B and 4) all α type voters vote B and all β type voters vote B. The next three theorems cover
these 4 Symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibria.
The cases 1 and 2 are both Duverger Law equilibria. Case 3 is, under a set of necessary
20The cases where one candidate is above the threshold is not relevant as the starting outcome is O = (A), (B), (C)
not O = (AC), (BC).
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conditions which will be defined, a sincere equilibria. Case 4 is completely insincere voting
where all α and β type voters are not sincere. This is an equilibrium under a set of necessary
conditions which will be defined.
1.4.4 Existence of Duverger’s Law equilibrium
Theorem 1.4. The Duverger Law equilibrium exists for all threshold levels and any level of uncertainty.
When all α and β type voters vote for A the outcome is O = (A). Candidate A has all
the votes from type α and β and this represents an absolute majority. Therefore regardless of
the threshold level candidate A exceeds the threshold level. When candidate C also exceeds
the threshold level, ηγ > τ ∗ n, candidate A will still win as they also pass the strict majority
threshold and candidate C does not.
The outcome, O = (A), is the best possible outcome for α type voters; there is no possible
deviation that can increase their utility. The β type voters would prefer the outcome O = (B).
If a β type voter deviates to B candidate B will now have one vote. They remain the candidate
with the least votes. The deviation will not lead to O = (B). However if candidate A was less
than one vote above the threshold21 the election will move to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that
Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C}. In this subgame candidate C has a positive probability of winning the
election (except in the case where P(V1, fc) = N and all voters vote in round two and candidate
A still wins with certainty ). The expected outcome of this subgame is therefore worse than the
outcome without deviation O = (A). So no voter benefits from deviation and the Duverger Law
outcome is an equilibrium. This result holds under the same logic when candidate B receives all
the α and β type voters votes. 
1.4.5 Existence of Sincere equilibrium
Theorem 1.5. The sincere equilibrium exists for any level of uncertainty and as long as ηα, ηβ ≤ τ ∗ n−
1.
21or one vote above a strict majority when candidate C is above the lower threshold
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All α type voters vote for A and all β type voters vote for B. When ηγ > τ ∗ n the outcome
is O = (C). When ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n as ηα = ηβ the election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that
Ai(V1, fc) = {ω, C} where ω is chosen by the random draw fc and is A or B. Candidate A and
B have an equal probability of reaching round two.
When ηγ > τ ∗ n the outcome is O = (C). This is the worst possible outcome for the α and β
type voters. If a single α type voter deviates to B then candidate B now has a vote total of ηβ+ 1.
If ηβ + 1 > τ ∗ n the election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {B, C} and
both candidates have a positive probability of winning. This outcome is preferable to O = (C)
and sincere voting is not an equilibrium. The same result holds if a β type voter deviates to A.
If ηβ + 1 ≤ τ ∗ n then the outcome of the election is still O = (C) and deviation has no effect.
In this case sincere voting is an equilibrium as both voting types cannot deviate and change the
outcome of the election. Therefore when ηγ > τ ∗ n there is a sincere equilibrium if and only if
ηα, ηβ ≤ τ ∗ n− 1.
When ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n the election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω, C}
where ω is chosen by the random draw fc and is A or B. Candidate A and B have an equal
probability of reaching round two. As ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n and ηγ > ηα, ηβ a single deviation by the α and
β type voter cannot take A or B above the threshold. If an α type voter deviates to B candidate
B has strictly more votes than candidate A. Candidate A therefore has strictly the least votes of
the three candidates. The election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {B, C}.
The α type voters strictly prefer the subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C} which
occurred with 50% probability without deviation. The expected outcome of the election is now
worse for the α type voter. Therefore they will not deviate to B. The same result holds if a β type
voter deviates to A. So when ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n and by extension ηα, ηβ ≤ τ ∗ n− 1 there is always a
sincere equilibrium. 
Theorem 1.6. Complete insincere voting is an equilibrium if and only if ηγ > τ ∗ n and ηα, ηβ ≤
τ ∗ n− 1
All α type voters vote B and all β type voters vote A. When ηγ > τ ∗ n the outcome is
O = (C). When ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n as ηα = ηβ the election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that
Ai(V1, fc) = {ω, C} where ω is chosen by the random draw fc and is A or B. Candidate A and
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B have an equal probability of reaching round two.
When ηγ > τ ∗ n the outcome is O = (C). This is the worst possible outcome for the α and β
type voters. If a single α type voter deviates to A then candidate A now has a vote total of ηβ+ 1.
If ηβ + 1 > τ ∗ n the election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C} and
both candidates have a positive probability of winning. This outcome is preferable to O = (C)
and completely insincere voting is not an equilibrium. If ηβ + 1 ≤ τ ∗ n then the outcome of
the election is still O = (C) and deviation has no effect. The same result holds if a β type voter
deviates to B. In this case sincere voting is an equilibrium as both voting types cannot deviate
and change the outcome of the election. Therefore when ηγ > τ ∗ n there is an equilibrium
where all voters are insincere if and only if ηα, ηβ ≤ τ ∗ n− 1.
When ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n the election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that Ai(V1, fc) = {ω, C}
where ω is chosen by the random draw fc and is A or B. Candidate A and B have an equal
probability of reaching round two. As ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n and ηγ > ηα, ηβ a single deviation by the
α and β type voter can not take A or B above the threshold. If an α type voter deviates to
A candidate A has strictly more votes than candidate B. Candidate B therefore has strictly
the least votes of the three candidates. The election moves to subgame h = (V1, fc) such that
Ai(V1, fc) = {A, C}. The α type voters strictly prefer this subgame to the subgame h = (V1, fc)
such that Ai(V1, fc) = {B, C} which occurred with 50% probability without deviation. The
expected outcome of the election is now better for the α type voter. Therefore they will deviate
to A. The same result holds if a β type voter deviates to B. So when ηγ ≤ τ ∗ n there is no
equilibrium where all voters are insincere. 
One assumption in this chapter thus far has been that the equilibrium is symmetric. All
voters of a given type vote the same way in equilibrium. If this condition is dropped the sincere
equilibrium and the Duverger’s Law equilibrium are no longer the only equilibrium that exist.
A third type of non-symmetric equilibrium exist. Like the sincere equilibrium these equilibrium
only exist under a specific set of conditions. However these conditions are not on the distribution
of voter types but instead the distribution of votes. The necessary distribution of votes for a non-
symmetric equilibrium to exist are defined in appendix C.
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1.5 Experimental Procedure and Design
All sessions were run in the Economics computer lab at Royal Holloway University of London.
The experiment was programmed and conducted by myself22 using z-tree software Fischbacher
(2007). Subjects were all students from the university from a range of academic disciplines as
well as being both UG and PG students. A session was run over roughly 60 - 90 minutes de-
pending on subject response speed. Subjects were paid an attendance fee of £6 and 6 payments
selected at random from the session. The payment related to the outcome of elections as shown
in table 1.2. Subject payments ranged from £10.20 to £15 with an average of £12.66.
The experiment was run over 12 sessions. 6 sessions with 16 subjects and 6 sessions with 8
subjects. A total of 144 subjects participated in the experiment and no individual participated
multiple times. There were a total of 6 treatments with each subject participating in 3 of the
treatments. Table 1.3 in section 1.5.2 summarises the breakdown of treatments. Within each
treatment there were 9 periods. This gives a total of 27 periods per session. Each period is a
separate election and an election consists of 8 subjects. In the large sessions with 16 subjects
they were split in half at the start of the session and these groups remained the same throughout
the session. The experiment had a total of 18 independent observations of voting groups.
Each period within a treatment is run identically and explained here. Prior to a treatment
starting all rules are read out and subjects take a short quiz to check understanding.
1.5.1 Experimental Period
The basic design that tests majority requirement with full round two participation was similar
to those previously run by Morton and Rietz (2007) which compared the majority requirement
to plurality. As part of the literature on divided majority this experiment builds on the design
from Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993, 1996). The number of subjects is the same as
those used in these experiments23.
A period starts with the allocation of type to each subject. A subject is either of type α or type
β. Subjects will now be defined as type α voters or type β voters in a given period. The third type
22 My thanks to Doctor Bjoern Hartig for his help and advice in setting up the experiment
23with the exception of the lower γ as the effect of this is what is of interest
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of voter, type γ, have a dominant strategy and will be computer simulated similar to a number
of previous studies, Bouton, Castanheira, and Llorente-Saguer (2016, 2017), Battaglini, Morton,
and Palfrey (2008, 2010). Morton and Tyran (2012) have shown that one group’s preferences are
not affected by the preferences of another group. Simulating type γ votes should therefore not
affect the behavior of type α or type β voters.
There are 8 subjects and 4 are allocated type α and 4 type β. These types are allocated ev-
ery period. There will be 5/6 γ type voters depending on treatment. This gives an election
population of 13/14 voters.
There are three candidates, A, B and C and each type of voter has a given preference rela-
tionship over these three types as shown in the set-up section. Table 1.2 gives the corresponding
monetary payments the subjects see. All payments are in pounds. The numbers were selected
to reflect similar relative payments from similar experiments and with the aim of an average
hourly earnings of £10.
TABLE 1.2: Subject’s payoff table from the experiment
Type A B C # of voters
α 1.50 1.20 0.20 4
β 1.20 1.50 0.20 4
Subjects are not given the payoffs for the simulated voters but are told that all γ type voters
are indifferent between A and B and strictly prefer C. They are also told that these voters will
always vote for C24.
Of the nine periods per treatment two will be selected at random and the payment made in
those two periods are what the subjects receive. This table is common knowledge and appears
on each screen that subjects see.
Subjects will be asked to participate in a pre-election poll. The experiment asks whether
subjects co-ordinate, the poll allows for a simple definition of co-ordination at the voter level.
This is expanded on in 1.5.2.
In the poll they get 4 choices, Vote A, Vote B, Vote C, or abstain. Abstention is allowed in
the poll to allow for an additional signal. If one voter abstains this leads to 7 votes (by subjects
24due to the number of γ type voters and the fact they all vote for C in round one there is no round two where C
will not be an option, therefore the γ voter never has to chose between A and B
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ignoring simulated votes). If all other voters vote for A or B this guarantees a poll leader. There-
fore a voter who is unsure whether a poll will give a definitive leader can abstain. Including it
here allows us to investigate if subjects consider this and if such a signal is successful.
A vote in the poll is not binding in regard to the round one vote. Finally, the result of the poll
and their vote in the poll have no effect on the payments they receive. All of this is made clear
to them prior to the experiment.
The result of the poll is then made public to everyone regardless of if they voted or not.
Subjects see the total number of poll votes for each candidate but do not see who voted for each
candidate or the types of those who voted for each candidate. All γ types will vote for C and
this is known.
The election now begins. Voters are asked to vote in round one of the election. As in Guar-
naschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) voting is compulsory and abstention is not allowed 25.
After everyone has voted, subjects see a screen telling them the number of votes each candidate
has received. If a candidate wins the election, depending on the threshold as explained in the
setup, the period ends and subjects are told the result and move to the next period.
If the necessary conditions are not met the election moves to round two. The candidate with
the least votes is eliminated and subjects are told this. At this stage subjects, depending on
treatment, are either asked to vote in round two or are sent to a wait screen till round two is
finished.
All those selected will vote again. A subject’s vote in this round does not have to be the same
as their vote in round one. The results of this vote are then shown to all voters regardless of if
they were asked to vote or not. This round will, by definition, have a winner. All subjects are
told the winner of the elections and the period is over. The screen goes to the next period wait
screen.
This completes the description of a single period. There is no wait time between periods
but at the end of a treatment (9 periods) the screen stops and the rules of the next treatment are
outlined. At the end of the 3rd treatment a final screen appears telling subjects how much they
25Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993, 1996) allowed for abstention for a similar divided majority game
under plurality and found abstention rate was only 0.65%
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have made in each treatment and a total for the session.
The next section outlines the treatment design within subject and between subjects.
1.5.2 Between-subject and Within-subject Design
TABLE 1.3: Summary of Treatments based on the 3 dimensions that define their
differences
Within subject variables
Threshold γ = 6 γ = 5
Level Certainty Uncertainty Uncertainty
Between 50 % MC6 MU6 MU5
Subject
Treatment Flexible FC6 FU6 FU5
Table 1.3 shows a subject will participate under either the 50% victory condition (absolute
majority required to win) or the flexible victory condition with a 50% threshold as well as the
lower 40% threshold.
Under one of these two victory conditions a subject will participate in 3 treatments within a
session. The 3 treatments are:
1. There are 6 γ type voter and all voters participate in round two (when reached).
2. There are 6 γ type voters and 5 are randomly chosen to participate in round two (from the
set of 14 voters). This creates uncertainty over who will participate in round two.
3. There are 5 γ type voters and 5 are randomly chosen to participate in round two (from the
set of 13 voters). This creates uncertainty over who will participate in round two (this risk
that the γ type voters are a round two majority is smaller )
The order that subjects participate in treatments was changed for each session such that each
treatment came first, second and third within a session an equal amount of the times.
The number of subjects that participated under the majority rule was equal to the number
that participated in the flexible rule. As such the number of groups that had each treatment first,
second and third was equal 26.
26there were 18 groups and each treatment came 1st 2nd and 3rd in the order 3 times
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1.5.3 Coordination
As discussed in section 1.4.4 there exist two equilibria where only two candidates get a positive
share of the vote27. These two Duverger equilibria exist when all subjects (representing all α and
β type voters) vote for A or B. These will be defined as the coordinated equilibria 28. This defines
coordination at the group level however the aim of the analysis in this chapter is to also consider
coordination at the individual level. To do this two forms of individual level coordination are
defined. A player can co-ordinate on the candidate that won the poll this period or the candidate
that won the election in the last period.
Definition 1.5. Poll coordinated (PC) voting: An individual makes a coordinated vote when
they vote for the candidate (between A and B) that has the most votes in the poll that occurred
before the election. When both candidates A and B have the same number of votes there is no
poll coordinated voting.
Definition 1.6. History coordinated (HC) voting: An individual makes a coordinated vote when
they vote for the candidate (between A and B) that won the last period’s election.
The results of the experiment will only present the Poll coordination. Having analyzed the
results for both coordination methods it was found that polling is a more successful coordina-
tion mechanism. A candidate winning the poll prior to an election was a better predictor of
voter action than the previous election result. Once irrelevant data is removed29 the correlation
between the winner of the last election and the candidate a player voted for was 0.2450 while
the correlation between the poll leader and the candidate a player voted for was much higher at
0.7164. The results when using the (HC) definition of coordinated voting gives similar results to
those presented but with lower significants.
1.6 Results
The results are broken down into the key theorems and the less important propositions that were
proved in section 1.4, the set of conjectures that come from the results of the experiment and
27excludes the case where only A and B get a positive share of the vote as γ type voters will always vote for C
28These are specific cases of Duverger equilibria, they are defined to separate them from alternative Duverger
equilibria
29For details about what data was removed and why see appendix
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predictions based on the payoffs in each treatment. These predictions are laid out prior to each
conjecture. Finally a set of propositions that test the less important theorems that were used to
reach the key theorems and the assumptions made regarding the effect of polling are presented.
Each theorem, conjecture or proposition is followed by the findings of the experiment that either
support or oppose the theorem, conjecture or proposition. Prior to this I give a summary of the
data.
1.6.1 Summary
As stated in 1.5.2 there were 6 treatments and each treatment represents a specific voting rule.
For each treatment 72 voters participated in that voting rule and there were 9 independent sets of
voters. Each independent set of voters voted 9 times under each election rule giving 81 elections
in total for each treatment: a total of 486 elections.
Candidate A won in 51.4% of the elections. Candidate B won in 28.2% of elections and candi-
date C in 20.4% of elections. The outcomes for each treatment is given in table 1.4 in percentage
terms and in brackets the number of elections this occurred.
TABLE 1.4: Summary of election winner by treatment
Outcome MC6 MU6 MU5 FC6 FU6 FU5 Total
A wins 48.1% 55.6% 40.7% 45.7% 51.9% 66.7% 51.4%
(39) (45) (33) (37) (42) (54) (250)
B wins 42.0% 21.0% 45.7% 28.4% 12.4% 19.8% 28.2%
(34) (17) (37) (23) (10) (16) (137)
C wins 9.9% 23.5% 13.6% 25.9% 35.8% 13.6% 20.4%
(8) (19) (11) (21) (29) (11) (99)
Part of these results come from random draws where candidates are tied so there is expected
to be some variation. With that in mind, candidate A’s odds of victory do not seem to be affected
much by threshold and the only case where a large effect is seen, is between MU5 and FU5.
This shows the effect of threshold with a small uncertainty. This rise is generated from a fall in
candidate B’s odds of victory. This suggests that uncertainty is having an effect on coordination,
as players coordinate to mitigate the effect of a lower threshold. This effect is not prevalent when
considering the effect of lower thresholds under large uncertainty, or no uncertainty. The effect
seems to come from the fact that in FU5 the minority is not large enough to pass the variable
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threshold, but voters are coordinating as if they were. This decision at the voter level will be
expanded on in the main results.
Threshold does seem to have an effect on candidate C’s odds of victory, but only when can-
didate C can pass the variable threshold, suggesting this effect comes from round one upset risk
not round two upset risk.
The second summary we give is the occurrence of round two. This is only needed when
no candidate passes the variable threshold or two candidates pass the variable threshold and
neither passes the majority threshold. The election reaches the second round in 45% of periods.
The outcome for each treatment is given in table 1.5.
TABLE 1.5: Occurrence of the second round by treatment
Outcome MC6 MU6 MU5 FC6 FU6 FU5 Total
2nd round needed 86% 68% 56% 17% 30% 19% 46%
2nd round not needed 14% 32% 44% 83% 70% 81% 54%
There is a clear difference in the need for round two between treatments. The starkest is the
effect of the threshold under certainty (from MC6 to FC6). The need for round two falls by 69%
points. A similar but smaller effect is seen under uncertainty (from MU6toFU6), of roughly 38%
points. Uncertainty itself also has an effect but much smaller. It reduces the need for round two
by 18% points with just the majority threshold (from MC6 to MU6). This effect is not seen with
a lower threshold, suggesting that with a lower threshold, either coordination is insufficient to
avoid the upset risk, or coordination is complete and therefore takes A or B above the majority
threshold. We can see this from the fact that C does not win 83% of the elections but we know
they always pass the variable threshold.
1.6.2 Duverger’s Law Equilibria
Theorem 1.7. Duverger’s Law equilibria always exist under uncertainty and all thresholds. It exists in
all 6 treatments
The theoretical results here say that for any threshold and for any level of uncertainty there
must exist a Duverger’s Law equilibrium. It is predicted that such an equilibrium exists in all
6 treatments in this experiment30. It is important to class what results will be interpreted as a
30See Appendix G for the experimental example that shows Duverger’s Law equilibrium existence
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Duverger’s Law equilibrium. This chapter uses the same definition of a Duverger’s Law equi-
librium as Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993). Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber
(1993) suppose that all voters randomly select a candidate such that all candidates are equally
likely to be selected. The CDF for votes received by a single candidate is calculated and a one
sided test asking what vote totals make a candidate’s vote total significantly smaller than ex-
pected is carried out. With 14 voters and three candidates the random election gives an outcome
where at least one candidate gets 0 or 1 votes with 2.7% probability. The probability that at least
one candidate gets 0, 1 or 2 is 10.5%. Using these densities they reject the idea that a vote is
random in favour of a Duverger’s Law type effect if and only if at least one candidate gets 0 or
1 votes.
This chapter will use the same system but updated for our purposes. There are only 8 real
voters in this experiment not 14 therefore the corresponding probabilities are not the same.
Equally we have shown in the theory section that voters never select candidate C therefore we
treat random voting as a random vote between candidate A and candidate B. Using these con-
ditions the probability that candidate A or B gets 0 votes is 0.78% while the probability that
candidate A or B get 0 or 1 is 7.03%. Using these numbers I reject random voting in favour of a
Duverger’s Law type effect if and only if candidate A or B gets 0 votes. In the cases when this
happens we can be 99% confident that a Duverger’s Law type effect did happen as opposed to
a random effect.
Table 1.6 shows the percentage of elections where either candidate A or candidate B got zero
votes. Therefore it shows the percentage of elections where random voting is rejected in favour
of a Duverger’s Law type effect. This is broken down by treatment to allow fo comparison for
the prevalence of Duverger’s equilibrium when the threshold or uncertainty is changed. They
are also broken down by period to see if a Duverger’s Law equilibrium exists more at the start
or end of the treatment.
The first observation from the table is that a Duverger’s Law equilibrium exists in at least
10% of elections in all six treatments supporting the theorem that a Duverger’s Law equilibrium
always exists. Learning seems to have an effect; the occurrence of a Duverger’s Law equilibrium
increases by 8% from the first 3 rounds to the last 3 rounds. This suggest that as the players learn
the game better they start to coordinate on a single candidate and a Duverger’s Law equilibrium
occur more often. Breaking this down by treatment in five of the six treatments the occurrence
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of a Duverger’s Law equilibrium increases in the later periods. In the case of the (MU5), (FU6)
and (FU5) it is by a substantial percentage, 14.8%, 25.9% and 11.1% respectively. Uncertainty
seems to be something that takes voters longer to adapt to. The two treatments with certainty
do not see large changes in the occurrence of Duverger’s Law equilibria over time.
TABLE 1.6: The percentage of elections with Duverger’s Law equilibrium in the
first round of voting for each of the treatments
Percentage of elections that
ended in the Duverger equilibrium
Treatment All 9 Periods Period 1-3 Period 7-9
MC6 (Majority Threshold, 13.58% 11.11% 14.81%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
MU6 (Majority Threshold, 30.86% 37.04% 25.93%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
MU5 (Majority Threshold, 13.58% 7.41% 22.22%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
FC6 (Flexible Threshold, 58.02% 51.85% 55.56%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
FU6 (Flexible Threshold, 41.98% 33.33% 59.26%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
FU5 (Flexible Threshold, 34.57% 18.52% 29.63%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
All treatments 32.10% 26.54% 34.57%
Notes: Each treatment has 81 elections and 9 of the 18 independent groups participated in each treatment. The value is the percentage of times that either Duverger’s Law
equilibrium exists, where candidate A or B get zero votes in the first round of the election.
Duverger’s Law equilibria are most prevalent in FC6 (58.02%) and least prevalent in MC6 (13.6%)
and MU5 (13.6%). This suggest that moving from the Majority threshold to the flexible thresh-
old is increasing the occurrence of Duverger’s Law equilibria especially when there is certainty
about the second round voting population. This finding along with the payoff differences31
between reaching Duverger’s Law equilibria and the sincere equilibria (the other Symmetric
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria) informs conjecture 1.1.
A similar finding supports conjecture 1.2. Uncertainty seems to increase the occurrence of
the Duverger’s Law equilibria when there is a majority threshold ( comparing MC6 and MU6).
Here uncertainty reduces the payoffs expected from sincere voting as seen in appendix F. The
31see appendix F for details of the different payoffs from each treatment at each voting level
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opposite effect is found when there is just the majority threshold. This would seem to be due
to the extreme difference between MC6 and FC6. The importance of the threshold here seems
to outweigh the effect of the uncertainty. This result can be seen in table 1.7 and the interaction
effect of the two variables is discussed in the conjectures. Finally conjecture 1.3 is supported by
the fact that lowering the γ value reduces the occurrence of Duverger’s Law equilibria by 7.4%
and 17.3% respectively for the flexible threshold and the majority threshold.
While the theory in this chapter is silent about equilibrium selection based on the payoffs
from Duverger’s Law equilibria and the sincere equilibrium in each treatment, an informed
conjecture regarding comparative statics can be made. The rationale for these conjectures is
given below the conjecture and uses the summary of payoffs for each outcome in appendix F.
Three conjectures regarding the dimensions of the experiment are presented. Table 1.7 presents
the results to all three conjectures which are stated after the table.
TABLE 1.7: The Effect of threshold, uncertainty, and γ type group size on the prob-
ability that Duverger’s Law Equilibria exist
DV: Duverger’s Law Equilibrium Threshold effect & Threshold effect & Threshold effect &
probability of existence in Uncertainty effect Uncertainty effect with number of γ type
round one of an election interaction effect voter
Lowering the Threshold 0.278*** 0.444*** 0.209**
level (from 50% to 40%) (0.101) (0.111) (0.083)
Moving from Certainty 0.006 0.173*** -
to Uncertainty (0.04) (0.066) -
Threshold and Uncertainty - -0.333*** -
Interaction effect (moving from - (0.093) -
MC6toFU6)
Increasing the number - - 0.173**
of γ type voters - - (0.049)
Threshold and γ type voters - - -0.098
Interaction effect (moving from - - (0.098)
MC6toFU6)
Constant 0.219*** 0.136* 0.136**
(0.074) (0.078) (0.058)
Number of Observations 324 324 324
Notes: The Regression is a Random-effects GLS regression with Group Variable being the 18 independent voting groups. The results are the variables coefficient and standard
error. An Observation is a single election result. The number of observations equals total observations 3888 divided by 8 for total number of elections 486 times 23 as in each
specification 2 of the 6 treatments are not relevant
* : P value < 0.1 , ** : P value < 0.05 , *** : P value < 0.01
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Conjecture 1.1. The proportion of Duverger’s Law equilibria is increased by lowering the thresh-
old for first round victory when there are 6 γ type voters.
With and without uncertainty lowering the threshold leads to the minority candidate win-
ning the election unless at least 6 of the 8 voters vote for the same candidate. This means that the
sincere equilibrium gives a very low payoff. In comparing the payoffs, lowering the threshold
under certainty reduces the payoffs from 1.35 down to 0.2 for the sincere equilibrium. Under
uncertainty a similar reduction in payoff can be seen from 0.96 down to 0.2. This fall is smaller
but still significant.This incentivises voters to co-ordinate to Duverger’s Law equilibria. While a
single vote does not change this the conjecture here argues that at such a low payoff voters are
more likely to deviate and try to reach a Duverger Law equilibrium.
The first column in table 1.7 shows that lowering the threshold increases the probability of
Duverger’s Law equilibrium occurring by 27.8%, an effect that is significant at the 99% level.
This supports the idea that lowering the threshold incentivises voters to try to coordinate and
reach a Duverger’s Law equilibrium. More interestingly move to column two when the inter-
action effect between lowering the threshold and introducing uncertainty increases the effect of
the lower threshold to 44.4% showing that the effect of a lower threshold is greater when there
is certainty. Both this effect and the interaction effect are significant at the 99% level. Looking at
the change in payoff this is to be expected as the drop in payoff for the sincere equilibrium with
certainty is larger.
Conjecture 1.2. The proportion of Duverger’s Law equilibria is increased by introducing uncer-
tainty over the round two voters types.
With and without a lower threshold the introduction of uncertainty decreases the expected
return in round two (as candidate C is expected to win a positive proportion of second round
elections) and incentivises deviation to a Duverger’s Law equilibrium to win the election in
round one. The results only partially support this conjecture. Uncertainty has no effect without
the interaction effect. This suggests that the threshold effect is greater than the uncertainty effect
so without the interaction of these two the effect of uncertainty is absorbed. This can be ex-
plained mostly by the very large effect of lowering the threshold with certainty. This can be seen
when the interaction effect is included in column two. Uncertainty increases the probability of
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a Duverger’s Law equilibrium by 17.3% which is 99% significant. However this effect is smaller
than the interaction effect of 33.3% so while uncertainty has an effect it is not as large.
Conjecture 1.3. The proportion of Duverger’s Law equilibria is increased by increasing the num-
ber of γ type voters.
Increasing the number of γ voters to 6 means candidate C wins in round one unless at least
6 of the 8 voters vote for the same candidate. The expected payoff with a lower γ is 1.06 while
the payoff with a higher γ is 0.2 and 0.96 for the flexible threshold and majority threshold re-
spectively. This incentivises voters to co-ordinate to Duverger’s Law equilibria. The effect of
increasing the number of γ voters to 6 increases the probability of a Duverger’s Law equilib-
rium by 12.3% supporting the idea that with a larger minority support the likelihood of the
minority candidate winning increases and this incentivises the majority to coordinate and see a
rise in the occurrence of a Duverger’s Law equilibrium.
The number of γ types does seem to have an effect on the occurrence of the Duverger’s Law
equilibria. Increasing the number of γ types to 6 increases the occurrence of the Duverger’s Law
equilibria by 17.3%. This rise has an effect for the majority threshold and the flexible threshold
but the effect is stronger for the majority threshold. If the interaction effect is included this effect
of increasing γ to six goes down to 7%. One issue with this finding is that the interaction effect
while large is not significant and this makes interpreting the different effects with or without the
change in threshold harder.
1.6.3 The Sincere Equilibrium
Theorem 1.8. The Sincere equilibrium exist for all 6 treatments in the experiment.
The theory in this chapter proves that there exists a set of values for the threshold, uncer-
tainty and γ population parameters such that for all voters voting sincerely is not an equilib-
rium. None of the treatments in the experiment have the necessary parameter values such that
the sincere equilibrium will not exist32. The prediction is therefore that: The sincere equilibrium
should exist in each treatment. The same test of falsifying the null in favour of sincere voting
will be conducted here. The probability will measure the probability that a population of 8 will
32 see appendix H for the experimental example that shows sincere equilibrium existence
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all vote sincerely. The probability that 8 random voters vote sincerely given the two choices is
0.39% while the probability that 7 voters vote sincerely is 3.5%. Using these numbers I reject the
idea that a vote is random in favour of a sincere voting type effect if and only if all 8 voters are
sincere. In the cases when this happens we can be 99% confident that a sincere voting type effect
did happen as opposed to a random effect.
Table 1.8 shows the percentage of elections where all 8 voters are sincere. Therefore it shows
the percentage of elections where random voting is rejected in favour of a sincere voting type
effect. This is broken down by treatment to allow for comparison for the prevalence of the
sincere equilibrium when the threshold or uncertainty is changed. They are also broken down
by period to see if the sincere equilibrium exists more at the start or end of the treatment.
TABLE 1.8: The percentage of elections with a sincere equilibrium in the first round
of voting for each of the treatments
Treatment Percentage of elections that
ended in the sincere equilibrium
All 9 Periods Period 1-3 Period 7-9
MC6 (Majority Threshold, 25.93% 25.93% 29.63%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
MU6 (Majority Threshold, 6.17% 3.7% 7.41%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
MU5 (Majority Threshold, 19.75% 25.93% 14.81%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
FC6 (Flexible Threshold, 2.47% 0% 3.70%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
FU6 (Flexible Threshold, 0% 0% 0%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
FU5 (Flexible Threshold, 1.23% 0% 3.70%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
All treatments 9.26% 9.26% 9.88%
Each treatment has 81 elections and 9 of the 18 independent groups participated in each treatment. The value is the percentage of times that the sincere equilibrium exists,
where candidate A or B get zero votes in the first round of the election.
For the whole experiment the sincere equilibrium does exist in 9.26% of elections however
the distribution among treatments is not equal. The sincere equilibrium does not exist in treat-
ment FU6 and is very low in FC6 and FU5. This suggests that moving from the majority thresh-
old to the flexible threshold reduces the probability of the sincere equilibrium. This seems to
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suggest that the fact that the payoff for the sincere equilibrium with a flexible threshold is much
lower33 than the payoff for the Duverger’s Law equilibria is having an effect. This supports
conjecture 1.4 and will be expanded on there.
Uncertainty reduces the occurrence of the sincere equilibrium with certainty ( moving from
MC6 to MU6) from 25.93% to 6.17%. Introducing uncertainty reduces the payoff received from
the sincere equilibrium and this seems to incentivise coordination and supports conjecture 1.5.
The effect of γ on the sincere equilibrium is only found with the majority threshold. Increasing
the value of γ increases the occurrence of the sincere equilibrium. This supports conjecture 1.6
but does not support this conjecture when there is a flexible threshold as the expected fall is not
seen.
Finally the effect of learning is smaller than for the Duverger’s Law equilibria. The change
between the first three rounds and the last three rounds is much smaller. The occurrence only
changes by more than 5% in one treatment as it falls from 25.93% to 14.81% for MU5. This is
in part due to the lower occurrence in general but also suggests that if reached (or not reached)
voters do not learn more about the sincere equilibrium.
As previously stated the theory section is silent on equilibrium selection but again using
payoff from the different sincere equilibria in each treatment (see appendix F) a set of informed
conjectures regarding the comparative statics can be made. Again three conjectures are pre-
sented. Table 1.9 give the result of all three conjectures.
Conjecture 1.4. The proportion of sincere equilibria is decreased by lowering the threshold for
first round victory when there are 6 γ type voters.
For both certainty and uncertainty, lowering the threshold when there are 6 γ type voters
leads to candidate C winning the election in the sincere equilibrium. This removes the incentive
to remain sincere and voters have an incentive to try to get at least 6 votes for one of the two
candidates. The payoffs from the sincere equilibrium with a majority threshold are 1.35 and
0.96 for certainty and uncertainty respectively and both fall to 0.2 with a lower threshold (see
appendix F for values).
33see appendix F
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TABLE 1.9: The Effect of threshold, uncertainty, and γ type group size on the prob-
ability that the sincere equilibria exists
DV: Sincere Equilibrium Threshold effect & Threshold effect & Threshold effect &
probability of existence in Uncertainty effect Uncertainty effect with number of γ type
round one of an election interaction effect voter
Lowering the Threshold -0.148*** -0.235*** -0.123***
level (from 50% to 40%) (0.054) (0.061) (0.057)
Moving from Certainty -0.111*** -0.120*** -
to Uncertainty (0.028) (0.039) -
Threshold and Uncertainty - 0.173***
Interaction effect (moving from - (0.055)
MC6toFU6)
Increasing the number - - -0.074***
of γ type voters - - (0.024)
Constant 0.216*** 0.259*** 0.166***
(0.041) (0.043) (0.042)
Number of Observations 324 324 324
Notes: The Regression is a Random-effects GLS regression with Group Variable being the 18 independent voting groups. The results are the variables coefficient and standard
error. An Observation is a single election result. The number of observations equals total observations 3888 divided by 8 for total number of elections 486 times 23 as in each
specification 2 of the 6 treatments are not relevant
* : P value < 0.1 , ** : P value < 0.05 , *** : P value < 0.01
The results in column one of table 1.9 support this. The effect of moving from the major-
ity threshold to the flexible threshold is to reduce the occurrence of the sincere equilibrium by
14.8%. This effect is more pronounced once the interaction between threshold and uncertainty
is introduced (the difference between MC6 and FU6). This shows that the effect of threshold on
when there is certainty shown in column two is 23.5%. This makes sense as the effect on payoff
(a fall from 1.35 to 0.2) is largest here. The effect with uncertainty is much smaller once the in-
teraction effect is included ( 0.235 - 0.173 = 0.062, there a fall of 6.2%). This again makes sense as
the fall in payoff is smaller here (from 0.96 down to 0.2).
Conjecture 1.5. The proportion of sincere equilibria is decreased by introducing uncertainty
over the round two voters types.
For both thresholds introducing uncertainty increases the probability that candidate C wins
when all voters are sincere introducing an incentive to try to reach a point where candidate A or
B wins in round one.
This conjecture is partially supported by the data. In column one of table 1.9 introducing
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uncertainty does have an effect when there is a majority threshold. The occurrence falls by
11.1% for the whole study; however this effect disappears when the interaction effect is included.
Considering column 2 of table 1.9 the fall from MC6 to MU6 is 12% but the change from FC6 to
FU6 is negligible and is absorbed by the interaction effect. This suggests that as with the results
on Duverger’s Law equilibria the threshold effect outweighs the uncertainty effect.
Conjecture 1.6. The proportion of sincere equilibria is decreased by increasing the number of γ
type voters.
Increasing the number of γ type voters when there is a 40% threshold means that candidate
C wins in round one when there is a sincere equilibrium. This creates an incentive for the voters
to get one candidate at least 6 votes.
Column three in table 1.9 shows that increasing γ decreases the occurrence of the sincere
equilibrium. If the interaction effect is included (not shown in the table) the effect of γ is ab-
sorbed by the interaction effect. This can be explained by the fact that with a flexible threshold
the occurrence of the sincere equilibrium is extremely low in both cases so the floor for sincere
equilibrium occurrence has been reached.
1.6.4 Non-symmetric Equilibria
Under the Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium the sincere equilibrium and Duverger’s Law
equilibrium are the only equilibria. However if the Symmetric condition is dropped there is an-
other set of possible non-symmetric equilibria; the ’non-pivotal’ equilibria. At least one such
equilibrium exists in each treatment34. The existence of such equilibria can in part be explained
by error in the experiment but if they are significant it suggests that symmetry may be an unrea-
sonable assumption to make about the set of equilibria that exists.
Theorem 1.9. The non-symmetric equilibrium exists in all 6 treatments.
For this theorem there is no limit to be tested as there was for Duverger’s Law equilibria
(a candidate getting zero votes compared to random voting) or the sincere equilibrium (all 8
voters voting sincerely). Therefore the table below simply reports the percentage of the time
34see appendix I for the experimental example that shows non-symmetric equilibrium existence in all treatments
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that a non-symmetric equilibrium exists without being able to make a statistical claim about this
not being random. It will be the case that some of the occurrence of these equilibria will be due
to randomness making the results less concrete. Therefore the comparison here just considers
how the occurrences changes between treatments instead of making a claim about the existence
of an effect compared to randomness. Table 1.10 presents the occurrence of the non-symmetric
equilibria for each treatment.
TABLE 1.10: The percentage of elections with non-symmetric equilibrium in the
first round of voting for each of the treatments
Percentage of elections that
ended in the non-symmetric equilibrium
Treatment All 9 Periods Period 1-3 Period 7-9
MC6 (Majority Threshold, 19.8% 11.1% 18.5%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
MU6 (Majority Threshold, 14.8% 11.1% 11.1%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
MU5 (Majority Threshold, 23.5% 22.2% 33.3%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
FC6 (Flexible Threshold, 14.8% 22.2% 11.1%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
FU6 (Flexible Threshold, 6.1% 7.4% 0%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
FU5 (Flexible Threshold, 33.3% 44.4% 25.9%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
All treatments 18.7% 19.8% 16.7%
Notes: Each treatment has 81 elections and 9 of the 18 independent groups participated in each treatment. The value is the percentage of times that either Duverger’s Law
equilibrium exists, where candidate A or B get zero votes in the first round of the election.
The first finding to observe is that the non-symmetric equilibria occurs reasonably often, in
18.7% of elections. This is twice as often as the sincere equilibrium and about half as often as
the Duverger’s Law equilibria which is the most prevalent type of equilibrium. While it is not
possible to prove that this is not random this does suggest that voters are reaching these equi-
libria though they may not persist over time. Looking at the effect of learning there is no clear
theme. In three treatments (FC6, FU6 and FU5) the occurrence of the non-symmetric equilibria
goes down but in two treatments (MC6 and MU5) it goes up and in one treatment (MU6) it is
unchanged. It is worth noting that in the three treatments where the non-symmetric equilib-
rium occurs less over time there is a lower threshold. This coincides with a rise in Duverger’s
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Law equilibria which supports the findings in the rest of the chapter that lowering the threshold
seems to have a larger effect on the occurrence of Duverger’s Law equilibria and this seems in
part to come from a reduction in the occurrence of the non-symmetric equilibrium.
The possible conjecture regarding the effect of threshold level on non-symmetric equilib-
rium occurrence is not as clear as it was for a Duverger’s Law equilibrium or sincere equilib-
rium existence but one can still be made. As thresholds seem to have a large positive effect on
deviation to the Duverger’s Law equilibrium it is reasonable to assume that the occurrence of
the non-symmetric equilibrium will go down under a lower threshold (as the occurrence of the
Duverger’s Law equilibrium goes up). One caveat is worth including for this. In treatments
MU5 and FU5 a vote total of 7 votes for one majority candidate and one vote for the other
majority candidate is a non-symmetric equilibrium. These are the only treatments where this
is the case and as a lower threshold seems to increase the occurrence of Duverger’s Law equi-
librium it would be reasonable to assume that it also increases the probability of this type of
non-symmetric equilibrium. Therefore the effect of a lower threshold will be predicted to have
the opposite effect. These predictions are outlined in conjecture 1.7. Table 1.10 seems to support
these assumptions. Table 1.11 presents the results of conjecture 1.7 which is discussed after the
table.
The final conjecture, conjecture 1.8 regarding the non-symmetric equilibrium, aims to pre-
dict the effect of uncertainty. If we consider appendix I we see an outline of the vote shares
where the non-symmetric equilibrium exists35. Three of the treatments have 4 vote totals that
are non-symmetric equilibrium (MC6, FC6 and FU5) while three treatments have 2 vote totals
that are non-symmetric equilibrium ( MU6, MU5 and FU6). Of the treatments where there are
4 possible non-symmetric equilibrium two are under certainty. Their corresponding treatments
with uncertainty (where the only difference between the treatments is uncertainty) both only
have 2 vote totals that are non-symmetric equilibrium. So while the paper does not claim to
prove a specific equilibrium selection method there is a case to be made that the non-symmetric
equilibrium will occur less often under uncertainty. This is the final conjecture regarding the
non-symmetric equilibrium.
35The first set of non-symmetric equilibria are where candidates A or B have seven votes. This is a non-symmetric
equilibrium in MC6, MU5, FC6 and FU5. The second set of non-symmetric equilibria are when candidate A or B
have six votes. This is a non-symmetric equilibrium in MC6, MU6, FC6, FU6 and FU5.
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TABLE 1.11: The Effect of threshold, uncertainty, and γ type group size on the
probability that Non-symmetric Equilibria exist
DV: Non-symmetric Equilibrium Threshold effect & Threshold effect & Threshold effect when
existence probability in Uncertainty effect Uncertainty effect with the number of γ types
round one of an election interaction effect equals five
Lowering the Threshold -0.068 -0.049 -
level (from 50% to 40%) (0.042) (0.057) -
Moving from Certainty -0.068* -0.049 -
to Uncertainty (0.038) (0.053) -
Threshold and Uncertainty - -0.037 -
Interaction effect (moving from - (0.076) -
MC6toFU6)
Increasing the number - - 0.099
of γ type voters - - (0.088)
Constant 0.206*** 0.198*** 0.235***
(0.035) (0.076) (0.062)
Number of Observations 324 324 162
Notes: The Regression is a Random-effects GLS regression with Group Variable being the 18 independent voting groups. The results are the variables coefficient and standard
error. An Observation is a single election result. The number of observations equals total observations 3888 divided by 8 for total number of elections 486 times 23 as in
specification one and two 2 of the 6 treatments are not relevant. In specification three only 2 of the 6 treatments are relevant so there are only 162 observations.
* : P value < 0.1 , ** : P value < 0.05 , *** : P value < 0.01
Conjecture 1.7. The non-symmetric equilibrium occurs less often with a flexible threshold if
and only if there are six γ type voters. When there are five γ type voters the non-symmetric
equilibrium will occur more often with a flexible threshold.
As stated above this conjecture has less motivation than those regarding the sincere equilib-
rium and the Duverger’s Law equilibrium. This conjecture is based on the fact that a flexible
thresholds increase the occurrence of the Duverger’s Law equilibrium. With six γ type vot-
ers there is no non-symmetric equilibrium that is similar to the Duverger’s Law equilibrium
(no non-symmetric equilibrium where one majority candidate has 7 votes and the other has
1). For this reason the threshold is predicted to decrease the occurrence of the non-symmetric
equilibrium. With five γ type voters there is a non-symmetric equilibrium where one majority
candidate has 7 votes and the other has 1 and therefore the flexible threshold should increase
the occurrence of the non-symmetric equilibrium. Table 1.11 shows that the effect of the flexible
threshold does have the sign that is expected. It is negative with six γ types and positive with
five γ types. Beyond this though the table does not support the conjecture. None of these effects
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are significant due in large part to large standard errors. As this conjecture has the weakest jus-
tification it is perhaps not surprising that this conjecture has the weakest support from the data.
So while these non-symmetric equilibrium do seem to exists (see table 1.10) there seems to be
limited evidence that changing the threshold has a significant effect.
Conjecture 1.8. The non-symmetric equilibrium occurs less often when there is uncertainty
about who votes in the second round of the election.
The reasoning for this conjecture relates to the number of vote totals that represent non-
symmetric equilibria. There are more vote totals that represent non-symmetric equilibria when
there is certainty than when there is uncertainty. As with conjecture 1.7 this justification is
weaker than the justification for the conjectures that relate to the sincere equilibrium and the
Duverger’s Law equilibrium. Table 1.11 shows that uncertainty does have the negative effect
that is predicted. Introducing uncertainty decreases the occurrence of the non-symmetric equi-
librium by 6.8%. Unlike the effect of the flexible threshold this effect is significant but only at
the 90% level. So there is some support for this conjecture but the support from the data is again
weaker than the support for the earlier conjectures.
1.6.5 Non-equilibrium Outcomes
A non-equilibrium outcome is any set of vote totals such that at least one voter can increase their
payoff by changing their voting decision. In the theory section the non-equilibrium outcomes is
not expected to occur as the election is expected to be in equilibrium.
In experiments there is an element of learning involved and the equilibrium is not expected
to be reached in all cases. Table 1.12 shows the existence of non-equilibrium events where the
vote totals in the election are such that an α or β type voter can increase their payoff by changing
their vote in round one36.
Conjecture 1.9. In the experiment non-equilibrium outcomes will occur as voters make mis-
takes.
36Such an outcome can occur in the second round but in any such case a voter will be taking a dominated vote and
this is addressed in subsection 1.6.6.
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The first thing to note about this table is that non-equilibria outcomes occur often. The oc-
currence of non-equilibria outcomes ranges from 24.7% of elections to 51.8% of elections among
the treatments. This suggests as expected that voters do not act perfectly in the experiment and
do not reach equilibria outcome in all elections.
TABLE 1.12: The percentage of elections with non-equilibrium outcomes in the
first round of voting for each of the treatments
Percentage of elections that
ended in the non-equilibrium outcome
Treatment All 9 Periods Period 1-3 Period 7-9
MC6 (Majority Threshold, 40.7% 51.8% 37.0%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
MU6 (Majority Threshold, 48.1% 48.1% 55.5%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
MU5 (Majority Threshold, 43.2% 44.4% 29.6%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
FC6 (Flexible Threshold, 24.7% 25.9% 29.6%
Certainty and 6 γ types)
FU6 (Flexible Threshold, 51.8% 59.3% 40.7%
Uncertainty and 6 γ types
FU5 (Flexible Threshold, 30.8% 37.0% 40.7%
Uncertainty and 5 γ types
All treatments 39.9% 44.4% 38.9%
Notes: Each treatment has 81 elections and 9 of the 18 independent groups participated in each treatment
The value is the percentage of times that the non-equilibrium exists,
The occurrence of non-equilibria outcomes is lowest in treatment FC6 which is also the treat-
ment that has the largest percentage of Duverger’s Law equilibrium outcomes. This suggests
that when Duverger’s Law equilibrium is most appealing (in terms of payoffs achieved at the
Duverger’s Law equilibrium compared to the sincere equilibrium) the non-equilibrium events
occur less often. In FC6 the payoff from the sincere equilibria and the non-equilibria adjacent
to the sincere equilibria (where one candidate gets 5 votes and the other gets 3) is 0.2 while
the payoff from the non-symmetric equilibria and the Duverger’s Law equilibria is either 1.5
or 1.2. With this in mind it is then surprising that the treatment with the largest non-equilibria
outcomes is FU6 as this has a similar cost to being sincere; however in this case a vote tally of
one candidate getting seven votes and the other getting one is not an equilibrium. This is the
most prevalent non-equilibrium outcome for this treatment suggesting voters see the benefit of
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reaching Duverger’s Law equilibria but fail to fully coordinate on it.
Conjecture 1.10. The proportion of non-equilibria outcomes will decrease during a treatment as
players better learn the game and select an equilibrium strategy.
It is expected that over time voters learn the game better so the non-equilibrium outcomes
should occur less frequently. All treatments have outcomes that are not equilibria37. Table 1.12
outlines the prevalence of non-equilibrium outcomes in each treatment over time.
The occurrence of non-equilibrium outcomes can be seen in table 1.12 falling by 5.5% from
the first three periods to the last three periods. This fall is not as large as expected from learning.
Yet another form of learning does seem to happen and be more important: learning between
treatments. Each participant took part in three treatments and seems to learn more between
treatments.
To test this the order of the treatment is included as a variable as is the order of periods in the
treatment. The first of these variables takes the value one, two or three. The participants partici-
pated in three treatments and the order they participated was randomly assigned to them. When
this variable takes the value one it means the treatment was the first treatment a participant par-
ticipated in. When it takes the value two it is the second treatment a participant participated
in. Then when it takes the value three it is the last treatments a participant participated in. The
second of the new variables takes the value one to nine. For each treatment the participants
repeated the election nine times. This variable equals where in that repetition a given election
occurred. So if period equals one it was the first time they participated in that treatment and so
on.
Table 1.13 shows that between studies the occurrence of non-equilibria outcomes goes down
by 10.5% and this is significant at the 99% level. This effect does go down slightly if the effect of
thresholds and uncertainty are taken into account but the effect is still 99% significant and has
an effect of 9.4%. Equally interesting from this table is that the effect of threshold and uncer-
tainty are not significant though both have quite large magnitudes. Non-equilibrium outcomes
seem to be effected most by learning between treatments and not as much by the threshold or
uncertainty. This supports conjecture 1.10 that non-equilibrium outcomes goes down as voters
learn the game better and improve their strategy.
37see appendix J for details about the set of non-equilibrium outcomes in the experimental treatments
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TABLE 1.13: Effect of time, threshold and uncertainty on the non-equilibrium ex-
istence
DV: Non-equilibrium outcome Specification 1 Specification 2
occurrence
Variables
Threshold level - -0.160
(50% down to 40%) - (0.101)
Uncertainty - 0.074
- (0.072)
Interaction - 0.196*
- (0.102)
Treatment order in session -0.105*** -0.094***
(1-3) (0.026) (0.034)
Period order in the treatment -0.007 -0.006
(1-9) (0.008) (0.010)
Constant 0.646*** 0.626***
(0.072) (0.111)
N= 486 324
Notes: Study order refers to order that participants did the treatments in if study order is 1 this treatments was the first the participants did etc Period order refers to order
that participants did the treatments in. If study order is 1 this treatments was the first the participants did etc. There are less observations in specification two as treatment
MU5 and FU5 have to be dropped
*** significant at 99%, ** significant at 95%, * significant at 90%
1.6.6 Key Assumptions to Test
Underpinning the results above is the assumption that voters do not take weakly dominated
strategies. For the α type voters and the β type voters there are two strategies that are weakly
dominated. Providing results to support these two propositions is not a contribution of this
chapter but is necessary for the other results. The results of both these propositions are in table
1.14. Both results use the same tests that Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993) use to test
dominated voting against random voting.
Proposition 1.10. All α type voters and β type voters always vote for candidate A or candidate
B in all second rounds that either candidate contests against candidate C.
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This has been proven in Besley and Coate (1997). The results should show that whenever a
voter votes in round two they do not vote for candidate C. If we consider the percentage of votes
for candidate C in round two in all treatments the percentage of dominated votes is below 5%
and in 2 of the 6 treatments it is 0%. This supports the idea that voters do not vote for candidate
C in round two.
Proposition 1.11. All α type voters and β type voters never vote for candidate C in the first
round of elections. This is a weakly dominated vote and should never occur.
As in all treatments the percentage of voters that are γ type voters is greater than 13 candidate
C always enters the second round if it occurs. Therefore there are no cases where it is better for
α and β type voters to vote C in round one. This is a dominated vote and should never occur.
Table 1.14 shows that if we consider the percentage of votes for candidate C in round one in all
treatments the percentage of dominated votes is below 5% and in 5 of the 6 treatments near 2%.
This supports the idea that voters do not vote for candidate C in round one.
The two propositions that dominated voting does not occur in round one or round two seem
to be supported by the results of the experiment. This is important as these are two theoretical
assumptions that underpin the theorems in this chapter. These results are also similar to those
found in similar experimental papers where there is a small percentage of dominated votes
found in Morton and Rietz (2007). In their paper dominated voting is slightly larger but this can
be explained in part by the fact that they make the γ type voters active and this group have more
dominated votes so the likelihood of error is increased.
TABLE 1.14: The percentage of the votes in round one and round two where a
voter took a dominated strategy by voting for candidate C
Treatment Round One Round Two
number of Dominated % of Dominated number of Dominated % of Dominated
votes Votes votes votes Votes votes
MC6 648 17 2.62% 560 19 3.39%
MU6 648 13 2.01% 161 3 1.86%
MU5 648 16 2.47% 142 4 2.82%
FC6 648 27 4.17% 112 2 1.79%
FU6 648 16 2.47% 100 0 0%
FU5 648 16 2.47% 46 0 0%
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A third assumption of the experiment is that polling is a successful coordination mechanism.
Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993, 1996) both give evidence that polling can work as
a successful coordination mechanism. Finding the effect of polling is not a primary aim of this
chapter and no treatments were run that did not include polling. All that needs to be found here
is that polling improves coordination as the experiment needs a coordination device. Coordina-
tion here means that a voter votes for the candidate, between candidate A and candidate B, that
wins the poll. This is the dependant variable in table 1.15. Table 1.15 is split into two groups.
To measure how voters change their likelihood of voting for candidate A and candidate B. The
table then reports the effects of candidate A winning the poll. This is in comparison to a poll tie.
The same effect is tested when candidate B wins the poll. Specification one and two are tested
under these conditions allowing for individual random effects and for individual clustering.
The final specification then includes the margin of victory for each candidate. This measures if
coordination is more likely when a candidate wins the poll by a large amount. Here the variable
measure the difference between the winning candidate and the losing candidate and the effect
is an increase of one in the difference. Conjecture 1.11 is that polling will have an effect and the
winner of the poll will receive more votes in the main election. IF this is found to be the case
then polling has worked as a coordination device. Election histories was also considered as a
possible coordination mechanism as it was in Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993, 1996)
but when the two were analysed for correlation38 to first round votes it was found that polling
better explained the action of the voters in the experiment and so polling is the only coordination
mechanism considered in the results.
38See appendix E for the method used to check correlation
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TABLE 1.15: The effect of polls result and poll lead on probability to coordinate
votes
DV: Coordinated voting Candidate A Candidate B
level in round one Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3 Spec 1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Variables
A wins the poll 0.372*** 0.354*** 0.285*** -0.359*** -0.336*** -0.278***
(0.020) (0.015) (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.022)
B wins the poll -0.398** -0.387*** -0.307*** 0.398*** 0.396*** 0.295***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025)
Margin of Victory A - - 0.028*** - - -0.024***
- - (0.006) - - (0.006)
Margin of Victory B - - -0.040*** - - 0.051***
- - (0.009) - - (0.009)
Constant 0.522*** 0.527*** 0.525*** 0.446*** 0.435*** 0.437***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012)
Individual random effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Cluster by individual Yes No No Yes No No
Notes N is always 3888 and number of groups is always 144
All regressions are OLS with a form of individual fixed effect/clustering
*** significant at 99%, ** significant at 95%, * significant at 90%
Conjecture 1.11. Polling is successfully used as a coordination mechanism.
There is a small in-built ballot effect: when considering the constant we see that with no poll
winner, candidate A gets 52.2% of the vote, while candidate B gets 44.6%. This ballot effect is
found in other papers that tests its effect in the real world in a number of election scenarios.
Meredith and Salant (2013) finds it in a study of local elections in California and gets an estimate
of 4% to 5% for ballot effect. Lutz (2010) finds similar effects in Swiss open ballot PR elections.
Then finally Brockington (2003) suggests the effect is anything from 0% to 5% in his study of city
council elections in Illinois; this paper argues it is primarily low information voters that cause a
ballot effect which seems reasonable though in this experiment I would argue ballot effect has
a useful role in assisting coordination and is not just due to low information voters. This could
explain why the ballot effect is slightly higher here than in the real world studies where it is not
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a coordination tool.
Specification one and two respectively test the effect of candidate A or B winning the poll
on the % of votes candidates A and B receive. This is run with both individual fixed effects and
clustering by participant. These are two methods to allow for the predicted participant level
correlation. The effect of candidate A winning the poll is an increase of 35.4% and 37.2% points
in candidate A’s votes respectively and a similar fall of 33.6% and 35.9% points in candidate B’s
votes. When candidate B wins the poll, it has an almost identically effect in reverse.
Specification three adds a second explanatory variable, the margin of the poll result. This
refers to the difference between the number of poll votes that candidate A wins and the number
that candidate B wins. Specification three is only run under an OLS with individual fixed effect.
Both the GLS with random effects and clustering were also tested and gave results with similar
magnitude and significance. As such, including all three seemed superfluous.
When margin of victory is included it reduces the magnitude of the simple victory variable
under all three controls and all four coefficients. All remain significant and positive. The effect
of candidate A winning the poll is now a rise of 28.5% points for candidate A’s vote number and
a 27.8% points fall in candidate B’s vote %. A similar reversed effect happens when candidate B
wins the poll (a fall of 30.7% for candidate A and 29.5% rise for candidate B).
1.7 Conclusion
The main aims of this chapter are: 1) To find experimental evidence of the existence of Du-
verger’s Law equilibrium and the sincere equilibrium in two round divided majority election
games with uncertainty and flexible thresholds, 2) Assuming these equilibria exist test the effect
of flexible thresholds and uncertainty on the occurrence of these two equilibrium. 3) to measure
the effect of changing the level of uncertainty on two round elections. The secondary aims of this
chapter are: 4) to redesign the theoretical model in Bouton (2013), which initially proposed these
predictions, to be testable by a lab experiment. 5) to investigate the assumption of symmetry
in the equilibrium concept and search for the existence of non-symmetric equilibrium in the ex-
periment 6) to show that voters do not take dominated strategies in the experiment under these
new parameters of uncertainty and a lower threshold, therefore supporting the assumptions
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necessary for the other results.
To achieve these aims I ran a lab based experiment with six treatments. Three treatments
with a majority threshold and three with a flexible threshold. Participants then participated in
either the majority threshold treatments or the flexible threshold treatments. Within these three
treatments one was run with certainty about the second round participants and six supporters
of the minority candidate (MC6 and FC6 respectively) on was was run with uncertainty about
the second round participants and six supporters of the minority candidate (MU6 and FU6
respectively) and one was run with uncertainty about the second round participants and five
supporters of the minority candidate (MU5 and FU5 respectively). This gave the framework for
the experiment.
The theoretical section of the chapter finds that both the Duverger Law equilibrium and the
sincere equilibrium should occur in all 6 treatments in this experiment. This finding is supported
by the results in the chapter. Using the same method as Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber
(1993) to compare a Duverger’s Law type effect against random voting the chapter finds that a
Duvergers Law type effect occurs in 32.10% of all elections in the experiment. This effect is found
to occur most often in treatments FC6 , FU6 and FU5. Therefore the flexible threshold seems to
increase the occurrence of the Duverger’s Law equilibrium. This supports the conjecture in
this chapter that a lower threshold creates a greater cost to no reaching the Duverger’s Law
equilibrium and therefore incentivises participants to try to reach it.
When we test the effect of the flexible threshold on the occurrence of Duverger’s Law equi-
librium we find the effect to be a 27.8% increase in occurrence. This effect goes up when the
interaction effect with uncertainty is included. Uncertainty also has a significant effect of the
occurrence of Duverger’s Law equilibrium but only when the interaction effect is taken into ac-
count. This suggest that of the two variables changing the threshold has a dominant effect. The
effect of uncertainty, 17.3%, is smaller than the interaction effect, 33.3%, which is negative. So the
flexible threshold and uncertainty effect the Duverger’s Law equilibrium in the same direction.
Both variables have a positive effect on the occurrence of the Duverger’s Law equilibrium.
The second Symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is predicted by the theory to exist is
the sincere equilibrium. The findings of the experiment support this prediction. Using the same
method as Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993) but now to compare random voting
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with sincere voting it is found that the sincere equilibrium occurs in 9.26% of elections. This
is less than the Duverger’s Law equilibrium but still a significant percentage of the time. The
effect of threshold and uncertainty on the existence of the sincere equilibrium is also significant
but smaller. The effect of the flexible threshold on the occurrence of the sincere equilibrium is
14.8% which rises to 23.5% when the interaction effect is considered. Unlike the Duverger’s Law
equilibrium uncertainty does has a significant effect, 11.1% without the interaction effect. The
effect of uncertainty rises to 12% with the interaction effect, 17.3%, which again is negative. So
the flexible threshold and uncertainty effect the sincere equilibrium in the same direction. Both
variables have a negative effect on the sincere equilibrium
The first half of this paper present an altered version of Bouton (2013); the main theoretical
differences are the use of a known and exogenous voting population. This is compared to a
Poisson distribution in Bouton (2013). The other differences include a slightly altered definition
of a variable threshold that retains the majority threshold as a victory condition. These two
changes do not change the results of the Symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. As such the
predictions of Bouton (2013) remain valid and will be tested.
The assumption of symmetry simplifies the analysis in Bouton (2013) but if removed the
results still hold. However if a fixed number of voters is assumed this is not the case. This
chapter finds a set of non-symmetric equilibrium that can exist in each of the treatments of the
experiment. The non-symmetric equilibria occurs reasonably often, in 18.7% of elections in the
experiment. This can be partially explained by error and some degree of randomness in real
world voters. The fact that such equilibrium exist more often than the sincere equilibrium does
raise questions about the validity of the assumption of symmetry. This chapter does not aim to
address these questions but that does not mean they are not valid and worth investigation.
The set of dominated strategies in this experiment come from the results of Besley and Coate
(1997). The occurrence of dominated voting has been investigated in other experimental litera-
ture and this chapter does not claim any innovation in this area. It is merely worth noting that
this chapter finds a similar level of dominated voting, among its subjects, as similar experiments
such as Morton and Rietz (2007) among others.
To finish this chapter finds that uncertainty and flexible thresholds matter to the results of
elections. Yet neither is investigated extensively in the literature. Uncertainty in particular is
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to some degree inevitable in two round elections yet the risk of upset in these election is not
well documented. This chapter supports the idea that a lower flexible threshold can be used
by a election designer to incentivise coordination among voters and reduce the cost of elections
by having less second round elections. The contribution of this chapter is to add experimen-
tal evidence to existing theoretical literature on the effect of threshold and uncertainty in two
round elections with divided majorities. in doing so it expands the understanding of these mod-
els, highlights some questions regarding the assumption of symmetry among voting types, finds
supporting evidence for dominated voting being rare in experiments. without making any theo-
retical claims about equilibrium selection it lays out a number of conjectures regarding the effect
of threshold and uncertainty and the likely effect on equilibrium selection and supports these
with data.
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Chapter 2
The Weakness of Plurality in Electoral
Systems
2.1 Introduction
Under a winner takes all plurality election rule the candidate with the most votes wins the
election. Duverger (1959) proves that in such an election only two candidates should win a
positive share of the votes cast. This proof known now as Duverger’s Law can be seen to hold
to a varying degree in many Plurality elections. In the United States for example the Republican
Party candidate for president and Democratic Party candidate for president win roughly 95%
of the votes cast and the whole electoral college. In 1992 when Ross Perot, the most successful
third party candidate in the last 100 years, ran the two dominant parties still gained 80% of the
votes cast and the whole electoral college1. A less stark example is the United Kingdom where
the two dominant parties, the Labour party and the Conservative party, have both received at
least 30% of the vote cast in all post war elections with two exceptions2. In no post World War
Two election has another party won or come in second the United Kingdom or the United States.
With such a clear history of two party dominance a vote for any other party would appear to be
1For more information about United States elections see The Federal Election Commission,
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml
2The election of 1983 where leader Michael Foot got only 27.3% of the national vote and the election of 2010 where
leader Gordon Brown got only 29% of the national vote. For more information about UK elections see The Electoral
Commission, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research/electoral-data
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a wasted vote. Yet such third party candidate voters still exist.
As increased polarisation has crept into modern politics the actions of these third party can-
didate voters has become more important, especially as previous elections have suggested that
the votes the third party candidate gets can alter the outcome of elections if re-allocated. For
example, Ralph Nader in 2000 gained only 2.74% of the popular vote but with such a tight elec-
tion3 his supporters, had they voted for Vice President Al Gore or Governor George Bush, could
have swung the election4.
A number of explanations have been suggested for why such ’wasted’ votes exist. Castan-
heira (2003) suggests that people vote for losing candidates to try to set the agenda. A number
of papers including Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) and Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) focused
on the pivotal probability and the fact that voters may choose a wasted vote as they do not think
their vote matters. Fey (1997) among others suggests that there is a lack of information and that
voters are unable to work out which of the two candidates they should coordinate to. Finally,
and linked more closely to the work in this paper, Tavits and Annus (2006) suggest that it takes
time for voters to learn especially in new democracies and so over time ’wasted votes’ go down.
These ideas among others will be considered in the literature review.
This chapter fits into the literature on third candidate voting. There is a trade-off between
strategic voting and sincere revelation of preferences that is at the heart of the third candidate
voting literature. Voters wish to influence the outcome of elections if they are pivotal to those
outcomes but when not pivotal they prefer to vote sincerely (for any one of the reasons men-
tioned in other literature). This chapter adds to this literature by considering if voters in fact
would prefer to be strategic in elections but due to their inability to know when they are pivotal
or inability to fully rationalise the actions of all the other voters they fail to do this. Voters in this
case can be described as having bounded rationality and in this chapter I suggest that this is one
rationale for ’wasted’ votes.
I will then propose one solution to this trade-off between strategic decision making and
sincere voting to be the instant run-off election rule. Making a similar argument as that of Piketty
3Florida was within 537 votes and Nader receiving 97,421 in the state, for data see
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm
4Herron and JeffreyLewis (2007) argues that while Ralph Naders did not exclusively take votes from Al Gore
his supporters were 60 % to 40 % in favour of the defeated candidate Al Gore, a difference that due to the unusual
closeness of Florida’s election would have swung the election for Al Gore
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(2000). This chapter will show that this rule simplifies the strategic decisions allowing voters to
sincerely reveal their preferences while making fully rational strategic decisions under bounded
rationality.
To investigate the effect of bounded rationality and the benefits of the instant run-off I present
in section 2.3 a three candidate winner takes all election model. This model allows for all types of
voter preference order but makes a set of assumptions about the number of voters with each type
of preference. Two candidates will have a ’large’ number of supporters while one candidate will
have a ’small’ number of supporters. The model will implement a social choice function where
each voter inputs a set of preferences that link to the different voting rules. Two voting rules will
be analysed in this chapter, the plurality election rule and the instant run-off election rule.
Under the Plurality rule each voter casts a single ballot for a single candidate and the can-
didate with the most votes wins the election. Under the instant run-off election rule each voter
casts a single list ranking all candidates on the ballot in order of preference. A candidate then
wins if they have a strict majority of the first ranked votes. If no candidate has a strict major-
ity the candidate with the least votes is eliminated. Their votes transfer to their second ranked
candidate. This continues until one candidate has a strict majority. Section 2.4 gives more detail
regarding these voting rules. The instant run-off rule follows on from the two round election
rule discussed in chapter one. Chapter three will show that under the conditions assumed in
chapter one and two these two rules are equivalent. Therefore Chapter two continues to add to
the understanding of these run-of election rules.
The first aim of this paper is to fully characterise the sincere equilibrium under the conditions
of two dominant parties and one small party. This builds on work by Besley and Coate (1997),
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) by specifically looking at the restricted case of three candidates
where only two have a large support5. The sincere equilibrium occurs if no voter wishes to
reveal insincere preferences to the social choice function when all other voters reveal sincere
preferences to the social choice function. If no voter wishes to reveal insincere preferences in
such a case that voting distribution has a sincere equilibrium6. In characterising the sincere
equilibrium this chapter will define the necessary conditions for such an equilibrium to not exist
5Defined as their support being at least 2 greater than the small candidate; while this is a broad definition it is the
necessary condition, in reality the difference is almost certainly larger
6The distribution of voters is the only parameter of importance other than the voting rule itself as this defines the
number of votes each candidate gets when everyone is sincere
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for the two voting rules.
The main contribution of this chapter is the application of bounded rationality to voter de-
cision making. This builds most directly on Nagel (1995). Nagel (1995) introduces the idea of
level-k thinking. Applied to voting games this suggests that there exists a level-0 thinker who
does not react to any other voter in the election. Instead they apply the most minimal thought
process in making a decision. The chapter interprets such a voter in two ways as either naive
or random. The random interpretation comes directly from Nagel (1995) and assumes that all
level-0 thinkers randomly pick a candidate (or in the case of instant run-off a random order-
ing of candidates) assigning each candidate equal probability. The naive interpretation comes
from Bassi (2015) who argues that the level-0 voter will naively assume that there is no possible
strategy they could take and so will be sincere. This chapter will model both interpretations for
both voting rules. After the level-0 thinker comes a level-1 thinker. They assume that all other
voters act as level-0 thinkers and then best respond to this population. The level-2 thinker then
assumes that all other voters act as level-1 thinkers and then best respond and so on.
This chapter will analyse the strategies at all levels of thinking until an equilibrium is reached
where higher levels do not change their strategy compared to lower level thinking. The chapter
will then compare when the two voting rules lead to different strategies at the same level and
analyse which voting rule gives an outcome that is preferred by the majority of voters. It will
also compare when a voting rule reaches a strategy that does not change at higher levels of
thinking. The motivation for this being that if a voting rule reaches the same outcome with a
lower level of thinking, this is preferable as it requires voters to think less while achieving the
same utility.
The first result of the chapter regards the sincere equilibrium. Subsection 2.2 proves that the
sincere equilibrium exists for all vote distributions discussed in this chapter for the instant run-
off rule. Subsection 2.1 proves that for the plurality rule the sincere equilibrium exists only if a
candidate has a strict lead and all voters that most prefer the third candidate either prefer the
leader or are not pivotal. These results support the idea that it is easier to be sincere and not be
casting a vote for a candidate that is not optimal. Additionally to this result, the chapter finds
that when the two election rules give different outcomes the outcome reached by the instant run-
off election rule is strictly preferred by a strict majority of voters. This is implicit in the results
and the explanation can be found in the discussion after the proof of the sincere equilibrium
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existence theorem.
The second result of the chapter is a simple one. It is found that applied to this voting
game the results from the two assumptions about ’naive’ (Ns) and ’random’ (Nr) level-0 voters
are equivalent with one adjustment. The best response to a set of ’random’ level-0 voters is
to vote sincerely which is the strategy of the ’naive’ level-0 voter. The strategy of the level-0
’naive’ voter to sincerely reveal their preferences is equivalent to the strategy of the level-1 voter
that responds to a level-0 ’random’ voter. As a voter at level-k best responds to a population of
level-(k-1) voters this relationship between the ’naive’ assumption and the ’random’ assumption
holds. The strategy at level-k under the assumption of ’random’ level-0 voters is the same as the
strategy at level-(k-1) under the assumption of ’naive’ level-0 voters. Therefore the main results
for the level-k thinking here will be defined in terms of the ’random’ level-0 assumption (as this
includes all the findings for the ’naive’ level-0 assumption but the ’naive’ assumption does not
include the finds for the level-0 ’random’ voter).
The third and most important set of results in this chapter relates to the findings on the
level-k strategies for each election rule and how they compare to each other. The key areas of
interest are the strategies taken at each level, the outcome of elections at each levels, and how
long it takes to reach a strategy that does not change at higher levels of thinking. Each of these
three areas support the idea that 1) under the plurality rule voters often make ’wasted’ votes for
candidates that cannot win when they are at lower levels of thinking, 2) that the instant run-off
has higher levels of sincere voting while also eliminating these ’wasted’ votes solving the issue
of ’wasted’ votes being due to bounded rationality.
Subsection 2.6.1 proves that all higher levels above the random level-0 thinker vote sincerely
and the sincere equilibrium is the only one that exists. Subsection 2.6.2 proves that there are 3
possible equilibria for the plurality rule. The three possible equilibria are the sincere equilibrium,
Duverger Law equilibrium and the non-pivotal equilibrium. In comparing the two voting rules
the results tell us that when the sincere equilibrium exists for the plurality election rule that the
strategy that does not change at higher levels is reached at the same point for both rules. As
with the results in section 2.5.1 the instant run-off election rule will sometimes give an outcome
that is strictly preferred to the outcome under the plurality election rule. When Duverger’s law
equilibrium occurs for the plurality election rule the outcome of the plurality election rule is the
same as that of the instant run-off election rule however it takes an additional level of thinking
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to reach this outcome. Finally when the non-pivotal equilibrium is reached under the plurality
election rule the outcome under the instant run-off rule is either the same as this outcome or
strictly preferred for a strict majority of voters. It also takes a higher level of thought to reach
the outcome.
See the discussion at the end of section 2.6 for more of this discussion but the key take
away points are that under the plurality election rule the ’small’ candidate does get votes due
to bounded rationality initially but also, due to voters not being pivotal, the ’small’ candidate
still gets votes at all levels of rationality. Secondly, that the instant run-off election rule solves
this problem by leading to sincere voting at all levels of rationality as well as eliminating wasted
votes. The instant run-off election rule also reaches the outcome that is strictly preferred by a
strict majority with a lower level of thinking than the plurality election rule takes to reach the
same outcome. The next section will move onto an analysis of the literature mentioned in this
section regarding ’wasted’ votes and bounded rationality as well as other papers in the related
literature.
2.2 Literature
Downs (1957) and Hotelling (1929), establishes the baseline median voter theory7. This con-
siders the party position and voting problem for the simplest elections with only 2 candidates.
Plurality, instant run-off, and all other single winner systems without a dictator, give the same
results. Black (1948), gave the formal analysis and the explicit instructions to Hotelling linear
city. All systems are equally simple. Applying the Nash strategy to such a game shows that
when strategic, voters’ weakly dominant strategy is to vote sincerely, and when pivotal this
strategy is strictly dominant in 2 candidate elections for both systems we focus on. This result,
while critical to the understanding of political economics, is limited due to its two candidate
nature. Expanding on it requires consideration of three or more candidates.
Duverger (1959) argues that actually a larger number of voters does not really matter. Under
plurality a multi-candidate system with strategic voters should in equilibrium tend towards only
two parties gaining a positive vote share therefore the outcome is identical, these two candidates
7On a linear policy space, given sincere voters (there is never an incentive to be insincere in two candidate elec-
tions) parties all take positions most preferred by the middle voter.
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being perceived as the viable winners of that election. See Palfrey (1988) for the mathematical
proof of Duverger’s Law. In theory, this should solve the problem of 3 candidate elections.
Even if many candidates enter the electorate work out the viable winners and vote for them
exclusively. Yet cases where a third party gets votes do still exist. Duverger’s Law does not
always hold and the cases where it fails to hold are significant and of interest. The idea of
’wasted votes’ (votes that do not support one of the two viable winning candidates) frame this
part of the literature. The next section looks at why voters ’waste’ their vote and present some
papers that argue that at times these votes are not ’wasted’.
2.2.1 Wasted Votes
Castanheira (2003) argues that agenda setting is a reason such ’wasted votes’ might exist. In this
model voters stick with candidates that are not expected to win so that in the future other more
viable candidates will realise that such voters exist and might move to a position to win some of
these ’wasted votes’.
One reason voters ’waste’ votes is voters do not expect to be pivotal. If a voter does not
expect to be pivotal they decide they do not need to worry about who wins, instead they opt to
be sincere preferring honesty when all their voting options give the same outcome. Attempts
were first made to calculate the probability of a decisive vote by Beck (1975). He noted that
a vote "‘will only be significant if an individual assumes all other voters are totally indifferent
between the two [alternatives]."’. Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) then showed that to the
limit, a voter must assume two voting groups are of equal size to believe they might be pivotal.
This case will be considered in this chapter and will be shown to be a key scenario where such
’wasted votes’ are eliminated and the sincere equilibrium does not hold. As such they are of
key importance if the aim is to incentivise both sincere revelation of preferences and voter op-
timal decision making. Since then the pivotal voting model has been more widely used, that
introduces a degree of uncertainty over group types to allow for more than just this knife edge
result. From this Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), have shown that due to low pivotal probability
for certain groups voting is not always rational. The pivotal voting models generally introduce
a small cost of voting which is not recovered due to the low odds of changing the vote.
Fey (1997) suggests that such wasted votes appear due to a lack of information and that
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with pre-election polls voters will have enough information to move to the Duverger equilib-
rium. This lack of information is somewhat different to the idea posed in this chapter regarding
bounded rationality. It suggests that voters are fully rational but do not know enough to work
out who is a viable winner. This lack of information leading to wasted votes is seen in a lot of
the divided majority literature of Myerson and Weber (1993) later tested by Forsythe, Myerson,
Rietz, and Weber (1993, 1996) and for two round elections8 by Morton and Rietz (2007). This
literature supports the idea that the key issue is communication among a group that would like
to coordinate but fail to. This failure to coordinate then leads to wasted votes.
There are a number of other rationales given for ’wasted votes’ that I will not go into detail
on such as split tickets for ethnic parties suggested in Chandra (2009). The strength of the candi-
dates is also a generation of uncertainty as suggested in Myatt, Fisher, and others (2002) which
tests this uncertainty on data from UK general elections.
In an argument that is closer to the one made in this chapter Tavits and Annus (2006) argue
that voters take a period of time to learn what to do especially in new democracies. They show
that over time, referring to Eastern European countries, as countries have democracy for longer
the number of wasted votes goes down. This could be seen as a process of going up levels of
thinking in the model in this chapter. As voters spend longer voting they learn more about
themselves and more importantly the other voters and this leads to them applying higher levels
of thinking and reduces the number of ’wasted votes’. This leads on to the literature around
level-k thinking. This is the method by which bounded rationality is introduced into this chap-
ter. The next section highlights the key papers on this topic and the alternative interpretations
of bounded rationality including those chosen by this chapter and some that are not.
2.2.2 Bounded Rationality and Level-k
This chapter will analyse the level-k bounded rationality in Nagel (1995) in an election voting
game. In her paper she proposes that people do not act with complete rationality they are in
fact bounded by their rationality. She starts with the most bound person who with a level-0
strategy just randomly picks a candidate. The next level of person, level-1, assumes everyone
that votes other than them are of level-0. They then best respond to such a group of voters.
8A voting rule that with 3 candidates is equivalent to the instant run-off
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Each higher level best responds to the group one level below them until a point is reached
where higher levels of voters do not change their voting strategy from those taken at a lower
level. The idea of randomness being the lowest rationality is contentious in the literature. Bassi
(2015) for example counters that even the least rational voter should know their own preferences.
Therefore she proposes that the lowest level of rationality is to naively assume that there is no
strategy better than sincerity. Bassi separates behaviour into strategic and sincere. With the
aim of limiting manipulation which is defined as a voter behaving strategically (insincerely) to
change the outcome of the election, naive voters in her model do not try to change the outcome
of the election with strategy. They are therefore equivalent to voters in the sincere equilibrium
from the last section. Where Bassi calls voters Naive we will simply call them sincere. Her paper
uses this assumption about the level-0 to compare Approval voting9 and Borda count10 voting
rules with Plurality. This chapter will add to this literature by looking at the instant run-off rule
under similar conditions.
Other work in bounded rationality has been done by Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) where
they defined the cognitive hierarchy. This model will not be considered in this chapter but it
takes the assumptions laid out by Nagel (1995) and then expands her conditions. Where Nagel
assumes that a voter at a higher level best responds to a group one level below them Camerer,
Ho, and Chong (2004) assume that a voter best responds to a set of voters that are distributed
among the levels below that voter. This gives a more general rule for such cognitive hierarchy
models and an extension of this chapter could be to include such analysis alongside that of
Nagel’s level-k model.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Voters and Candidates
The election consists of a set of players N with the size n. Each player is a voter in the election
and an individual player, hereafter called a voter, is represented by i. The model will assume
9Approval voting is a winner takes all electoral system where each voter selects all candidates that she approves
of. The winner is then the candidate that gets the most approval votes
10Borda count is a winner takes all electoral system where each voter ranks the candidates. Each candidate gets a
fixed number of points from each voter based on where they appear in the ranking. The winner is then the candidate
with the most points.
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that n is odd11.
N : = {1, , , n} (N set of all voters)
i ∈ N (i individual voter)
There are three candidates in the set Ω and an individual candidate is represented by ω.
These candidates will be called, candidate A, candidate B, and candidate C.
Ω : = {A, B, C}
ω ∈ Ω ( ω individual candidate)
2.3.2 Individual Preferences
Voter i’s preference,%i, is defined over a set of feasible winning lotteries of the three candidates.
%i on ∆{A, B, C}
There are 7 possible lotteries. These 7 lotteries are one of three types.
1. One candidate wins with certainty; in which case the lottery generates a single winner and
the singleton lottery is written as A, B, or C depending on the candidate that wins.
2. Two candidates have a positive winning probability; in which case the odds of victory are
uniform and each candidate has a one half probability of victory. These will be written as
AB, AC or BC, depending on the two candidates that could win.
3. All three candidates have a positive winning probability; again the odds of victory are
uniform and each candidate has a one third probability of victory. This is written as TIE12.
For example:
Lottery {1, 0, 0} ≡ (A)
Lottery {0.5, 0.5, 0} ≡ (AB)
Lottery { 13 , 13 , 13} ≡ (TIE)
11This condition simplifies analysis but is not necessary for any of the results
12the reason for using TIE instead of (ABC) is to avoid confusion with the utility order (ABC) that is also defined
in this section
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The utility function Ui(ω) represents the voters’ preferences; if a voter prefers a candidate,
ω, over an alternative, ω′, then the utility from a singleton lottery for candidate ω is greater than
a singleton lottery for candidate ω′. The voter has strict preferences over the singleton lotteries
therefore the utility relationship is strict.
Ui(ω) > Ui(ω′) ⇐⇒ (ω) i (ω′)
The relationship is also transitive therefore the utility from singleton lotteries can be or-
dered/ranked.
Ui(ω) > Ui(ω′) > Ui(ω′′)
s.t. ω 6= ω′
ω 6= ω′′
ω′ 6= ω′′
for some ω,ω′,ω′′ ∈ Ω
The strict utility order/rank will then be summarised with a three component list. For ex-
ample:
Ui(A) > Ui(B) > Ui(C) ≡ (ABC)
This strict utility order explains the utility relationship over the singleton lotteries. This order
also explains the utility relationship for two of the other lotteries. For the same example if the
voter has utility order (ABC) then the utility from lottery (A) is strictly greater than the utility
from lottery (AB) (as this lottery has a one half chance that B wins instead of A which is strictly
worse), similarly the utility from lottery (AB) is strictly greater than the utility from lottery (B)
etc. The full utility relationship that is now explained is;
for (ABC) : Ui(A) > Ui(AB) > Ui(B) > Ui(BC) > Ui(C)
The utility relationship for the other two candidate tie, (AC), and the three way tie lottery,
(TIE), are ambiguous under the definition usedhere to summarise voter preferences as a strict
utility order over the singleton lotteries. Three cases must be considered that depend on the
relationship between the singleton lottery (B) and the two candidate tie (AC) for the voter with
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utility order (ABC)13. More generally the case to consider is the relationship between the middle
ranked candidate and a two way tie between the first and third ranked candidate. The three
possible relationships are;
For (ABC) : (B) i (AC), (B) ∼i (AC) or (AC) i (B)
This ignores the three way tie but it can be shown that if the relationship between lottery B
and AC is known then the position of the lottery TIE is also known. This is summarised below
but for the full proof to this see appendix K.
if Ui(B) > Ui(AC) then Ui(B) > Ui(TIE) > Ui(AC)
if Ui(B) = Ui(AC) then Ui(B) = Ui(TIE) = Ui(AC)
if Ui(B) < Ui(AC) then Ui(B) < Ui(TIE) < Ui(AC)
For a given voter with a given strict utility order it is not possible to assume that one of these
three possible relationships always occurs. It will be shown in this paper that these differences
never matter and all results hold for all three possible orders (AC), (B) and (TIE).
2.3.3 Preference profile and Support Vote
The % is a preference profile of the %i preferences for all the i voters in N.
% = {%1,%2, ... %n}
The support vote, SV, for a candidate is then the number of voters that order that candi-
date first. These voters most preferred outcome is the singleton lottery for this candidate. For
example the support vote for candidate A:
SV1A(%) =
#i | %i =
ABCACB


It is assumed that the support votes for candidate A and candidate B are ’large’ and the
support vote for candidate C is ’small’ to represent the difference in ’large’ and ’small’ candidates
in the model. Formally, a ’large’ candidates’ support vote will be defined as strictly greater than a
13The utility from (AC) compared to the other four lotteries is unambiguous: lottery (AC) is strictly worse than
(A) and (AB) as half the time candidate C wins instead of candidate A and candidate B respectively and this is
worse. By the same logic (AC) is strictly better than lottery (BC) and (C) making (B) the lottery where the utility
relationship is ambiguous
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’small’ candidates’ support vote plus two. With two ’large’ candidates and one ’small’ candidate,
a ’large’ candidates’ support vote will be strictly greater than n divided by three. Finally, it will
be assumed that no candidate has a zero support vote.
The difference here between a ’large’ and a ’small’ candidate is very minor and they can be
very similar. The reason for this is that the distinction as defined here is sufficient for the cases
discussed in this paper. Generally in the real world the difference between the ’large’ and the
’small’ candidates is much greater but this paper aims to show that this is not necessary and a
much smaller difference is all that is required for the results. A larger difference between the
’large’ and ’small’ candidate does not change the results in this paper.
< is the set of all % s.t. V1A(%), V1B(%) > n3 > V1C(%) + 2
V1ω(%) > 0 ∀ ω ∈ Ω
2.3.4 Strategies
This paper will analyse two strategies: firstly the sincere voting strategy and then the set of
thinking levels for level-k thinking. These two strategies are introduced and defined below.
The sincere voting strategy will then be analysed to see if all players playing this strategy is
a Nash equilibrium which is outlined in in part 2.3.5. The strategy take by a voter at a given
level of thinking is by definition a best response given their bounded rationality. So the analysis
will focus on different levels of thinking and answer the question: if all voters take the strategy
that is the best response at a given level is this a Nash equilibrium when their rationality is not
bounded?
Sincere Voting strategy
A voter is sincere if they truthfully reveal their preferences to the social choice function. The
profile % is sincere if all voters truthfully reveal their preferences. The model restricts the vote
total such that when all voters truthfully reveal their preferences the round one vote total for A
and for B are strictly more than two above the vote total C.
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Level-K voting strategy
The second strategy considers the set of actions voters take when they have a finite depth of
reasoning. It is assumed that voters are unable or unwilling to employ the necessary level of
thinking to enact the completely rational strategy taken in equilibrium. Instead voters will be
defined based on the level of thinking they implement in selecting their strategy. At a given level
a voter has a set of beliefs about how rational the other voters are in the population.
The beliefs are calculated using the same belief orders as the players in Nagel (1995). Firstly
the level-0 voter; they have zero− order belie f s. These voters select a strategy at random. They
form no beliefs about other voters and do not pick a salient number that is important to them.
They randomise over the action set; each candidate has a one third probability of being ordered
first, ordered second or ordered third. An alternative definition will also be considered; level-
0 voters will be considered naively sincere as suggested in Bassi (2015). In this case they will
reveal a sincere set of preferences to the social choice function.
Using these two definitions of level-0 gives two specifications to consider. These will be
defined as:
1. (Ns): level-0 voters reveal sincere preferences
2. (Nr): level-0 voters reveal random preferences
Next level-1 voters; they have f irst-order belie f s on the behavior of the other players. These
voters believe that all other voters make a vote at random. These voters then make a best re-
sponse to this belief. The level-1 voter assumes all other voters are level-0. They reveal a set of
preferences that is a best response to a population that vote randomly.
The level-2 voter has second-order belie f s. These beliefs are on the f irst-order belie f s of the
other voters. These voters then best respond to the belief that all other voters have f irst-order
belie f s. The level-2 voter assumes all other voters are level-1. The belief of a voter at level-k can
be generalized as: all other voters are thinking at level-(k-1) and hold one level of belief below
themselves. The strategy at any given level-k is the best response to a population of voters at a
level-(k-1).
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A voter will take a strategy at a given level of thinking that is a best response to the popu-
lation of voters one level below them. At a given level it can be ambigious what strategy is the
best response. In such cases the voters will only deviate from a lower level strategy if it gives
a strictly better outcome for them. When an agent thinking at level-k is indifferent between ac-
tions, one of which is their level-(k-1) action, they will remain with the decision at level-(k-1).
This avoids the issue of non-pivotal equilibria in levels higher than k when an equilibrium has
been reached at k.
2.3.5 Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept used will be the Nash equilibrium14. The paper will not aim to fully
define the set of Nash equilibria but analyse if the sincere voting strategy and each level of the
level-k voting strategy when played by all voters reach a Nash equilibrium. The outcome of
the SCF is a Nash equilibrium when no voter can give an alternative preference ranking that
changes the outcome to one they prefer.
%′ is a Nash equilibrium if at %: sc f (%′) %i sc f (%′′i , %′−i) ∀ i, ∀ %
′′
i
The SCF will represent either the SCF under plurality, PL(%), or the SCF under instant run-
off, IRO(%).
2.4 Voting Rules
2.4.1 Plurality
< represents the set of all %. Then the social choice function f for the plurality voting rule PL
maps < to the lottery of candidate that wins the election.
Social choice function: PL f : < → ∆{A, B, C}
The function calculates the number of votes for each candidate: V1A(%), V1B(%) and V1C(%).
For a given voter their vote will be cast for the candidate that they reveal as their most preferred
14see Nash (1950) for more details
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candidate when they reveal their preferences. When all voters submit sincere preferences these
values will equal the support vote.
Under plurality the candidate with the most votes wins the election. In this case the outcome
of the SCF is a singleton lottery and a deterministic outcome. When more than one candidate tie
on the most votes, the outcome of the SCF is a mixed lottery with a non-deterministic outcome.
Each candidate that is tied for first has an equal chance of winning.
The set M represents the set of candidates that are tied for first. The value |M| equals the
number of candidates that are tied for first.
M(%) := {ω|V1ω(%) ≥ V1ω′(%) ∀ω′ ∈ Ω}
Each candidate that is in the set M has an equal probability of winning. This probability is
equal to one divided by |M|.
PL(%)(ω) = 1|M| i f ω ∈ M
PL(%)(ω) = 0 i f V1ω(%) < V1ω′(%) f or some ω′ in Ω
When |M| equals one, the SCF has a deterministic outcome. If |M| is greater than one, the
SCF has a non-deterministic outcome. |M| cannot be less than or equal to zero.
2.4.2 The Instant run-off
For the instant run-off, there are at most two calculation steps that can have different vote totals.
Under the Instant run-off rule, a candidate wins by having more than half of the vote at a given
step of the SCF. Once a candidate has over half the vote at a given step, later steps are not
needed. The function f maps < to the lottery of winners as it did under plurality. There is an
odd number of voters, therefore there are no ties in an IRO election. The SCF only generates
singleton lotteries. The outcome of an IRO election is always deterministic.
Social choice function: IRO f : < → {A, B, C}
To select a winner, the function calculates the votes at two steps. In step one, the values
V1A(%), V1B(%) and V1C(%) are calculated as they were for PL(%). These vote totals will equal
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the support vote if all voters reveal sincere preferences.
If any of these values exceed half the vote, that candidate wins. The only outcome that is
generated from step one is a singleton for one candidate giving a deterministic victory for that
candidate. When the election ends in step one the outcome of the SCF is:
IRO(%)(ω) = 1 i f V1ω(%) > n2
If no candidates exceeds half the vote then step two is needed. The social choice function
generates a random linear order over the set Ω. This randomly assigns an order over the candi-
dates A, B and C such that no candidate is repeated and all candidates are included.
Two candidates are selected, ω and ω′ such that neither is the unique candidate with the
lowest vote share in the first round. When two candidates have the equal lowest vote share
ω is the candidate that is not the candidate with the lowest vote share and ω′ is the higher
ranked candidate from the random order among the candidates tied in last place. When three
candidates are tied with one third of the vote each then neither ω or ω′ is the unique candidate
that comes last in the random order. The candidate ω′′ that is not selected is eliminated from the
election.
At this stage all votes must go to ω or ω′. This process generates the step two values for the
two remaining candidates V2ω(%), V2ω′(%). Candidate ω′′ vote total is zero.
V2ω(%)(ω,ω′) = #{ i | ω %i ω′}
V2ω′(%)(ω,ω′) = #{ i | ω′ %i ω}
There is no chance to change preference order once a candidate is eliminated. As such the
only votes that can change between steps are those of voters who gave ω′′ as their first prefer-
ence. Voters had to give a full preference list over the three candidates and therefore the vote
total at this stage still equals n.
V2ω(%) + V2ω′(%) = n
When the election ends in step two the outcome of the SCF is:
SCF(%)(ω) = 1 if V2ω(%) > n2
SCF(%)(ω) = 0 if V2ω(%) < n2
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As n is odd: V2ω(%) 6= n2
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Sincere Voting results
Theorem 2.1. Under the Plurality rule sincere revelation of preferences is an equilibrium if a candidate
has a strict lead and all voters that most prefer candidate C are either not pivotal or all prefer the candidate
with the strict lead.
Proof: When voters reveal sincere preferences the social choice function, PL, outcome can
only be a lottery over A and B. Without loss of generality, we will assume candidate A has a
greater than or equal number of votes than candidate B. All results hold when candidate B has
a greater than or equal number of votes than candidate A. Therefore the outcome of PL is A or
AB.
PL(%) = (A)
PL(%) = (AB)
First considerPL(%) = (A): This is a Nash equilibrium under one of two conditions:
(1) No voter is pivotal
PL(%′i,%−i) = (A) ∀ i and ∀ %′i 6=%
(2) all pivotal voters prefer A to B.
PL (%′i,%−i) ≺i (A) ∀ i and ∀ %′i 6=% s.t. PL(%′i, %−i) 6= (A)
Table 2.1 outlines the preference profiles for which sincere voting is an equilibrium. Column
one gives the necessary vote total conditions. Column two defines which voters are pivotal.
Column three then gives the conditions needed for this to be a sincere equilibrium.
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Vote Total Condition Pivotal voters Individual Preference
Preferences Conditions
V1A(%) ≥ V1B(%) + 3 No Pivotal Voters No conditions
V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 2 ABC and ACB A  B
V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1 ABC and ACB A  B
CAB and CBA
TABLE 2.1: Pivotal voters and their necessary preferences for a set of vote totals to
be a sincere equilibrium
V1A(%) ≥ V1B(%)
The first-row states that if candidate A leads candidate B by more than two votes then no
voter is pivotal. The second-row states that if candidate A leads candidate B by more than one
but at most two votes than anyone that voted A must prefer candidate A to candidate B. All such
voters do prefer candidate A to candidate B by definition. The final row states that if candidate
A leads candidate B by one or less votes then all those that vote A and C must prefer candidate
A to candidate B. This is true by the definition of their type. For candidate C’s voters, it means
that none can be type (CBA). As such this type must not exist in the election. There is no sincere
equilibrium if candidate A leads candidate B by at most one vote and any of the voters that
voted C prefer B, type (CBA).
Now consider PL(%) = (AB): This is never an equilibrium. When candidate A and candi-
date B have the same vote total and therefore the outcome is the lottery (0.5,0.5,0) all voters are
pivotal. Therefore for this to be an equilibrium the candidates that voted for C must both prefer
A to B (CAB) and B to A (CBA) or they will deviate to one of these candidates. This is not
possible therefore this is never an equilibrium. 
Theorem 2.2. Under instant run-off sincere revelation of preferences is always an equilibrium.
Proof: The social choice function, IRO, outcome can come from the first step of calculations or
the second step of calculations.
Outcome in first step:
Occurs when a candidate has a strict majority. Only candidate A or B can have over half the
vote when voters honestly reveal their preferences. Given the assumption that candidate A has
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weakly more votes than candidate B, then only candidate A can win in step one.
A candidate wins at step one:
V1A(%) ≥ n+12
IRO(%) = (A)
This holds as an equilibrium under one of two conditions:
(1) No voter is pivotal
V1A(%) > n+12
IRO(%) = (A)
(2) all pivotal voters prefer A to B.
V1A(%) = n+12 ∩ IRO(%′i,%−i) ≺i (A) ∀i and %′i s.t IRO(%′i,%−i) 6= (A)
IRO(%) = (A)
The only types where IRO(%′i,%−i) 6= (A) are (ABC) and (ACB). All voters reveal their
preferences honestly, therefore all those that are pivotal prefer candidate A to all other candi-
dates. None of these voters can benefit from deviating away from the preferences they revealed.
Sincere voting by all voters in such a case is therefore an equilibrium.
A candidate wins at step two:
This leaves any case where candidate A does not win in the first step and no candidate has
a strict majority of the votes. This requires both steps of the social choice function to find the
solution. The analysis starts with step two:
All voters reveal their preferences honestly therefore candidate C will have the least votes.
Candidate A and candidate B progress to step two. In step two there can be no tie as there are
an odd number of voters. It is assumed that candidate A has weakly more votes than candidate
B in step one. This does not mean candidate A must have weakly more votes than candidate B
in step two. Here it will be assumed that the candidate that wins in the second step is ω and the
other candidate is ω′.
V2ω(%) ≥ n+12
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IRO(%) = (ω)
No one will deviate at step two (by changing the position they order candidate A and candidate
B in):
(1) No voter is pivotal
V2ω(%) > n+12
IRO(%) = (ω)
(2) all pivotal voters prefer ω to ω′.
V2ω(%) = n+12 ∩ IRO(%′i,%−i) ≺i (ω)∀i and %′i s.t IRO(%′i,%i−1) 6= (ω)
IRO(%) = (ω)
ω wins in the second step of the social choice function IRO with sincere voting. It must now be
shown that knowing that ω wins in step two no voter will reveal an insincere first choice which
will be used in the first step of analysis.
In step one when voters reveal preferences honestly, candidate C will be behind candidate A
and candidate B by more than two votes. Therefore there is no deviation by a single voter such
that candidate C is not the candidate that comes last.
The only way to change the outcome of function IRO is to get a candidate a strict majority so
they win in the first step. For this to be possible this candidate must be within one vote of a
strict majority. As candidate A has weakly more votes than candidate B it will first be assumed
that just candidate A is within one vote of a strict majority. After this it is assumed that both
candidate A and candidate B are within one vote of a strict majority.
V1A(%) = n−12
V1B(%) < n−12
IRO(%) = (ω)
There are then two cases, when (ω) = (A) and when (ω) = (B).
Case 1: The candidate that wins in the second step is candidate A: (ω) = (A).
This is always an equilibrium, no voter can change the outcome of the election. A deviation
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to A gives candidate A a strict majority in step one and candidate A wins, IRO(%′i,%−i) = (A).
There is no benefit to this deviation as candidate A will win in step two without deviation there-
fore the result is not changed. Therefore in this case sincere voting by all voters is an equilibrium.
IRO(%′i,%−i) = IRO(%) ∀i and ∀ %′i
IRO(%) = (A)
Case 2: The candidate that wins in the second step is candidate B: (ω) = (B).
This is always an equilibrium, no voter that can change the outcome wants to. If candidate
A is within one vote of having a strict majority and candidate B wins in step two there must be
no voters whose vote moves to candidate A in step two. There are no (CAB) types.
if V1A =
n−1
2 and V
2
B ≥ n+12 then V1A = V2A
All the voters that most prefer C can deviate to A but all prefer candidate B to candidate A
and will therefore not benefit from deviation. Therefore in this case sincere voting by all voters
is an equilibrium.
IRO(%′i,%−i) ≺i IRO(%) ∀i and %′i s.t IRO(%′i,%−i) 6= IRO(%)
IRO(%) = (B)
Finally, assume both candidate A and candidate B are within one vote of having a strict
majority at step one and candidate ω still wins the election.
V1A(%) = n−12
V1B(%) = n−12
IRO(%) = (ω)
In all such cases V1C = 1 as the sum of all three candidates vote share must equal n. This
single voter must prefer ω to ω′ as V2ω = n+12 . They can deviate to ω
′ and ω′ will win in step one
however they prefer ω so such a deviation gives a lower utility. There is also no benefit from
changing their most preferred choice to ω as this means ω wins in step one but they will win in
step two anyway.
IRO(%′i,%−i) ≺i (ω) ∀i and %′i s.t IRO(%′i,%−i) 6= (ω)
IRO(%) = (ω)
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Therefore in all such cases sincere voting by all voters is an equilibrium. 
Discussion: The above analysis shows that a profile where all voters honestly reveal their pref-
erences is always an equilibrium for the IRO but there is a set of vote distributions where the
plurality rule does not lead to a sincere equilibrium. In moving to an IRO voting rule, a designer
can guarantee that sincere voting will always be an equilibrium. This is beneficial if the aim of
designing the election rules is to induce sincere revelation of preferences.
The next step is to compare the results of the election under sincere revelation of preferences.
In this analysis, we can exclude any voting distribution where the two voting rules give the same
outcome as sincere voting as in such cases all voters are indifferent between voting rules. When
a sincere equilibrium exists for plurality, the two rules give different equilibria outcomes when
the candidate (or candidates) that leads in step one does not equal the candidate that wins in
step two. Otherwise they will give the same outcome.
Keeping the assumption that candidate A has weakly more support than candidate B the
plurality election can have one of two outcomes: O = (A), (AB). Of these only (A) exists in
equilibrium. The instant run-off election can have one of two outcomes: either candidate A
wins or candidate B wins: O = (A), (B). When the outcome of the plurality election is (A) then
the outcome of the instant run-off election must be (B) as the alternative outcome, (A), would
mean the two rules give the same outcome.
If candidate B wins in step two and all voters honestly reveal their preferences then it must
be the case that a strict majority prefer candidate B to candidate A in the population. Therefore
when the outcome of plurality is candidate A winning and the outcome of the instant run-
off election is that candidate B wins then a strict majority of voters prefer the outcome of the
election under the instant run-off election rule compared to the plurality election rule when they
are different. When the rules do not give different results all voters are indifferent.
Finally, consider the voter distributions where plurality does not lead to a sincere equilib-
rium. In such cases the lead candidate A has over candidate B is less than 1 (as before it is
assumed without loss of generality that candidate A has weakly more sincere support than can-
didate B).
No voter that most prefers candidate A or candidate B will deviate but a voter that most
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prefers candidate C might. Doing so changes the result from (A) to (B) or vice versa. Impor-
tantly this means that the outcome is still only O = (A), (B). So after deviation either candidate
A or candidate B wins. When this new result (which can be the same as the old result but does
not have to be) gives different results to the result under the instant run-off election rule then the
instant run-off election rule leads to the candidate that a strict majority prefer between candidate
A and candidate B. Therefore when the results are different the instant run-off election rule is
preferred by a strict majority compared with the result of the plurality election rule. When the
rules do not give different results all voters are indifferent.
2.6 Level - K voting Results
Here the results consider the optimal strategy at different levels of thinking where voters are
bounded in their rationality. In these results the strategies at different levels of thinking are
considered and compared for different voting rules. One way to compare the equilibrium at
different levels of thinking will be to analyse if such outcomes are equilibrium when voters are
not bounded by their rationality.
2.6.1 Instant Run-off
For instant run-off only one equilibrium is reached as k goes to infinity and that is the sincere
equilibrium where all voters reveal their preferences sincerely.
Theorem 2.3. With ’naive’ sincere, (Ns), level-0 voters the instant run-off rule reaches an unbounded
equilibrium at level-0. Sincere voting is the optimal strategy at all levels. The Nash equilibrium when k
goes to infinity is the sincere equilibrium.
Proof: For the (Ns) specification the level-0 voter is sincere, honestly revealing their prefer-
ences. Therefore when all voters are level-0 the IRO generates a profile with honest revelation
of preferences.
IRO(%) = (ω) i f f V1ω(%) ≥ n+12 and/or V2ω(%) ≥ n+12
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The level-1 voter assumes all voters are level-0. Their expectations are then a profile with
honest revelation of preferences. From section 2.2 it is known that for instant run-off all voters
voting sincerely leads to an equilibrium. Therefore level-1 voter will not deviate away from
sincere voting as the election is in equilibrium. The level-2 voter assumes all voters are level-1.
As all level-1 voters remain sincere the level-2 voter’s expectations are also the sincere profile.
The Nash equilibrium when k goes to infinity is the sincere equilibrium and this is reached at
level-0. 
Theorem 2.4. With randomizing, (Nr), level-0 voters the instant run-off rule reaches an unbounded
equilibrium at level-1. Sincere voting is the optimal strategy at all levels from level-1 and above. The
Nash equilibrium when k goes to infinity is the sincere equilibrium.
Proof: For the Nr specification the level-0 voter is random: they present a preference at
random. These preference only need to be complete, transitive and strict in singleton lotteries.
The SCF generates a random profile where each candidate has an equal chance of victory.
IRO(%) =⇒ { 13 , 13 , 13}
The level-1 voter assumes all voters are level-0 and their expectations are then the uniformly
random profile. The best response to a random profile where each candidate has an equal chance
of victory is to vote sincerely. A deviation to ω increases the probability ω wins by a fixed
amount δ and decreases the probability of all other candidates winning by an equal amount, For
example if for %′i the voter deviates to A:
IRO(%′i,%−i) = ( 13 + δ, 13 − δ2 , 13 − δ2 )
The probability candidate A wins is 13 + δ etc. The value for δ is not affected by which candi-
date a voter deviates to. So, the odds of the candidate that is a voter’s lowest preference winning
is not affected by whether the voter selects their first or second most preferred candidate.
Therefore, it is best to present a profile where the candidate that gets the vote is the candidate
that maximizes utility. Therefore a level-1 voter will vote sincerely.
Finally the level-2 voter assumes all voters are level-1. Their expectation is then the sincere
profile. Therefore, the level-2 voter under the Nr specification is equivalent to the level-1 voter
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under Ns. The remaining results follow the same process as Ns.
The Nash equilibrium when k goes to infinity, is the sincere equilibrium and it is reached at
level-1. 
2.6.2 Plurality
For Plurality there will be one of three equilibria reached as k goes to infinity (voters rationality
is unbounded): the sincere equilibrium, the Duverger’s Law equilibrium and the non-pivotal
equilibrium (the sincere equilibrium and the Duverger’s Law equilibrium can be cases of the
non-pivotal equilibrium. Here the non-pivotal equilibrium will be all equilibria excluding these
two types of equilibrium. )
Definition 2.1. The Duverger’s Law Equilibrium: This is an equilibrium where only two candi-
dates get a positive share of the vote.
Definition 2.2. The Non-pivotal Equilibrium: This is an equilibrium where no voter is able to
change the outcome of the election so there is no incentive to deviate.
Theorem 2.5. With ’naive’ sincere, (Ns), level-0 voters the plurality election has a sincere equilibrium
under the same conditions as theorem 2.1. The strategy played in equilibrium is reached at level-0.
Proof: All level-0 voters are sincere. It will again be assumed that candidate A has weakly more
sincere votes than candidate B.
V1A(%) ≥ V1B(%)
PL(%) = (A)
The level-1 voters have to best respond to a population of sincere voters. If all level-1 voters
best response is to vote sincerely, then there is a sincere equilibrium at level-1. The level-2 voters
are then identical to the level-1 voters and so on as k goes to infinity. The sincere equilibrium
occurs under one of two conditions.
1) No voter is pivotal:
PL(%′i,%−i) = (A) ∀ i and ∀ %′i 6=%
PL(%) = (A)
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(2) All pivotal voters prefer A to B.
PL (%′i,%−i) ≺i (A) ∀ i and ∀ %′i 6=% s.t. PL(%′i, %−i) 6= A
PL(%) = (A)
These are the same results as those found in theorem 2.1. When a sincere equilibrium exists
it will be reached at level-0 and all voters at higher levels of thinking will vote sincerely. 
Theorem 2.5 means that the remaining results will only consider the cases where there is no
sincere equilibrium. This occurs in one of two types of vote total: 1) V1A(%) = V1B(%) regardless
of the preferences of the voters that most prefer candidate C and 2) V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1 if there
exists at least one voter with preferences (CBA). The next two proofs calculate the necessary
conditions for the other two.
Theorem 2.6. With ’naive’ sincere, (Ns), level-0 voters( preference profile (%) ) the plurality election
has a Duverger’s Law equilibrium under one of three conditions:
1. V1A(%) = V1B(%)
2. V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1 ∩ (#i| %i= (CAB)) = 0
3. V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1 ∩ (#i| %i= (CBA)) = 1, 2
In condition one and two the Duverger’s Law equilibrium strategy is reached at level-1 and in condition
three it is reached at level-2.
Proof: The level-0 voters are sincere. There are two possible outcomes of the election with
level-0 voters (that do not end in the sincere equilibrium):
1. PL(%) = (A) if V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1
2. PL(%) = (AB) if V1A(%) = V1B(%)
No voter that most prefers candidate A, ((ABC), (ACB)), will prefer to deviate. The outcomes
of a deviation by a voter that most prefers candidate A are:
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1. When V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1; PL(%′i,%−i) = (AB) or (B) depending on if the deviation is
to making C or B the first choice respectively. In either case deviating is worse than not
deviating; PL(%′i,%−i) ≺i PL(%).
2. When V1A(%) = V1B(%); the same logic holds as the outcome of any deviation is now
PL(%′i,%−i) = (B). Deviating is again worse than not deviating; PL(%′i,%−i) ≺i PL(%).
No voters that most prefer candidate B, ((BAC), (BCA)), will prefer to deviate when they can.
The outcomes of a deviation by a voter that most prefers candidate B are:
1. When V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1; there is no deviation that changes the result, PL(%′i,%−i) =
PL(%) so there will be no deviation.
2. When V1A(%) = V1B(%); the same logic holds for voters that most prefer B that held for
voters that most prefer A. The outcome of any deviation is PL(%′i,%−i) = (A). Deviating
is again worse than not deviating; PL(%′i,%−i) ≺i PL(%).
This leaves the preference revelation of the voters that most prefer candidate C, ((CAB), (CBA)).
One or both of these types will deviate and will do so when pivotal. Both deviations are such
that their second most preferred option is presented as their most preferred option:
(CAB) types deviate to (ACB)
(CBA) types deviate to (BCA)
If both opt to be insincere in their preference revelation in equilibrium this is a Duverger’s
Law equilibrium. If only one opts to be insincere in their preference revelation in equilibrium
this is a non-pivotal equilibrium, which is covered in the next theorem.
Case 1: When candidate A and candidate B are tied all voters are pivotal and will deviate.
PL(%) = (AB) if V1A(%) = V1B(%)
If a (CAB) type voter reveals preferences (ACB) then the outcome of the social choice func-
tion is candidate A wins; IRO(%′i,%−i) = (A). They prefer candidate A to candidate B therefore
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this is better than the outcome without deviation; IRO(%) = (AB). Therefore the deviation hap-
pens. The same logic holds for the (CBA) type voters. Therefore all voters that prefer candidate
C have deviated to candidate A or candidate B.
V1A(%′) = #(i|A %i B)
V1B(%′) = #(i|A %i B)
PL(%′) = ω s.t. ω ∈ {A, B} ∩ V1ω > V1ω′ s.t. ω′ ∈ {A, B}\ω
This is the same strategy as the second step of the IRO social choice function with sincere
revelation of preferences and this has been shown to always be an equilibrium in theorem 2.2.
This does not need to be repeated here. The level-1 voters take the strategy where they vote for
the candidate they prefer between candidate A and candidate B. All players doing this is an
equilibrium therefore the level-2 voters who best respond to the population of level-1 voters do
so by taking the same strategy as the level-1 voter.
Case 2: When candidate A has one more vote than candidate B.
V1A(%) = V2B(%) + 1
PL(%) = (A)
As with the last case, and for the same reason, all voters that most prefer candidate A and
candidate B will not deviate. Additionally, no voter that most prefers candidate C and ranks
candidate A second, (CAB), will deviate. If they deviate to%′ so that their preference revelation
is B as their first choice then the outcome is IRO(%′i,%−i) = (AB) this gives a lower utility than
the outcome without deviation. If they deviate so that their preference reveals A as their first
choice then the outcome is unchanged.
PL(%i,%−i) ≺ (A) ∀ i s.t. (%i= (CAB) when PL(%i,%−i) 6= A
The voters that most prefer candidate C and rank candidate B second, (CBA), will deviate.
If they deviate the change to the outcome is the same as when a (CAB) type deviates. The
difference is that they prefer the outcome (AB) to (A).
PL(%i,%−i)  (A) ∀ i s.t. (%i= (CBA) when PL(%i,%−i) 6= A
Therefore with level-1 thinking all those that sincerely prefer candidate A and candidate B
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remain sincere as does the type (CAB) but type (CBA) gives insincere preferences and reveals
(BCA) instead. This is a Duverger’s Law equilibrium if there are no (CAB) type voters. Then
all voters vote for either candidate A or candidate B and as shown in 2.2 this is an equilibrium.
Then all levels above level-1 play the same strategy as level-1.
Case 3: This continues on from case 2. Candidate A has one more vote than candidate B at
level-0 with preference revelation %.
V1A(%) +V1B(%) + 1
PL(%) = A
Then in level-1 the preferences that are revealed, %′, are still sincere for all types of voter
except (CBA)who reveal (BCA). Now assume that there are a strictly positive number of (CAB)
and (CBA)type voters. The level-2 thinking will lead to the Duverger’s Law equilibrium if and
only if the (CAB) type voters deviate. This occurs if candidate A is tied with candidate B or one
behind candidate B. This occurs if there are exactly one or two voters that at level-0 revealed
preferences of type (CBA).
V1A(%′) = V1B(%′) if (#i| %i= (CBA)) = 1
PL(%′) = (AB)
or
V1A(%′) = V1B(%′)− 1 if (#i| %i= (CBA)) = 2
PL(%′) = (B)
In either outcome all (CAB) types will want to reveal alternative preferences %′′ of (ACB).
The outcome when (#i| %i= (CBA)) = 1 is; PL(%′′i ,%′−i) = (A). The outcome when (#i| %i=
(CBA)) = 2 is; PL(%′′i ,%′−i) = (AB). These outcomes are better than (AB) and (B) respectively.
Therefore all level-2 voters that reveal sincere preferences (CAB) at level-0 and level-1 now
deviate to insincere revelation of preferences and now all voters reveal preferences that lead to
a vote for candidate A or B and the Duverger’s Law equilibrium has been reached and as with
the other two cases this is an equilibrium for all higher levels of thinking. 
Theorem 2.7. With ’naive’ sincere, (Ns), level-0 voters the plurality election has a non-pivotal equilib-
rium if three conditions hold:
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1. V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1
2. (#i| %i= (CAB)) ≥ 1
3. (#i| %i= (CBA)) ≥ 3 .
The strategy played in equilibrium is reached at level-1.
Proof: For there to be a non-pivotal equilibrium that is not the sincere equilibrium it must be the
case that one of the groups that most prefer candidate C, ((CAB), (CBA)), deviates to a prefer-
ence revelation that ranks their second choice first (ACB) and (BCA) respectively. It cannot be
the case that both change the preference they reveal as this is then the Duverger’s Law equilib-
rium. Therefore this can only happen when candidate A has one more vote than candidate B
from the sincere revelation of preferences %. The outcome of sincere revelation of preferences is
therefore candidate A winning.
V1A(%) = V1B(%) + 1
PL(%) = (A)
The voters with sincere preferences (CBA) will then deviate at level-1 to %′i= (BCA). The
voters with preference (CAB) does not deviate as in all cases the outcome is either the same or
worse. These two results were shown in 2.6.2 and are not repeated here. The outcome of the
level-1 election is then either a tie between candidate A and candidate B or victory for candidate
B.
PL(%′) = (AB), (B)
If there are no voters with sincere preferences (CAB) then this leads to the Duverger’s Law
equilibrium therefore there must be at least one such voter.
(#i| %i= (CAB)) ≥ 1
At level-2; if the result of a level-1 election is a tie between candidate A and candidate B then
all the (CAB) type voters will want to deviate their revealed preferences to (ACB). Therefore the
election can not be tied and there cannot only be one voter with sincere preferences (CBA). For
the same reason candidate B cannot win by a single vote or the voters with sincere preferences
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equal to (CAB) will want to deviate. Therefore the number of (CBA) type voters cannot be one
or two (it can also not be zero as this will always lead to a sincere equilbrium see 2.2).
(#i| %i= (CBA)) ≥ 3
When these three conditions hold, candidate B wins the election, no voter is pivotal and all
voters vote sincerely except from those voters with sincere preferences (CAB). This non-pivotal
equilibrium is reached at level-1 thinking, %′. If all voters are level-0, %, candidate A wins but
this is not an unbounded equilibrium ( it only exists due to voter’s inability to reason a better
response).
PL(%) = (A)
PL(%′) = (B)
Theorem 2.8. With randomized, (Nr), level-0 voters the result is identical to that of the (Ns) specifi-
cation except each strategy occurs at a level of thinking one above that of the (Ns) specification and the
level-0 thinker is random.
Proof: At level-0 all voters vote randomly. As shown in proof 2.6.1 the best response to a
population of random voters is to reveal sincere preferences. Therefore all level-1 voters vote
sincerely. Therefore level-1 voters under the assumptions of (Nr) act in the same way as level -
0 voters under the (Ns) set of assumptions. All results found in proof 2.5, proof 2.6.2 and proof
2.7 hold for randomized level-0 voters except each strategy is reached one level higher as are the
equilibria.
Discussion: Subsection 2.6.2 proves that there are 3 possible equilibria for the plurality rule: the
sincere equilibrium, which exists under the same conditions as those laid out in subsection 2.1,
the Duverger’s Law equilibrium, where only two candidates get a positive share of the votes in
step one and then finally a non-pivotal equilibrium where some percentage of supporters of the
’small’ candidate do shift their vote to one of the ’large’ candidates but not all do.
The sincere equilibrium is reached at level-0 and level-1 respectively for Ns and Nr. There
is always a sincere equilibrium under the Instant Run-off election rule, see subsection 2.2 for the
proof. This is not the case for the plurality election rule which occurs under the same conditions
as those in subsection 2.1. The sincere equilibrium outcome is always candidate A or candidate
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B. The equilibrium outcome under the instant run-off election rule will always be the candidate,
between A and B, that is preferred by a strict majority of voters. Then, in any case where the
two mechanisms give different outcomes, the outcome under the instant run-off election rule is
preferred by a strict majority of voters compared to the plurality election rule.
The Duverger’s Law equilibrium is reached when all supporters of the ’small’ candidate
have an incentive to deviate to one of the ’large’ candidates. Duverger’s Law equilibrium is
reached at level-(1 or 2) and level-(2 or 3) respectively for Ns and Nr. The outcome of this elec-
tion is the same as the outcome of the instant run-off election under the assumption of sincere
voting. To reach this equilibrium requires an additional level of rationality regardless of speci-
fication. If we restrict to lower levels of rationality, then the two mechanisms can give different
outcomes. When they do, the outcome under instant run-off election rule is preferred by a strict
majority. When they give the same outcome the instant run-off election rule requires a lower
level of rationality.
Finally the non-pivotal equilibrium exists when only some of the supporters of the ’small’
candidate have an incentive to shift their vote, specifically those that prefer one ’large’ candidate
do deviate to that candidate while those that prefer the other ’large’ candidate do not deviate.
This will always require a higher level of thinking than the instant run-off election rule to reach
equilibrium. The instant run-off election rule reaches equilibrium at level-0 or level-1 in Ns and
Nr respectively while the non-pivotal equilibrium, will require at least level-1 and level-2 for
Ns and Nr respectively. The outcome of the non-pivotal equilibrium will always be victory for
the candidate that came second in the profile with honest revelations of preferences. Unlike the
Duverger’s Law equilibrium, the outcome of the non-pivotal equilibrium can be different from
the outcome under instant run-off election rules. When the rules give different outcomes the
outcome under the instant run-off election rule leads to an outcome that is strictly better for a
strict majority of the population compared to the plurality election rule.
So at best, the outcome of the plurality election rule is the same as the instant run-off election
rule while taking the same number of levels to reach equilibrium and is preferred by a strict
majority to the other ’large’ candidate. There exists a set of voter type distributions, such that
the outcome is strictly worse for a strict majority and/or takes longer to be reached.
In summary, this supports the argument that the plurality election rule leads to ’wasted’
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votes due to bounded rationality at lower levels of thinking. It also suggests that even at higher
levels of thinking with unbounded rationality ’wasted’ votes occur due to voters not being piv-
otal. This is one rationale for the phenomenon of wasted votes that is suggested as a problem/
contradiction to Duverger’s Law as well as being seen in the real world. One solution to this
problem is the instant run-off election rule; this eliminates the ’wasted’ vote problem as inter-
preted in this paper. It also requires a lower level of thinking to implement the strategy played
with compete rationality. Finally it gives a better payoff to a strict majority of voters compared
to the plurality election rule when these rules have different outcomes.
2.7 Conclusion
The chapter presents a social choice function voting model with three candidates with three
objectives; (1) defining the sincere equilibrium for cases with two ’large’ candidates and one
’small’ candidate to compare plurality and instant run-off (2) to apply level-k thinking to election
models to shed light on bounded rationality in voting games (3) to argue that the instant run-
off election rule is superior with voters of bounded rationality in election systems with two
dominant parities/candidates.
The model investigated the effect a ’small’ candidate that is not expected to win can have
in an election. The first aim of the chapter was to characterises the full equilibrium under two
alternative voting rules. The Instant Run-off rule was found to give a sincere equilibrium for all
vote shares under the condition of ’large’ and ’small’ candidates. Plurality by comparison only
sometimes has a sincere equilibrium. The chapter then defined the cases where plurality fails to
have a sincere equilibrium.
The second aim of the paper was to give the outcomes for the level-k bounded rationality
thinking in Nagel (1995) in a three candidate voting game. This adds to the literature of the idea
of ’wasted votes’. The argument in this paper is that some voters make ’wasted votes’ because
they are bounded in their rationality and are unable to consider the higher levels of thinking
necessary to reach a Duverger’s Law equilibrium. It also finds that under certain conditions
voters still ’waste’ their vote due to not being pivotal.
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It was shown that the Nash equilibrium when k tends to infinity for the instant run-off elec-
tion rule was always the sincere equilibrium. All three candidates got a positive vote share as
predicted by Duverger (1959) in the corollary he gave regarding run-off elections. This requires
a low level of thinking. When Nagel’s random level-0 voter is assumed the sincere equilibrium
strategy is reached by level-1 thinkers. Alternatively if the ’naive’ voter from Bassi (2015) is
assumed the sincere equilibrium strategy is reached by level-0 thinkers.
The results for plurality support Duverger’s Law in part. The Duverger’s Law equilibrium
does exist for certain distributions of voters but the sincere equilibrium also still exists as does a
set of non-pivotal equilibria.
When the Duverger equilibrium occurred under the plurality election rule, it gave the same
results as the instant run-off election rule did but required a higher level of thinking to reach
the equilibrium. When the plurality election rule ended in the sincere equilibrium, this was
reached at the same level of thinking as the instant run-off election but not always with the same
outcome.
A third set of equilibria were reached for plurality. In this set of non-pivotal equilibria all
three candidates get a positive vote share but not all voters are sincere. This supports the idea
of the ’wasted’ vote not due to lack of information but rather due to voters not being pivotal.
Reaching this equilibrium requires a higher level of rationality than the equilibrium reached
under the instant run-off rule.
The final aim of the chapter was to argue that the instant run-off election rule is preferable
when voters are bounded in their rationality and there are two large parties. This chapter finds
that there are a number of reasons to prefer the instant run-off election rule. Firstly, when the
equilibrium outcome of the plurality rule and the instant run-off rule are different the outcome
of the instant run-off election rule was always strictly preferred by a strict majority of voters. So
the instant run-off election rule would be considered better by anyone that wants a social choice
function to represent the majority of votes.
The second reason to prefer the instant run-off rule is that it takes a weakly higher level
of thinking to reach the equilibrium under the plurality voting rule. What this means is that
the strategy that would be played by a perfectly rational voter is reached with a lower level of
90 Chapter 2. The Weakness of Plurality in Electoral Systems
thinking using the instant run-off election rule (or the same level of thinking). Therefore even
when both rules give the same outcome and can be argued to be equal it requires voters with a
higher level of rationality to reach this equilibrium. So the instant run-off election rule would be
considered better by anyone that wants an election rule that requires the voters to be able to act
optimally without thinking as much. This makes voting more accessible.
The final reason to prefer the instant run-off rule in this case is that it allows sincere voting
at the same time as letting voters optimise their strategy. Voters do not have to make a trade off
between honest revelation of preferences and optimal decision making. This is preferable if the
aim of elections is to receive the honest opinion of the voter and not just the outcome of tactical
voting that obscures the real will of the people.
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Chapter 3
Candidate Divergence, Entry, and the
Run-off Rule
3.1 Introduction
The first two chapters analysed voter strategy in three candidate elections. In chapter one the
Divided majority problem was tested experimentally under two related run-off rules. The first is
the two round run-off with a majority threshold rule (2RM); this is used in France’s presidential
election along with the majority of other presidential systems. The other is a flexible thresh-
old (2RF); this is loosely similar to that of Argentina and a number of other central and south
American countries. In chapter two Sincere voting and level-k bounded rational thinking were
analysed. The first rule analysed was the Plurality (P); this is used in 19 presidential systems
and is loosely similar to the United States electoral system1. The second rule was the Instant
run-off system (IRO); this is used to elect the Irish president and the parliament of Australia.
These four systems represent the vast majority of non-proportional representation elections in
the world.
The first two chapters focused on the voter’s strategy under these rules and other conditions,
in both cases a degree of policy divergence between candidates was assumed. Prior to this
chapter no discussion on what can motivate such a divergence was had. A large number of
papers have discussed what causes policy divergence and I present a non-exhaustive list in the
literature review in section 3.2. One prominent paper by Palfrey (1984) proposes that candidate
1theirs is a plurality of the electoral college not a population plurality
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divergence can be used as a crowding out method by incumbents to defeat entrant parties. In
Palfrey’s paper two candidates position themselves simultaneously preempting entry by a third
candidate. The paper proves that for Plurality the two candidates take symmetrically opposite
positions around the median voter and the entrant takes a position between the two candidates.
When the population is more concentrated around the median the entrant will take the median
position. Palfrey (1984) assumes sincere voting and shows that the entrant gets a smaller share
of the vote than the incumbents and never wins the election.
The model in Palfrey (1984) puts additional restrictions on the utilities of the voters, com-
pared to my first two chapters, by using the Downs (1957) and Hotelling (1929) linear city struc-
ture and making voters’ utility single peaked. In spite of this, the model still gives a good
structure to understand the policy positions that the candidates take in my first two chapters
and explain the divergence. This Chapter, using the same structure as Palfrey (1984), will anal-
ysis the candidate strategies and equilibrium outcome for the four election rules from chapter
one and two; 3.4.1 Plurality, 3.4.2 Instant Run-off, 3.4.3 two Round with majority Threshold, and
3.4.4 two round with flexible threshold.
Sincere voting has been shown to be a viable strategy under all four rules and will be as-
sumed in each case for this chapter. The strength of this assumption and the possible effect of
dropping it will be discussed in the results but will not be modeled. This chapter will compare
the candidate strategies under the four rules. It will present the effect that changing the election
rules has on the policy positions of different candidates as well as how it changes who win the
election and the policy that is implemented. As the first two chapters set the policy of the can-
didates and the utility that a voter gets from each candidate exogenously this chapter will aim
to see if a simple Downs-Hotelling model with entry leads to candidates taking policy positions
that replicate those seen in the first two chapters. Neither of the first two chapters used single
peaked preferences, as such there will be gaps or omission where the results of the analysis in
this chapter does not match perfectly with that of the other chapters. Where this occurs it will
be highlighted and discussed.
The simplest observation of the chapter is that if candidates cannot change their position be-
tween rounds. With three candidates the strategy of the candidates is identical under the (IRO)
rule and the (2RM) rule. Under the (IRO) rule voters rank their candidates sincerely, if a candi-
date has a strict majority that candidate wins, if no candidate has a strict majority the candidate
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with the least votes is eliminated. The votes for the candidate that got eliminated get instantly
moved to the second ranking of the voters that had supported the eliminated candidate. With
three candidates this only occurs once. Alternatively under (2RM) voters vote for their most
preferred candidate. If a candidate has a strict majority that candidate wins. If no candidate has
a strict majority the two candidates with the most votes go through to a second election. In this
election everyone votes again and votes for their most preferred candidate. For those whose
most preferred candidate from round one is still in the election their vote has not changed. For
those whose most preferred candidate was eliminated in the first round their vote will be for
their second choice. These two definitions are equivalent to the candidate under the conditions
of three candidates, no policy shift between voting rounds and sincere voting.
The first result of this chapter, section 3.6.1, is that under the Plurality rule the outcome
is that the two incumbents have larger vote shares than the entrant. This fits well with the
structure of the model used in chapter two. Here the ’large’ candidates have strictly larger vote
shares than the ’small’ candidate. In equilibrium the two incumbents have an equal vote share
on average. This relates well to the key area of interest in chapter two; when the two ’large’
candidates have similar support levels. This is the only case in chapter two where voters are
pivotal and may be strategic. In chapter two the supporters of the small candidate when pivotal
will deviate to the larger candidates. This strategic thinking is not analyised in this chapter but
intuition suggests that the policy divergence is not contradictory with strategic voting as both
incumbents still fear the entrant could make itself one of the ’large’ candidates and will position
themselves accordingly. Therefore entry supports policy divergence under plurality and is a
possible explanation for the policy positions of the candidates found in chapter two.
The second finding in the results, section 3.6.2, is less supporting of the structure of chapter
2. Under Instant Run-off the entrant takes a position that is identical to one of the incumbents.
This creates two candidates with a ’small’ vote share and one candidate that is ’large’. It suggests
that the ’small’ candidate in chapter two can not be explained by entry as easily with the (IRO)
rule. The key factor here is that under (IRO) the entrant has a 25% chance of victory and victory
for the ’small’ candidate is not possible in chapter two. This issue is solved if it is assumed that
candidates can not enter at the same position as an incumbent but there is no clear rationale for
this and it was not modeled.
Moving to the two round elections an interesting finding arises. The fact that the entrant
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takes the same position as one of the incumbents supports in part the divided majority design
in chapter one under the two round strict majority threshold rule. There are three components
with the equilibrium found for this rule that do not fit the structure of chapter one. Firstly here
the divided group is not a strict majority as they represent exactly 50% of the electorate and
secondly the minority candidate does not represent a strict minority as they also have 50% of
the electorate. Finally the two majority candidates have exactly the same policy position. All
these issues suggest that the policy positions found in the divided majority problem in chapter
one is not explained by the equilibrium found in this chapter.
The structure does however fit very well with a non-equilibrium outcome in this chapter.
Specifically, when one of the incumbents (for simplicity candidate B) takes a position further
from the centre than the other incumbent (A), candidate C then enters near to A but not taking
the identical policy position. This creates the divided majority that are split between two op-
tions. Additionally the voters that prefer candidate A and candidate C over candidate B do now
represent a strict majority as candidate B is further from the centre than A and C. The two ma-
jority candidates now do not have the same policy positions but are close. Finally as in chapter
one the minority candidate now has a zero probability of victory. This link is not perfect. The
voter utilities in chapter one are not single peaked on a single dimension however there is some
evidence to suggest that the divided majority problem can be explained by the entry problem
where one candidate takes a non equilibrium position.
The final result of the chapter involves the flexible threshold. The equilibrium of the game
under this rule is identical to that of Plurality. This is due to any reduction in the threshold
leading to it being impossible for the entrant to win the election and they return to being vote
maximisers instead of trying to win. This result therefore fits better with the design of chapter
one. It shows policy divergence among the majority candidates ( in this case they are the entrant
and the incumbent they move closer to). It also creates an actual minority candidate (they have
strictly less than half the vote when the entrant moves near to the other candidate). It also sup-
ports the claims in chapter one that lowering the threshold increases the odds that the minority
candidate wins. However it still has shortcomings, most obviously that the minority candidate
can still win in round two when one is reached. Like the result regarding the majority threshold
the divided majority can be partially explained by a entry problem with one candidate in a non-
equilibrium position. In doing so it creates the case where the minority candidate exceeds the
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flexible threshold and always wins as it does in the first chapter. The entrant and the incumbent
that is closer to the centre act as the majority and the minority is the other candidate. As with
the last case this is not perfect as the voters do not have single peaked preferences but there
is some evidence that an entry game partially explains the divided majority problem. This is
also a stronger case for the divided majority with a flexible threshold being an entry game in
equilibrium.
When considering two round elections; if candidates can shift their policy position in the
second round, both candidates will shift to the median voter position and the first round will
have no effect. This case will not be considered in this chapter as it is concerned with political
promises and cheap talk and not primarily candidate positioning. A possible extension would
be to allow for complete policy shifting and/or for a small shift between elections (which could
be fixed). Another extension not considered here is including participation uncertainty between
rounds. This was tested in chapter one for the divided majority but is not detailed here. With
sincere voting the intuition would be that it will have a limited effect as in this model candidates
rarely win in round one.
3.2 Literature
This chapter uses the spatial market proposed Hotelling (1929) that presents a linear city for
firms to compete with and uses the political interpretation from Downs (1957). The model pre-
sented in these papers assumes a single policy space from zero to one hundred (in this chap-
ter that will be scaled to zero to one) and introduces single peaked preferences. Downs and
Hotelling have been the basis of a huge number of papers in the literature on political parties
and is a well established framework. The finding of Hotelling (1929) is that parties in a two can-
didate system inevitably converge to the centre, now known as the median voter theory. Downs
(1957) supports this main finding but suggests that if abstention is introduced for voters that
have no candidate near them then with polarized voters the candidates will become polarized.
Downs (1957) also allowed for stable spatial equilibria with 3 parties if voters were grouped as
it forced parties to retain a degree of policy consistency (they were unable to jump over other
candidates taking a more right wing position than a candidate that had previously been right
of them etc). This abstention risk is one possible motivator for policy divergence but was not
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included in either of the first two chapters so will not be expanded on here.
If the conditions imposed by Downs are dropped and Hotelling’s original model is consid-
ered, a three candidate election has parties converge to the middle but does not have a stable
equilibrium. The median voter theory has been shown to explain a tenancy towards the cen-
tre for political parties but no political system has complete convergence to the centre. Downs
proposes that this is due to the risk of abstention and voters not being approximately normally
distributed. Since the introduction of the Downs-Hotelling model there have been numerous
papers aimed at explaining why the median voter theorem does not appear perfectly in reality.
This chapter aims to consider one of these explanations to justify the policy divergence used
in the other two chapters. The model this chapter analyses is the extension proposed by Pal-
frey (1984). This introduces candidate entry. He reverts to the conditions used by Hotelling and
therefore with three candidates simultaneous movement is not stable. Instead of simultaneous
policy positions his paper instead shows that if two incumbent parties move first and a third
candidate moves subsequently the first two act to minimize the entrant’s vote share and take
divergent policy positions. The citetpalfrey1984entry paper shows this for plurality and the ex-
tension of this chapter is to implement the same policy for alternative winner takes all elections
to compare the results and relate them to the models in my other chapters. Brusco, Dziubin´ski,
and Roy (2012) analyses the run-off voting system under the Downs-Hotelling model without
entry and three or more candidates. They find multiple equilibria including the divergent equi-
libria found in Palfrey (1984) for plurality and find cases with convergent outcomes like those
in Hotelling (1929). This supports the set of equilibria found in this chapter. Specifically this is
that median voter convergence will exist in such a model with simultaneous moves and that the
median voter position is an equilibrium as getting the most votes in round one is meaningless
unless the candidate also exceeds the threshold.
In contrast to Palfrey’s findings, Feddersen, Sened, and Wright (1990) present a similar model
of voter entry but with strategic voters. Additionally, they do not have two established candi-
dates. Instead candidates enter one at a time and are not fixed. With single entry, they get
complete convergence to the median voter. This model is in direct opposition to that of Palfrey
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(1984) but supports the original findings for Hotelling (1929).
The rest of this section presents some of the alternative explanations for candidate diver-
gence. These alternatives will not be modeled in this chapter but in cases where the findings in
this chapter do not transfer to the analysis in the other chapters some of these alternatives will
be discussed.
Castanheira, 2003 argues that candidates take divergent positions to give voters a chance to
agenda set. Here candidates take divergent positions so that voters can vote for them and signal
that there is a large percentage of the voting population that prefers this divergent position.
Voting for a candidate that will not win can increase the chance that a similar candidate will win
in the future.
Another reason given for divergent positions is the incumbent effect. Bernhardt and In-
german, 1985 present a model where candidates get a benefit from maintaining their current
position. Here divergence can occur as candidates take a position for a given set of voters and
are committed to it once the voters’ preference might change. There is then a premium on repu-
tation; where reputation is bolstered by candidates showing consistency and being perceived as
being less risky. In this case candidates diverge as the entrant will not want the same policy as
the incumbent. Victory then goes to the candidate that is currently closer to the voters’ tastes.
Aragones and Palfrey (2000) present a similar concept to incumbency effect by considering
the effect of one candidate being a favoured candidate. The favoured candidate will get all the
votes from any voters that are indifferent over the two candidates. They find divergent equilibria
where the favoured candidate takes a more moderate position.
The final paper considered in this short summary of other possible motivations for policy
divergence concerns the primary process; Gerber and Morton (1998) propose that policy diver-
gence is caused by primaries prior to the election and the level of ideological extremism in the
primary dictates the level of divergence.
The next section goes on to outline the model that will be analysed.
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3.3 Model
3.3.1 Candidates, Policy Space and Voters
This first section outlines the elements of the model that are common to all four voting rules
that will be analysed. This section has the same structure as Palfrey (1984) which is an extensive
form game with two stages of policy positioning.
There will be three players in the model, A, B and C. A player, ω, is a candidate in the
election. The setΩ represents all candidates. Players will henceforth be referred to as candidates.
ω ∈ Ω = {A, B, C}
There is a single dimension continuous policy space that will be normalized to the closed
range [0, 1]. λ will be a single policy position on this policy space.
λ ∈ [0, 1]
Each voter, i, has a ideal ’bliss’ point. This bliss point is a single policy position in the policy
space that will be called λi. Voters are entirely policy motivated. The only utility they get comes
from the policy that is implemented and not the candidate that implements it, Ui(λ). Their
utility decreases linearly the further a policy, λ, is from their bliss point. The utility curve is
symmetric around the bliss point and complete. The size of the set of voters will equal n.
λi ∈ [0, 1]
Ui(λ) = −|λi − λ|
The voters’ bliss points are distributed according to the CDF function F on the issue space,
[0, 1]. For the analysis of this chapter the distribution of bliss points will be assumed to be
uniform.
F(λ) = λ
Voters are not assumed to be active players in this game. They will vote sincerely and act
automatically. Sincere voting is defined by the voting rule and will be expanded on in the section
3.4 on voting rules. The voting rule and voters’ sincere voting are common knowledge to the
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candidates.
3.3.2 Histories
H is a set of finite histories that are terminal when a candidate has won the election. Z represents
the set of terminal histories. The set of actions available at a non-terminal history, h, are denoted
A(h). The action set A(h), at all non terminal histories, are all policy positions within the policy
space. The action of a candidate at history h is then a single policy position within the policy
space. A candidate’s policy position will be denoted λω
A(h) = [0, 1] ∀ h ∈ H\Z
aω(h) = λω ∈ [0, 1]
P is the function that assigns to each non-terminal history a subset of players from Ω ∪ {E}.
This is the player function and P(h) is the player that takes an action at history h. When P(h) = E
the election rule is implemented. No player acts at this stage but using the information at history
h the exogenous rules of the election select a winner.
The (∅) history occurs prior to any candidate setting a policy. At this history P assigns the
candidates A and B to set their policy position. These are the incumbent candidates. They set
their policy position knowing that after doing so a third candidate will enter and set a policy
position.
P(∅) = A, B
The next history follows on from candidates A and B setting their respective policy positions,
λA and λB. At this history, (λAλB) the function P selects candidate C to set their policy position.
Candidate C knows the policy position that both candidates A and B have taken.
P(λAλB) = C
After all three candidates have set their policy position at history (λAλBλC) the function P
selects E to play. The election rule is then implemented using the three policy positions at that
history and the distribution of voters.
P(λAλBλC) = E
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The election rule selects the outcome, O. O is the candidate that wins the election and is an
element of Ω. The election is over and the history (λAλBλCO) is terminal.
The utility a candidate gets from the election is denoted U(O|ω). A candidate, ω, is purely
office seeking. They get no utility from the policy, λω that is implemented. They get a positive
utility when they win the election, O = ω. They get no utility when another candidate, ω′, wins
the election, O = ω′.
U(ω|ω) > U (ω′|ω) ∀ ω ∈ Ω ∩ ∀ ω′ ∈ Ω\ω
The equilibrium concept that will be tested is the Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium is a set
of actions such that no candidate can increase their utility by deviating while all other players’
strategies are fixed.
3.3.3 Strategies
Candidate A’s and Candidate B’s strategy, σω is pure strategy selecting one element of [0, 1] for
the non-terminal history where h = (∅).
σω : (∅)→ [0, 1] ∀ ω ∈ {A, B} (3.1)
Candidate C’s mixed strategy, σC is a probability measure over the set [0, 1] for the non-
terminal history where h = (λAλB), such that all elements of the mixed strategy are selected
with equal probability.
σC : (λAλB)→ ∆[0, 1] (3.2)
3.3.4 Summary
The set up presented in section 3.3 defines the game from Palfrey (1984). The game has a Stack-
elberg leader relationship with candidate A and candidate B as the leaders and candidate C as
3.4. Voting Rules 101
the follower. There is also a Cournot-Nash relationship between candidate A and candidate B.
These relationships are presented in figure 3.1.
Entrant C
Established Candidate A Established Candidate B
Stackelberg Stackelberg
Cournot
-Nash
FIGURE 3.1: Strategic Interactions in the Palfrey Model
3.4 Voting Rules
This chapter compares the 4 voting rules that have been analysed in the first two chapters of the
thesis: single round plurality, two round majority threshold, two round flexible threshold and
Instant run-off. In this section each rule will be defined as will how they are implemented by the
voters.
3.4.1 Plurality (P):
Each voter has a single vote, vi, that they cast for a single candidate. The total number of votes
for a candidate are summed and divided by the number of voters n, to give a candidate’s vote
percentage, Vω.
vi = ω ∈ Ω
Vω =
(#i|vi=ω)
n
The candidate with the largest Vω wins the election. When two candidates tie with the largest
Vω one is randomly picked as the winner. Each has a one half probability of victory. If all three
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candidates are tied with one third of the vote the winner is randomly picked from all three
candidates and each candidate has a one third probability of victory.
Vω > Vω′ ∀ω′ ∈ Ω\ω ⇒ O = ω
Vω = Vω′ > V ′′ω s.t. ω 6= ω′ ⇒ Prob(O = ω) = Prob(O = ω′) = 12
Vω = Vω′ = V ′′ω s.t. ω 6= ω′ 6= ω′′ ⇒ Prob(O = ω) = Prob(O = ω′) = Prob(O = ω′′) = 13
Sincere Voting under Plurality
A voter gets utility from the outcome of the election. Their utility is dependent on their bliss
point, λi, the candidate that wins and the policy they implement; Ui(λω|O = ω). To simplify
notation this will be written Ui(ω).
Ui(λω|O = ω) = −|λi − λω|
Ui(λω|O = ω) ≡ Ui(ω)
Voters are sincere; they will therefore vote for the candidate that is closest to their bliss point.
If multiple candidates are tied as closest to a voter’s bliss point the voter will randomly select
one of the candidates and each candidate has an equal probability of winning.
Ui(ω) > Ui(ω′)∀ω′ ∈ Ω\ω ⇒ vi = ω
Ui(ω) = Ui(ω′) > U(ω′′)ω 6= ω′ ⇒ Prob(vi = ω) = Prob(vi = ω′) = 12
Ui(ω) = Ui(ω′) = U(ω′′)ω 6= ω′ 6= ω′′ ⇒ Prob(vi = ω) = Prob(vi = ω′) = Prob(vi = ω′) =
1
3
Voters cannot abstain from voting therefore the sum of the three candidates’ vote shares will
equal one.
∑
ω=A,B,C
Vω = 1
3.4.2 Instant Run-off (IRO):
Each voter gives a single vote vi that ranks the three candidates (v1i , v
2
i , v
3
i ). A vote v
r
i is the
candidate that voter i ranks in position r ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The total number of first votes, v1i are
summed for each candidate’s first round vote total and divided by n to give V1ω. Each rank
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must be unique and no candidate can be repeated in the ranking and therefore this is a complete
ranking of all candidates.
vi = (v1i , v
2
i , v
3
i )
v1i , v
2
i , v
3
i ∈ Ω s.t. v1i 6= v2i 6= v3i
V1ω =
(#i|v1i =ω)
n
If V1ω > 0.5 then candidate ω has a strict majority and wins the election. Only one candidate
can get a strict majority so there are no tie breaker rules for victory.
V1ω >
1
2 ⇒ O = ω
V1ω ≤ 12 ∀ ω ∈ Ω ⇒ round two
The candidate with the lowest share of the vote is eliminated from the set of options. The
eliminated candidate is denoted e. When more than one candidate are tied with the lowest
vote share one of these candidates will be eliminated at random. The two remaining candidates
have their vote share re-calculated for round two, V2ω. Their vote share now includes the second
votes, v2i , of any voter that had voted for candidate e. If a candidate gets a strict majority that
candidate win the election. If the two candidates get 50% of the vote each such that neither has
a strict majority then a candidate will be selected at random to win the election.
V2ω = 0 i f f ω = e
V2ω = V1ω +
(#i|v2i =ω ∩ v1i =ω′=e)
n ∀ω 6= e
V2ω >
1
2 ⇒ O = ω
V2ω = Vω′ = 0.5 ⇒ Prob(O = ω) = 0.5, Prob(O = ω′) = 0.5
Sincere Voting under Instant Run-off
The utility calculations are identical to (P); so will not be defined again. The only factor that
is different is how thee voters implement their vote. Now they have to rank all three candidates.
The candidate that they chose for v1i is the same candidate that they would vote for under (P).
The candidate chosen for v2i is then the candidate that they would select in (P) if the candi-
date they chose for v1i was not possible. The final selection v
3
i is whatever candidate remains.
The third selection is trivial and is included here for completeness. If there were more than 3
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candidate this selection would not be trivial.
As before abstention is not allowed therefore the sum of the three vote shares equals one.
∑
ω=A,B,C
Vrω = 1 ∀r ∈ {1, 2}
3.4.3 Two Round Strict Majority Threshold (2RM):
Each voter has two votes, one per round of voting. Their first vote, v1i is conducted in the first
round and is identical to (P) and will not be expanded on here. If a candidate gets a strict
majority of first round votes, V1ω >
1
2 , that candidate wins the election. If no candidate gets a
strict majority the election moves to round two.
V1ω >
1
2 ⇒ O = ω
V1ω ≤ 12 ∀ ω ∈ Ω ⇒ round two
In round two the two candidates with the most votes will be on the ballot. Each voter’s
second vote is then a binary choice between the two candidates that got the most votes in round
one. A candidate will win a strict majority of the votes in this round2. Therefore with three
candidates and no policy shifting between rounds the (2RM) rule is equivalent to the (IRO)
rule.
Sincere Voting under Two Round Strict Majority threshold
The sincere voting decision in round one for (2RM) is identical to (IRO); they select their
most preferred candidate. Additionally with three candidates and no policy shifting between
rounds the sincere voting decision for the second round of voting is identical to the second
ranked candidate for (IRO). The only difference between (IRO) and (2RM) is that for (IRO)
the third ranked candidate is also identified. This was only done for completeness and therefore
the actions of the voter are identical in both models.
2For the same reason as (IRO) there must be a candidate with a strict majority in round two.
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3.4.4 Two round elections with flexible threshold (2RF):
This has the same structure as (2RM). There are two rounds of voting but a candidate now wins
if they are the only candidate to surpass a percentage of the total votes cast. This percentage is
exogenously decided and denoted, τ ∈ [0, 1]. A candidate wins if they exceed τ with their round
one vote total. If no candidate exceeds the threshold or two candidates exceed the threshold3
the election moves to round two and from that point is identical to (2RM).
(V1ω > τ) ∩ (V1ω′ ≤ τ ∀ ω′ 6= ω) ⇒ O = ω
V1ω ≤ τ ∀ω ∈ Ω ⇒ round two
(V1ω > τ) ∩ (V1ω′ > τ s.t. ω 6= ω′) ⇒ round two
Sincere Voting under Two Round flexible threshold
This is identical to sincere voting under the two round strict majority threshold.
3.4.5 Comments
There are a number of comments to be made about these rules and how they will be analysed.
1. The majority threshold is a special case of the flexible threshold. These are separated out
for two reasons. Firstly this chapter is in part aiming to support findings in the first two
chapters and chapter one tests the majority threshold as a special case therefore it makes
sense to analyse the differences from the candidate perspective having done so from the
voter perspective. Secondly the majority threshold is by far the most prevalent two round
system in the world and while the work here and in chapter one acknowledge it is just a
special case of a flexible threshold its prevalence motivates any analysis to single it out.
2. The set of rules with three candidates and no policy shifting between voting rounds as well
as the set of sincere voters mean that (IRO) and (2RM) are equivalent from the perspective
of the players and for a given strategy the outcomes will be identical. For this reason the
two rules will be treated as the same in the analysis.
3τ is assumed to be > 13 as a threshold lower than a third can lead to three candidates passing the threshold for
entry into round two but the aim of two round elections is to limit the second vote to two candidates
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3.5 Vote Shares
To calculate how voters vote when they have a candidate to their left and right it is generally
necessary to calculate the mid point between two candidates. However, as the voters are uni-
formly distributed it is not necessary to calculate the mid point and instead just halve the voters
with bliss points between two candidates. This is the number of voters that will vote for each
of the candidates. Calculating the vote share of any population range just requires taking the
upper limit minus the lower limit.
3.5.1 With Candidate Divergence
Histories: h = (λA,λB) = (0.5, 0.5)
Candidate C will enter in one of five positions in relation to the position of candidate A (λA)
and candidate B (λA). The five possible positions are: λC = (λA − δ), (λA), (λB), (λB + δ) or
λC ∈ (λA,λB), where δ is strictly positive.
When λC = (λA − δ):
Candidate C gets all voters where λi ∈ [0,λC] and half of the votes where λi ∈ [λC,λA]. The
vote share is then:
VC = (λC − 0) + (λA−λC2 ) = (λA+λC2 )
λC = (λA − δ)
∴ VC = (λA−δ+λA2 ) = (λA − δ2 )
Candidate A then gets the other half of the votes where λi ∈ [λC,λA] and half of the votes
where λi ∈ [λA,λB]. Finally candidate B gets the other half of voters where λi ∈ [λA,λB] and all
the votes where λi ∈ [λB, 1]. So in terms of λA and λB their vote shares are;
VA = (λB−λA2 ) +
λA−(λA−δ)
2 ) = (
λB−λA+δ
2 )
VB = (1− λB) + (λB−λA2 ) = (1− λB+λA2 )
3.5. Vote Shares 107
To maximise vote share candidate C makes δ as small as possible.
When λC = (λB + δ):
The same logic as λC = (λA − δ) holds when λC = (λB + δ). Candidate C gets all of the
votes where λi ∈ [λC, 1] and half of the votes where λi ∈ [λB,λC], while candidate A’s and B’s
vote shares are flipped. The vote share is:
VC = (1− λB − δ) + (λB+δ−λB2 ) = (1− λB − δ2 )
VA = (λA+λB2 )
VB = (λB−λA+δ2 )
To maximise vote share candidate C makes δ as small as possible again.
When λC ∈ (λA,λB):
Candidate C gets half the vote where λi ∈ [λA,λC] and half the voters where λi ∈ [λC,λB].
Therefore their vote share is:
VC = (
λC−λA
2 ) + (
λB−λC
2 ) = (
λB−λA
2 )
Candidate C gets the same vote share in all cases and will therefore randomize within this range.
The vote share for candidate A and B is dependent on λC. Each gets the votes outside of their
position, respectively λi ∈ [0,λA] and λi ∈ [λB, 1]. They then also get the other half of the votes
between themselves and candidate C, respectively λi ∈ [λA,λC] and λi ∈ [λC,λB].
VA = (λA − 0) + (λC−λA2 ) = (λA+λC2 )
VB = (1− λB) + (λB−λC2 ) = (1− λB+λC2 )
When λC = λA:
Candidate C gets half the votes where λi ∈ [0,λA] as all voters are indifferent between can-
didate A and candidate C. They also get a quarter of the votes where λi ∈ [λA,λB]4. Their vote
share is therefore:
VC = (λA−02 ) + (
λB−λA
4 ) = (
2∗λA+λB−λA
4 ) = (
λA+λB
4 )
4In this range all the voters that are close to λB will vote for candidate B and this is half of the voters. Of the other
half that are closer to λA half will vote for candidate A and half for candidate C therefore a quarter of the voters
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Candidate A gets an identical vote share to candidate C. Then candidate B gets half the votes
where λi ∈ [λA,λB] and all the votes where λi ∈ [λB, 1]
VA = (λA+λB4 )
VB = (1− λA+λB2 )
When λC = λB:
Candidate C gets half of the votes where λi ∈ [λB, 1] and a quarter of the votes where λi ∈
[λA,λB]. Candidate B now has the same vote share as candidate C and candidate A gets the rest.
This gives vote share:
VC = ( 1−λB2 ) + (
λB−λA
4 ) = (0.5− λA+λB4 )
VA = (λA+λB2 )
VB = (0.5− λA+λB4 )
The values are summarised in the table below.
Position Candidate C Candidate A Candidate B Candidate C
λC Vote Share VA Vote Share VB Vote Share VC
λA − δ λB−λA+δ2 1− λB+λA2 λA − δ2
λA
λA+λB
4 1− λA+λB2 λA+λB4
∈ (λA,λB) λA+λC2 1− λB+λC2 λB−λA2
λB
λA+λB
2 0.5− λA+λB4 0.5− λA+λB4
λB + δ
λA+λB
2
λB−λA+δ
2 1− λB − δ2
TABLE 3.1: Summary of Vote Shares for set of feasibly optimal strategies for can-
didate C when the incumbent candidates take divergent policy positions
3.5.2 Without Candidate Divergence
Histories: h = (λA,λB) = (0.5, 0.5)
In this case there are only 3 possible points for candidate C to maximise vote share (for
plurality or round one in a Run-off); λC = (0.5− δ), (0.5) or (0.5 + δ). As this is for a single
policy position of candidate A and B the real numbers can be used and the calculations are
very simple. When candidate C takes position λC = (0.5− δ) or (0.5 + δ); candidate C gets all
votes to the outside of their policy position (below or above respectively) plus half the distance
between themselves and the middle. They therefore set δ to be as low as possible. This equals;
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VC = (0.5− δ2 ). The rest of the population is split equally between the other two candidates;
VA = VB = (0.25+ δ4 ).
Position Candidate C Candidate A Candidate B Candidate C
λC Vote Share VA Vote Share VB Vote Share VC
0.5− δ 0.25+ δ4 0.25+ δ4 0.5− δ2
0.5 13
1
3
1
3
0.5+ δ 0.25+ δ4 0.25+
δ
4 0.5− δ2
TABLE 3.2: Summary of Vote Shares for set of feasibly optimal strategies for can-
didate C when the incumbent candidates take the median voter position
3.6 Results
The results are divided by voting rule. Each is broken into a theorem and its proofs. Running in
parallel to the proof is a numerical example in Appendix L. When a step has a connected example
the relevant appendix section will be referenced. The proof is then followed by a discussion of
that result and how it relates to the other chapters.
For simplicity of notation it will be assumed throughout that when candidate A and candi-
date B do not take the same position on the spectrum that candidate A takes the lower position.
This is for simplification and is not the primary cause of any of the results.
3.6.1 Plurality (P)
The first result is a repetition of the Palfrey (1984) paper. The reason it is repeated here is to
frame the discussion on plurality and how this result fits with chapter two.
Theorem 3.1. Under the Plurality rule (λA,λB,λC) is an equilibrium if and only if:

λA = 0.25
λB = 0.75
λC ∈ [0.25, 0.75]
Proof: When h = (0.5, 0.5); λA = λB and vote shares can be found in table 3.2. Candidate C’s
best response is to play: λC = (λA − δ) or (λB + δ). In either case they get VC = 0.5− δ2 and win
with certainty.
This is not an equilibrium for candidate A or candidate B. They will deviate away from
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the centre. The vote shares for candidates C’s strategies can be found in table 3.1 For small
deviations candidate C will still take the outside position λC = (λA − δ) or (λB + δ). They select
the option that gives the largest vote share. This will be outside the candidate (assume A) that is
closer to the centre. Candidate C no longer wins as they have more votes than candidate A but
less votes than candidate B. Candidate B wins with certainty.
Candidate A now loses the election with certainty due to being the closer candidate to the
center. If they deviate to a position further from the center so that candidate B is now closer;
candidate C will enter with λC = (λB + δ) for the same reason as the previous paragraph.
Candidate A now wins with certainty. See appendix L.1.
The incentive to deviate exists with and without symmetric policy positions. This divergence
will continue until there is no incentive to move further from the centre. This will only occur
when the vote share that candidate C gets from λC ∈ [λA,λB] is greater than the vote share they
get from λC = (λA − δ) or (λB + δ). Taking vote shares:
λB−λA
2 > λA − δ
λB−λA
2 > 1− λB − δ
δ is the smallest amount possible. It is also necessary that both equations hold. If only one
holds then candidate C will still take λC = (λA − δ) or (λB + δ). Additionally we want the first
point either candidate stops diverging away from the center therefore for both equations the
vote share from λC ∈ [λA,λB] should be greater than that from λC = (λA − δ)or(λB + δ) by the
smallest possible amount. Putting these three points together gives the two equalities:
λB−λA
2 = λA
λB−λA
2 = 1− λB
Solving for these simultaneous equations gives λA = 0.25 and λB = 0.75. Candidate C’s
best response at h = (0.25, 0.75) is; λC ∈ [λA,λB]. They randomise in this range so half the time
they are closer to candidate A and half the time they are closer to candidate B. If an incumbent
deviates away from the centre; candidate C’s strategy is unchanged and the other candidate
will win as their vote share will be higher as they are closer to the centre5. Deviation further
5This result comes from the condition that candidate C randomises when indifferent so will randomise between
λA and λB so candidate A and B will get a quarter of the inside region on average but if A goes lower there are less
voters where λi ∈ [0,λA] than there are where λi ∈ [λB, 1]
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from the centre leads to a worse outcome (certain defeat instead of a 50% chance at victory). If
an incumbent deviates to the centre they will lose with certainty as candidate C will take the
outside position on their side. See appendix L.2 for an example. Therefore λA = 0.25, λB = 0.75
and λC ∈ [λA,λB] is the only Nash equilibrium. 
Discussion: The key findings of this result are that there is a stable equilibrium where three
candidates take different policy positions and that one of these three candidates gets strictly less
votes than the other two candidates. This mirrors the set of assumptions used in chapter two.
In chapter two there were two ’large’ candidates but no motivation was given for why they
were ’large’. One possible motivator for these ’large’ candidates is that they are the incumbents
and have an advantage from moving first. This chapter suggest that the entrant will take a
position between the two incumbents. This finding does not transfer to chapter two as there is
no equivalence for ’between’ when there is not a linear policy space. Where is does relate is the
fact that the ’small’ candidate supporters can be split over which ’large’ candidate they prefer.
This is analogous to being between the two candidates. Chapter two aims to be more general
than this but the specific cases presented in this chapter are included in the analysis in chapter
two.
The second finding of this result that supports the work done in chapter two is that the
equilibrium in this chapter has the two incumbent candidates hold equal vote shares on average.
This fits with the central cases of importance in chapter two. Most of the results in chapter
two where sincere voting as a strategy is not an equilibrium or performs less well than level-k
thinking are when the two ’large’ candidates have a similar vote share. What this says about the
equilibrium found here is that if they acted strategically the voters that support candidate C will
probably stop voting for candidate C and move to the incumbent candidates. As there is no cost
to entry this will not stop the candidate from entering but makes their vote share smaller (with
full rationality zero). Introducing strategic voting will not be done here but the intuition is that
some form of candidate divergence will still exist as both incumbents would still need to avoid
being seen as the small candidate.
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3.6.2 Majority run-off Rules (IRO and 2RM)
This result concerns both majority run-off rules; the instant run-off and the two round rule with
majority threshold.
Theorem 3.2. Under the instant run-off rule (and the two round elections with majority threshold) there
are multiple symmetric equilibria where λA = 1− λB and λA ∈ [0.25, 0.5]. Then candidate C’s best
response is; λC = λA or λB.
A summary of vote share in round one for each of candidate C’s strategies can be seen in table
3.1
Proof: While the vote shares that candidate C gets from different positions has not changed
their motivation has; now they want to not come last in round one and then be closer to the
centre than the candidate that they face in round two. Their best response must be examined
for two types of history; 1) symmetric h = (λA,λB) s.t. λA = 1− λB, 2) non-symmetric h =
(λA,λB) s.t. λA 6= 1− λB.
Starting with the non-symmetric h = (λA,λB) s.t. λA 6= 1− λB. Without loss of generality
it will be assumed that λA > 1− λB, so that candidate A is closer to the centre than candidate
B. Candidate C can guarantee victory by eliminating candidate A and being closer to the centre
than candidate B. This is achieved in one of two ways:
1) λC = λA − δ when λA + δ > λB−λA2 .
When candidate A is close enough to the centre; candidate C takes λC = λA − δ. Their vote
total V1C = λA− δ2 is greater than candidate A’s vote share of V1A = λB−λA+δ2 . Therefore candidate
A is eliminated and candidate C is closer to the centre than candidate B. See appendix L.3 for an
example.
2) λC = λA + δ when λA + δ2 <
λB−λA
2 .
They now take an inside option, they get the same vote share (λB−λA2 ) at any position where
λC ∈ (λA,λB) but the closer they move to λA the lower candidate A’s vote share (λA + δ2 ) is so
they will go just inside candidate A to eliminate them. Candidate A is closer than candidate B
and candidate C is closer than candidate A therefore candidate C must be closer to the center
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than candidate B so candidate C gets over half the round two votes and wins with certainty. See
appendix L.4 for an example.
There is an overlap between the two ways that C can win with certainty but there is always at
least one way.
Therefore candidate A and candidate B know that they will lose with certainty if they take
non-symmetric policy positions. So their strategies will be symmetric; h = (λA,λB) s.t λA =
1− λB.
In all such histories candidate C cannot enter outside the two candidates. While they might
be able to eliminate one of the candidates they then enter round two further from the centre than
their opponent and lose. See appendix L.5 for an example.
Candidate C can still win with certainty when they enter on the inside if the other candidates
are sufficiently far from the centre. They would take the position λC = (λA + δ) or (λB − δ)
and as long as they do not come last they will be closer to the centre than their opponent. See
appendix L.6 for an example.
Therefore there is a limit at which symmetric policy positions by candidate A and B will stop
candidate C taking an inside position and winning. This occurs when the vote share candidate
A gets, (λA + δ2 ), when candidate C takes λC = λA + δ, exceeds the vote share that candidate C
gets, (λB−λA2 ), at that position.
λA +
δ
2 >
λB−λA
2
due to the symmetric policy position: λA = 1− λB.
λA +
δ
2 >
1−λA−λA
2
λA +
δ
2 >
1
2 − λA
2 ∗ λA + δ2 > 12
δ tends towards zero and is strictly positive therefore for the equation above to hold it must
be the case that:
2 ∗ λA = 12
So λA = 0.25 and using the symmetric policy position λB = 0.75. Therefore at any symmetric
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policy pair closer to the centre if candidate C enters inside or outside one of the other candidates
they will lose with certainty in either round one or round two.
This leaves two remaining strategies λC = (λA) or (λB). The two cases are equivalent so
just λC = λA is considered. In such a case candidate C enters in the same place as candidate A
and they split the vote 50% each where λi ∈ [0, 0.5]. The other half of the vote goes to candidate
B. Candidate A and C have a 50% chance of being eliminated and the same chance of reaching
round two. In round two the two candidates left are the same distance from the centre so split
the second round vote 50% each and have a 50% chance of victory.
Candidate C’s overall odds of victory are 25%. As candidate C is indifferent over who they
copy they will randomise. Therefore the odds of candidate A or B winning is ( 50+252 )% = 37.5%.
If either candidate A or B moved closer or further from the centre their odds of victory would
be zero.
Therefore under the instant run-off rule (and the two round elections with majority thresh-
old) there are multiple symmetric equilibria where λA = 1− λB and λA ∈ [0.25, 0.5] then candi-
date C’s best response is; λC = λA or λB. 
Discussion: These results are relevant to two of the election rules that are being analysed in
this chapter. Firstly the instant run-off. The interesting point of discussion for this rule is how
it relates to plurality. In chapter two it was argued that (IRO) leads to a policy as close or
closer to majority support compared with plurality. This was due to the way sincere voting was
implemented. The results here suggest an additional way that (IRO) leads to a position nearer
the median voter (The policy that gets majority support over all other policies in a head to head).
(IRO) leads to a set of equilibria where candidates take positions closer to the middle. In essence
candidates are less worried about the extremist candidates winning so equilibria exist where
they can play closer to the centre. It is important to note that this relates to equilibrium selection
and this chapter does not aim to make any claims regarding which equilibria will be selected.
all that is said here is that the unique equilibrium under (P) is the most extreme6 equilibrium
(0.25, 0.75) that is possible under (IRO) and all other equilibria are closer to the median. One
result that contradicts the structure in chapter two is that for (IRO) there is no ’small’ candidate.
The fact that with entry the entrant takes an identical position to one of the incumbents suggests
6furthest from the centre
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that the policy divergence in chapter two must also be due to some alternative motivation such
as those proposed in Castanheira (2003) for example.
The second rule to discuss is (2RM) and how the findings of this chapter link to the work
in chapter one. The first thing to note is that the divided majority is at least in part found in
this chapter. The entrant takes an identical position to that of one of the other candidates. In
doing so they divide up the vote of half the electorate. This does not fit perfectly with the anal-
ysis in chapter one where the two candidates divided up a strict majority. This does introduce
a interesting link. It can be argued that the divided majority problem does not resemble the
equilibrium outcome found in this chapter. It does however link closely to a disequilibrium
case where one of the entrants takes a position that is too extreme. In such a case the entrant
takes a position close to the candidate that is nearer the middle and this entrant along with that
candidate represent the divided majority while the candidate that took the extreme position is
the minority candidate. This fits clearly with the structure of the first chapter and therefore one
justification for the structure in that chapter that causes the policy divergence is entry with one
incumbent not taking a equilibrium position. This is not a perfect comparison due to the single
dimension policy space in this model that is not used in chapter one but elements of entry game
support the divided majority. It asks an additional question of the divided majority game of
why the minority candidate does not take a slightly more central policy position to win some
of the time as they currently lose with certainty with a majority threshold. This suggests that as
with the ’small’ candidate in chapter two the minority candidate in chapter one is motivated by
more than just victory odds.
3.6.3 Flexible Threshold rule (2RF)
This result relates to the flexible threshold τ for any value where τ is below 12 . It is also assumed
but not necessary that τ is above 13 .
Theorem 3.3. Under the Flexible threshold rule (λA,λB,λC) is an equilibrium if and only if:

λA = 0.25
λB = 0.75
λC ∈ [0.25, 0.75]
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A summary of the vote share in round one can be found in table 3.1.
Proof: First consider when λA = (1− λB) and λA ≤ τ2 . Candidate C can take a position that
stops both candidates passing the threshold as long as it is in the range [1− 3τ2 , 3τ2 ]. Assume
λA =
τ
2 and candidate C playing λC =
3τ
2 first. Then candidate A gets all votes of voters in the
range [0,λA] and half the votes of voters in the range [λA,λC]. This means a vote share:
VA = ( τ2 − 0) + (
3τ
2 − τ2
2 ) =
τ
2 +
τ
2 = τ
So candidate A has exactly the threshold but is not above it so will not win in round one.
Candidate B gets all votes of voters in the range [λB, 1] and half the votes in [λC,λB]7. Finally
candidate C gets half the votes of voters in [λA,λB].
VB = (1− (1− τ2 )) + (
1− τ2− 3τ2
2 ) =
τ
2 + 0.5− τ = 0.5− τ2
VC =
(1− τ2 )− τ2
2 = 0.5− τ4 − τ4 = 0.5− τ2
So candidate B and C have an equal vote share. So one of them will be eliminated. When
candidate B is eliminated candidate C is closer to the centre than candidate A and will win with
certainty. When candidate C is eliminated candidate A and B are equally close to the centre
and will have a 50% chance of victory. In total, candidate A and B win with 25% likelihood
and candidate C wins with a 50% likelihood. Either candidate A or B wins with certainty if
they move to the centre slightly ( assume candidate A ); candidate C is not able to both stop
candidate A from passing the threshold and come second. Candidate A is guaranteed victory
as either they win passing the threshold or candidate C is eliminated and they are closer to
the centre than candidate B. So both candidates would move slightly closer to the centre. See
appendix L.7 for an example. The same logic holds for non-symmetric policy positions such that
neither incumbent candidate will take a position where λA ∈ [0, τ2 ] and λB ∈ [1− τ2 , 1].
Now analysis moves to symmetric policy positions where candidates are closer to the centre;
λA = (1− λB) and λA ∈ ( τ2 , 0.5). Candidate C can not win; they can not stop one candidate
from passing the threshold and come second. So they will just aim to maximise vote share.
When λA ≤ 0.25 this is achieved by taking an inside position and randomizing within that
range. While candidate C takes the inside position there is an incentive for candidate A (assume
7as τ < 0.5 ⇒ ( 3τ2 < 0.75) ∩ (1− τ) > 0.75 ⇒ λB > λC
3.6. Results 117
here A but the logic also holds for B) to deviate towards the centre as by being closer than
candidate B they beat candidate B in round two8. There is no equilibrium until the inside option
and the outside option for both candidates are equal. This has been shown in 3.6.1 to be at
h = (0.25, 0.75). For the same reason9 all points where λA 6= 1− λB when λA < 0.25 are not
equilibria as candidate A will move towards the centre. See appendix L.8 for an example.
When λA = (1 − λB) and λA ∈ (0.25, 0.5] the best response of candidate C is to take the
position λC = (λA − δ) or (λB + δ). If candidate A ( can be candidate B as well) moves further
from the centre to λA = 0.25− δ candidate C will now take the position λC = (λB + δ) and
candidate A gets VA = (0.5− δ2 ) this is then above the threshold and candidate A wins with
certainty. Both candidates use this logic until they reach the point where candidate C will not
take the outside position any more; h = (0.5, 0.5). This is then the only equilibrium.
Therefore the equilibrium is a symmetric policy position where λA = 0.25 and λB = 0.75.
Then candidate C’s best response is λC ∈ [0.25, 0.75]. 
Discussion: The obvious result of interest is that any threshold lower than a half leads to the
same policy positions as Plurality. Policy divergence is guaranteed with anything but a forced
majority requirement. The reason for this is that with the exception of a majority requirement
the incumbents can eliminate any probability that candidate C wins the election. As such they
do not try to win but to vote maximise. In doing so they force the incumbents to stop the
entrant from taking their outside position and this forces divergence equal to that of plurality.
In chapter one a lower threshold increased the odds that the minority candidate (in this chapter
the candidate that does not have the entrant move to its side) would win if their sincere support
exceeds the threshold. In this chapter voting is assumed to be sincere so a candidate only wins
in the first round if their sincere support exceeds the threshold. This event does occur in this
chapter when the entrant moves too far from the centre. It was not calculated in the result but
could easily be worked out how often this occurs. It was also the case in chapter one that the
odds that the minority candidate wins in round one increases as the threshold goes down and
this is true here. As the threshold goes down the entrant must be closer and closer to the centre
to stop a candidate winning in round one and as they are random the odds that they are close
8the only reason they stop moving to the centre is candidate C taking the position to their outside
9that candidates keep moving to the centre and being further from the centre is the weaker position
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enough go down.
As with the last result there are short comings in this result. First and most obvious is that as
with the last result the minority candidate can still win in round two if it is reached. Unlike the
last result though the policy difference of the majority is explained in this chapter.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter analysed the candidate strategies in three candidate elections with entry. It as-
sumed that two candidates start in the election and play against each other. A third candidate
then enters the election. When candidates enter is common knowledge as is the position they
take once they have taken it. This was modeled as a extensive form game.
I proposed using this model based on the entry game in Palfrey (1984) as a support to the
assumptions laid out in the first two chapters of this thesis. The first two chapters present re-
spectively a divided majority problem with three candidates under varying thresholds and a
three candidate election with two ’large’ candidates who are the only candidates that can viably
win. The aim was to analyse how candidates positioned themselves under the 4 voting rules
proposed in the two other chapters; Plurality (P), Instant run-off (IRO), two round strict major-
ity threshold (2RM) and two round elections with flexible threshold (2RF). In doing so I hoped
to find some insight to justify the assumptions made about the candidates in those chapters.
The first observation, though this is no innovation, is to note that the instant run-off and
the two round election with majority threshold are, with three candidates, identical as long as
candidates cannot change their position between voting rounds. Therefore only three voting
rules need to be analysed.
The first result of this chapter is that under the plurality rule the two incumbents who move
first end up with a larger share of the vote than the entrant. This links well with the assump-
tions in chapter two that assumes two ’large’ candidates. One rationale for these two ’large’
candidates in chapter two could be that they are incumbents with a first mover advantage. Fol-
lowing on from this these two incumbents are the only two candidates that can win the election.
This is the key assumption of the second chapter. Here the two ’large’ candidates are assumed
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to be the only candidates with enough underlying support to win. The results for the second
rule in chapter two are less supportive. Under the instant run-off rule the entrant copies the
strategy of one of the incumbents. This creates two ’small’ candidates and one ’large’ candidate
in this chapter which does not fit with the assumptions of chapter two. Therefore incumbent
first mover advantage does not seem to explain the set up of the instant run-off rule in chapter
two. Similarly in this chapter the entrant has a chance of victory which the ’small’ candidate in
chapter two does not.
Moving to the results regarding chapter one the evidence is again supportive. Under the
two round election rule with strict majority the entrant takes the same position as one of the
incumbents. This mirrors the assumption in chapter one of a divided majority ,where the entrant
and the incumbent they copy represent the divided majority while the incumbent they do not
copy represents the minority candidate. A few issues do arise in this comparison. Firstly the
divided majority in this chapter is not a strict majority as it is in chapter one. Directly linked to
this the minority candidate is not a strict minority in this chapter as it is in chapter one. Then
finally the minority candidate in this chapter has a positive probability of victory. This is not to
say that chapter one cannot be in part explained by this entry model. A better comparison to
chapter one would be an entry model that is not in equilibrium. In such a case the entrant moves
to a position very close to a incumbent and selects the incumbent that is closer to the centre. Now
they do represent a strict majority and the incumbent that was further from the centre represents
a strict minority. Additionally the candidate further from the centre that represents a minority
never wins.
The final result is that lowering the threshold by any amount reverts the strategy in this
game to that strategy played under the plurality rule. Any lower threshold makes it impossible
for an entrant to enter and win. This then supports the assumptions of chapter one. We have
a divided majority with slightly different policies as we see in chapter one (the entrant and
the incumbent they randomly position themselves closer to) and a unified minority (the other
incumbent). Other than the divided majority minor policy difference this theory again has the
same issues as the last argument. This issue is solved in the same way as the last one. You view
the divided majority game as a entry game being played marginally out of equilibrium.
This raises an interesting question about the divided majority game. Namely, why does the
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minority candidate in the divided majority game not change their policy to try to get enough
votes to represent a majority? This is what they would do in the entry model proposed in
this chapter. The suggestion is that in the divided majority game due to ideological factors
the minority candidate is making a decision that is not fully rational. This is especially relevant
with a lower threshold as in such a case the minority candidate can move slightly closer to the
centre and win with certainty while holding a policy position close to its theoretical ideological
position.
The entry game with incumbent first mover advantage can clearly explain parts of the as-
sumptions made in the first two chapters. In each case there are also weaknesses which do not
fit as nicely. As with any such proposed solution that uses a different set of rules these findings
and any support they give can only go so far. This chapter therefore does not claim to fully
explain why candidates in the first two chapters take the positions they take but it does give a
suggestion that seems to partially explain where the policy divergence in the first two chapters
could come from.
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Appendix A
Summary of world voting rules
Of the 217 countries, dependencies and other territories on which iDEA (institute for democracy
and electoral assistance) have data 104 do not directly elect a president. Sudan and Libya are
currently undergoing a transition without a clear election system known for the future. This
leaves 111 countries that elect a president directly. Of these, 87 use a form of two round run-off.
Of the rest 21 use the first past the post voting mechanism, one uses a party list, one uses single
transferable vote and one a simplified version of the single transferable vote.
Of the 87 countries that use a run-off, 78 use the basic absolute majority run-off. If there are
three or more candidates and no candidate wins an absolute majority of first round votes the top
two candidates based on first round vote share move to round two and the country votes again.
The other 9 have a variety of other mechanisms with a variable threshold. Kenya, Nigeria, and
Sierra Leone are the only countries that have a higher threshold than absolute majority in round
one. In Sierra Leone, a candidate requires 55% of the vote to win in round one. The second
round reverts to plurality (or 50% as they are equivalent in round two) as the other run-offs
do. In Kenya, they have the absolute majority requirement but also require that a candidate
have at least 25% of the vote in at least a half of the state’s counties (there are 57 counties).
Nigeria have a majority requirement and the same 25% rule but require at least two thirds of
the state’s regions (there are 36 regions). Argentina, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua have all lowered
their threshold level: Argentina have a threshold of 45% while Costa Rica and Nicaragua have
a threshold of 40%. On top of a lower threshold, they have a conditional threshold in Argentina
and Nicaragua. In Argentina and in Nicaragua a candidate wins with 40% or 35% if no other
candidate is above 30%. Finally, in Bolivia, Haiti and Ecuador they retain the 50% threshold but
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introduce a conditional threshold as well. In Bolivia and Ecuador, a candidate wins with above
40% of the vote if no other candidate has more than 30% of the vote. Then in Haiti, a candidate
can win with a plurality if every other candidate is behind them by 25% of the vote.
Of the 21 countries with a form of first past the post (Plurality), Cameroon, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Iceland, Kiribati, South Korea, Malawi, Panama, Philippines, Rwanda, Mexico,
Singapore, Taiwan, Togo and Venezuela have the standard ’most votes win’ system of plural-
ity. The only countries with alternative plurality elections are Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
United States. Bosnia and Herzegovina elect a three member body using plurality based on
specific groups, one Bosniak, one Croat and one Serb. They rotate the role every 8 months. Fi-
nally, within Plurality the United States elect their president using an indirect plurality using the
Electoral College.
The only countries that do not use either Plurality or two round runoff elections are Ireland,
Sri Lanka and Angola. In Ireland they use the single transferable vote where voters give a list of
preferred candidates and a candidate is eliminated one at a time (the lowest vote total leading
to elimination) until a candidate has an absolute majority (Also known as the instant run-off).
Sri Lanka use a similar system but only list 3 candidates. Finally, Angola elect a president as the
leader of the largest party in the national assembly akin to a Prime Minister but with executive
power.
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Round two Victory probability for
sincere voting in the experiment
The probability that a voter is selected first in treatment 1, 2, 3 and 4 is 114 . There are four α type
voters so the probability that a α voter is selected first is 414 . Similarly, there are four β type voters
and six γ type voters. So their probabilities are 414 and
6
14 respectively. Having been selected a
voter cannot be selected again.
Therefore if a voter is not selected first their probability of being selected second is 113 . As
such if a ? voter is selected first the probability than an α, β and γ voter are selected second are
3
13 ,
4
13 and
6
13 respectively and so on. From these we can calculate the probability that a specific
population is drawn.
In the experiment the second-round population is either everyone or 5. When it is everyone
then the odds that A (or B) beat C is certain. The calculations only need to happen when k = 5.
To do so it is necessary to consider the number of ways that a specific population can be drawn.
For example, there are no ways that five α types can be drawn, as there are only four α type
voters. There are then 5 ways four α type voters and one β voter can be selected.
α α α α β
α α α β α
α α β α α
α β α α α
β α α α α
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Formally the number of ways that a population with #α types, #β types and #γ types can be
generated is:
(#α, # β, #γ) = 5!
((#α)!∗(#β)!∗(#γ)!)
For example, the number of ways there can be 2α, 2β and 1γ type voter in the second round
is: 5!2!∗2!∗1! =
120
2∗2∗1 = 30. This is then multiplied by the probability a specific population of this
type is generated to calculate the probability that such a population can be calculated in general.
Using the same example if the order of the draw was α α β β γ:
30 ∗ 414 ∗ 313 ∗ 412 ∗ 311 ∗ 610 = 0.107892
The table below then summarises the probability of each possible population to 3 decimal
places.
Probability a Number of votes for β.
population is drawn
0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0.003 0.030 0.060 0.030 0.030 0
Number 1 0.030 0.160 0.180 0.048 0.002
of votes 2 0.060 0.180 0.108 0.012
for α 3 0.030 0.048 0.012
4 0.003 0.002
5 0
TABLE B.1: Summary of probabilities for all possible second round voting popu-
lations
From this we can calculate the probability that each candidate wins. If A (or B) faces C all α
and β types will vote A (or B) and all γ type voters will vote for C. So C wins when there are
3 or more type voters. This occurs with a probability of 0.342. Therefore A (or B) wins with a
0.658 probability. When A and B are in round two the probability each win is 0.5 as they are
symmetrical in the size of their population and in the probability that a γ type voter votes for
them.
These calculations can be repeated when there are 13 voters. The table below summarises
this.
Additionally, voters can update their probabilities with additional information. The only
additional information they get entering the final round is that if they are voting then at least
one of their type is voting (as they have been selected). So of the 5 voters one is them. This
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changes the odds that a candidate will win. The calculations can be repeated under these new
conditions and these are summarised in the table as well.
Round two Probability that Probability that Probability that
candidates A wins B wins C wins
14 voters AB 0.5 0.5 0
No updating AC 0.658 0 0.342
BC 0 0.658 0.342
14 voters AB 0.642 0.358 0
α type AC 0.783 0 0.217
updating BC 0 0.783 0.217
14 voters AB 0.358 0.642 0
β type AC 0.783 0 0.217
updating BC 0 0.783 0.217
14 voters AB 0.5 0.5 0
γ type AC 0.490 0 0.510
updating BC 0 0.490 0.510
13 voters AB 0.5 0.5 0
No updating AC 0.751 0 0.249
BC 0 0.751 0.249
13 voters AB 0.640 0.360 0
α type AC 0.848 0 0.152
updating BC 0 0.848 0.152
13 voters AB 0.360 0.640 0
β type AC 0.848 0 0.152
updating BC 0 0.848 0.152
13 voters AB 0.5 0.5 0
γ type AC 0.594 0 0.407
updating BC 0 0.594 0.407
TABLE B.2: Second round probability a candidate wins based on sincere voting
The important information to see here (in the highlighted cells) is that with less γ type voters
(when there are 13 voters there are 5 γ types) the probability that C wins goes from 0.342 down
to 0.249. This shows firstly that the probability of an upset victory is smaller and by how much.
This can help in understand how voters respond to level of uncertainty.
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Full set of non-symmetric equilibrium
When symmetry is dropped there are a number of other possible equilibrium cases. These are
called here the non-symmetric equilibrium. The five sets of necessary conditions for a non-
symmetric equilibrium too exist are outlined in this appendix.
No player can effect the result at all:
This refers not just to who wins but when they win(1st or 2nd round). Any case where no
voter can change the result at all requires that:
1. No candidate is 1 or less votes below passing the threshold.
2. No candidate is 1 or less votes above passing the threshold.
3. No candidate is within 2 or less votes of another candidate. With the exception of 2nd and
3rd if and only if the 1st place candidate is above the threshold.
No player can change the winner of the election:
This only occurs when there is certainty over the voters in the 2nd round, and is derived
from the fact that C can’t win the 2nd round, this requires:
1. γ voters vote C such that C has at least 1/3 of the vote.
2. Candidate C is not 1 or less votes below passing the threshold.
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3. Candidate C is not 1 or less votes above passing the threshold.
4. No candidate is within 2 or less votes of another candidate. With the exception of 2nd and
3rd if and only if the 1st place candidate is above the threshold.
5. If A or B are within one of or above passing the threshold(or γ is not 1 or less above or
below the majority threshold.)
No player that can wants to stop a candidate win in the 1st round:
This refers to a case where a candidate is 1 or less above the threshold such that if one voter
deviates away from this candidate they go below the threshold:
1. A candidate is above the threshold by 1 or less votes
2. No one that voted for this candidate would prefer for the other viable option to win more
than this candidate. This can be either another candidate that is above the threshold (only
2 can be) or the candidate that would come 2nd after the deviation.
No player that can wants a candidate above the threshold, this requires:
This refers to a case where a candidate is 1 or less below the threshold, such that is one voter
deviated to it it would go above the threshold, this requires:
1. A candidate is below the threshold by 1 or less votes.
2. All voters that do not vote for this candidate prefer the other viable option. This is either
the candidate that is above the threshold (this can be two candidates but one will fall below
the threshold if one of its supporters deviate) or the other candidate that is in the top 2 (it
could be tied with this candidate or coming 2nd).
No voter than can wants to change the two candidates that reach the 2nd round:
This refers to the case no voter wishes to deviate to to change the two candidates that reach
the 2nd round. This requires:
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1. No candidate is above the threshold
2. 2nd and 3rd place are 2 or less votes apart.
3. No one that votes for 2nd would prefer a head to head between 1st and 3rd instead of a
head to head between 1st and 2nd.
4. No one that votes for 1st would prefer the head to head in that deviation1 than the current
one, in this case 2nd and 3rd must be only 1 vote or less apart.
At least one of these cases exists for all 6 treatments in the experiment as is shown in ap-
pendix I.
1either between 1st and 3rd or between 2nd and 3rd.
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Experimental Form
D.1 Experimental Instructions Form:
Experimental Instructions:
Introduction
This experiment is part of a study of voting rules. Along with the participation payment the
remainder of your payment comes from the decisions you and your fellow participants make.
The Instructions are simple, if they are followed carefully and participants make good decisions
you should make a decent sum of money. If you have any questions during the experiment
please put up your hand. The experimenter will come and answer them for you. Other than
these questions participants must keep silent while the experiment is in progress.
There are going to be 27 separate voting periods. The votes will be conducted under 3 dif-
ferent rules. These will change every 9 periods. The new rules will be explained before the 1st
period they are implemented. At the end of 9 periods the computer will select 2 period at ran-
dom. These periods will be used to calculate your payment, you will not get payments from the
other periods.
Total Payments = Attendance Fee + 6 selected payment periods
Summary
132 Appendix D. Experimental Form
There are 8 participants. These 8 will vote in an election along with a number of pre-
programmed voters (ranging from 5-6). Therefore each period has 13-14 voters.
The objective is to elect a single candidate. There will be 3 candidates (voting options) A, B
and C. At the start of each new rule you will be assigned a type α or β. All pre-programmed
voters are assigned a third type γ. The payment you get is dependent on your type and the
candidate that wins. All of this information along with the size of each type is shown in the
payment table (see example below *not real payoffs):
Type Candidate A Candidate B candidate C # of voters
α 1.50 1.20 0.05 4
β 0.50 0.85 0.00 4
You have a single vote that you must cast for 1 of the 3 candidates. A candidate wins the
period if they get a high enough share of the votes cast. The share required will change during
the experiment. In any case where none of the candidates reaches the required share you will be
asked to vote again in a 2nd election (this is still the same period). In this 2nd election you will
be asked to choose between just 2 of the candidates. The candidate that got the least votes in
the 1st round is no longer an option. In this 2nd round the candidate with the largest vote share
wins.
At any given round the pre-programmed players will select the party that offers them the
largest payment. They will always vote for candidate C. If C is not an option it will randomly
select A or B.
Any case where a tiebreaker is needed one participant will be asked to flip a coin.
Procedure
In each period there can be up to 3 rounds, a pre-election round, the first election, and the
second election. At the start of the period you will be informed which of these rounds you are
required to vote in. These rules will also be at the top of each voting page.
The procedure is explained below:
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Prior to any voting you will be given the payment table for that election. This informs you
of the payments and the number of each type in that election. At the top of this page you will be
given your ID as well as the group you have been selected into (α, β) and your type. To the right
hand side there will be a box to vote in the first round, this vote is a pre-election poll. Everyone
can vote in this poll. The poll is optional and has no effect on the election result for that round.
Image: payment table and Pre-election poll
note that the voter types here are A and B and the candidates X, Y and Z. This is to reduce the
bias of α types assuming they should vote for A.
The next page will show the results of the pre-election poll as well as giving you the 2nd
chance to vote. This vote is the first that can decide the election. In this round you must vote
for 1 of the 3 candidates. There will be a box to type your vote into. This period is compulsory:
abstention is not an option. On the screen you will be reminded of the number of each voter type
and your type for that period. Once you have voted you will have to press the submit button at
the bottom of the page.
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Image: Pre election poll results page and Primary election voting page
After the 2nd round there is a results page (1st Election History Box). This will tell you how
many votes each candidate achieved in the 1st election. It will also tell you if someone passed
the required number of votes to win. In the 3rd and final round you may or may not be asked
to vote. This is dependent on the voting rules. If you are not selected you must wait for those
who are voting. If you are selected you are taken to a 2nd voting page. On this page you will
be reminded of the 2 remaining candidates in the election and your type. You are not told who
else has been selected to vote in the 2nd period. There will again be a voting box for you to enter
your vote in. If selected, voting is compulsory in the second period. Once you have selected
your choice you have to press the submit button at the bottom of the page.
Image: Primary election results and second election voting page
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After the 2nd vote all participants are told the results (Final Election History Box). The final
page informs voters of the winning candidate and the payment they get if this period is ran-
domly selected. If there is no need for a 2nd period (a candidate won in the 1st period) this page
comes after the 1st period results page. All payments are based on the latest period that was
required. The results page will also tell you the number of votes each candidate got in the 2nd
period but not who was selected to vote in the second period.
Image: Final Election Results page
The history boxes will only give details about the current period. It presents the results from
earlier election rounds in that period. Paper will be given for you to make notes of previous
periods if you wish to.
Payment
When the experiment session is completed the computer will sum the earnings from the 6
selected periods (one for each voting rule). This total will be displayed on your screen. It will
inform you of the 6 periods that were randomly selected. This plus the attendance fee will be
the amount you are paid.
Any Questions.
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D.2 Experiment Control Questions form
Control Questions
Please Circle your answer:
For the following set of control questions assume that the voting group preferences is such:
Type R Y G # of voters
α 0.90 0.50 0.05 5
β 0.40 0.95 0.20 4
γ 0.05 0.10 1.00 5
1) With a 50% threshold, if all voters are sincere who is eliminated in the first round?1
A Candidate G
B Candidate R
C Candidate Y
D Candidate G or R
2) With a 50% threshold, if all voters are sincere who will an α voter vote for in the second
round?2
A Candidate G
B Candidate R
C Candidate Y
D Candidate G or R
3) With a 50% threshold, if all voters are sincere who will a β voter vote for in the second round?3
A Candidate G
B Candidate R
C Candidate Y
D Candidate G or R
1Checking people understand: The basics of a two round election elimination process.
2That preferences do not change in the second round and therefore sincere preferences do not change
3The preference ordering, how elimination works and decision making in the second round.
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4) With a 40% threshold, if all voters are sincere who will win? When will they win?4
A Candidate G In the second round
B Candidate R In the first round
C Candidate Y In the first round
D Candidate R In the second round
5) If R and Y reach the 2nd round and everyone votes sincerely who will win? What pay-off
does a γ voter get?5
A Candidate Y Wins, a γ voter gets 0.10.
B Candidate R Wins, a γ voter gets 0.10.
C Candidate R Wins, a γ voter gets 0.05.
D Candidate Y Wins, a γ voter gets 0.00.
6) Will an α voter ever have a reason for voting insincerely in the second round?6
A No
B Yes, only if R is eliminated in the first round
C Yes, only if the threshold is 40%
D Yes, only if there is a pre poll that says her first choice will be knocked out.
7) Now assume in the second round vote only 5 randomly selected people from the 14 vote. If R
and Y reach the second round who is more likely to win?7
A They are equally as likely as it is random.
B R, they have more primary support, more alpha than beta voters.
C Y, They have more overall support as gamma voters as well as beta voters prefer them.
D We do not know as it is random
8) Now assume there is a pre-poll for the first round, a 40% threshold and the second round is
the same as that described in question 7. You are one of the 5 α types. The poll says that Y will
get 5 votes, R will get 3 and G 5. If you believe these predictions what is your best response?8
4The affect of the 40% threshold and how it effects the election.
5Preference relationships over two options in the second round and can read the pay-off table.
6The strategy in the second round and therefore understand how an election should go depending on who reaches
the second round.
7How random selection works and therefore the effect of uncertainty in electorates in the second round.
8The different elements when all thrown together. So the fact that 40% is enough to win, that in the second round
there is a risk that G can win and finally that sincere voting is optimal in the second round but not in the first.
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A It does not matter, Y and G are going to get into the second round regardless.
B Vote R, sincere voting is always optimal
C Vote Y, The threshold is only 40% so Y can win if you give them a 6th vote.
D Vote G, the first round is not important as in the second everyone will vote sincerely and Y wins anyway.
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Correlation between Voting decision
and Election history/poll results
When considering the correlation between the voting decision and the election history/polling
results it is simple to start by considering the whole data set. However 422 observations must
be eliminated before any results are possible as the first election someone participates in has no
Victor from the last election. This gives a starting point for the correlation table as shown in E.1.
As we can see from this very broad picture correlation is higher for the polling.
TABLE E.1: Correlation table for all data points excluding the first round of the
session
Corr Round one vote Poll Leader Previous election winner
Round one vote 1
Poll Leader 0.3016 1
Previous election winner 0.1784 0.0828 1
number of observations = 3456
This analysis is incomplete however as there are multiple data points that should be re-
moved. Firstly Consider the data points that should be removed to accurately represent the
correlation between poll vote leader and voting decision. When there is no poll leader there can
be no correlation. So data points where this is the case can be dropped. Correlation between
poll leader and the first round vote has risen to 0.7071. It is also possible to add back the first
round votes to give a complete picture and the correlation is very similar at 0.7071. The total
number of observations if the first round is included is 2968. It can also be seen that correlation
with previous election winner and voting decision has gone up but not by much.
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TABLE E.2: Correlation table for all data points excluding the first round of the
session and all votes where there was no poll winner
Corr Round one vote Poll Leader Previous election winner
Round one vote 1
Poll Leader 0.7071 1
Previous election winner 0.2216 0.2007 1
number of observations = 2648
In the previous table there are still issues. When considering the correlation between last
election’s winner and current vote it makes no sense to correlate with the last election winner
when that winner was C. So these observations can be dropped. This is done in table E.3. As
the table E.3 shows the results are very similar to the results shown in the other tables. The level
of correlation between poll result and voting decision is much higher at 0.7164 compared to the
correlation between last election result and voting decision at 0.2450.
TABLE E.3: Correlation table for all data points excluding: the first round of the
session, all votes where there was no poll winner and whenever candidate C won
the last election
Corr Round one vote Poll Leader Previous election winner
Round one vote 1
Poll Leader 0.7164 1
Previous election winner 0.2450 0.2779 1
number of observations = 2064
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Expected payoffs from each outcome in
the experiment
The experiment has the payoff table shown in table F.1.
Type A B C # of voters
α 1.50 1.20 0.20 4
β 1.20 1.50 0.20 4
TABLE F.1: Subject’s payoff table
Each payoff is known with certainty as is the probability that each outcome occurs for a
given vote share from the first round. The table F.2 summarise the payoff for each possible first
round vote total by calculating the probability each candidate wins for a given vote total times
the payoff at that vote total.
The table is simplified by taking the two assumptions that all γ type voters vote for candidate
C and no α or β type voter ever votes for candidate C. Therefore the table can be simplified to 8
values for each treatment.
The 8 values here represent the number of votes that candidate A gets (the number of votes
that candidate B gets will equal 8 minus this number). The table shows expected payoffs for an
α type voter but the β type voter’s payoffs can be calculated by reversing the table (the payoff
for α type voter when candidate A has 8 votes and candidate B has 0 votes is the same as the
payoff for β type voter when candidate B has 8 votes and candidate A has 0 votes and so on ).
The table then summarise the payoffs for all 6 treatments.
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TABLE F.2: Table to summarise the expected payoffs for the 6 tratments from the 8
possible vote distributions
A’s vote payoff for treatment
total MC6 MU6 MU5 FC6 FU6 FU5
8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
7 1.5 1.05 1.5 1.5 1.05 1.5
6 1.5 1.05 1.17 1.5 1.05 1.5
5 1.5 1.05 1.17 0.2 0.2 1.17
4 1.35 0.96 1.06 0.2 0.2 1.06
3 1.2 0.86 0.95 0.2 0.2 0.95
2 1.2 0.86 0.95 1.2 0.86 1.2
1 1.2 0.86 1.2 1.2 0.86 1.2
0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
note: all values are in £.
This table assumes that all elections in round two with certainty will be won by whichever
candidate A or B enters round two. Then with a γ equal to 6 the probability that in round two
enough γ types are drawn to win the election for C is 34%. The probability that in round two
enough γ tpes are drawn when γ equals 5 is 25%.
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The Duverger Law Equilibrium
Existence in the Experiment
When X1A = (0, 8) there is a Duverger’s Law equilibrium in all treatments.
When the total number of voters equals thirteen (MU5, FU5) the majority threshold is six
and a half. If candidate A (or B) gets eight, a single deviation will lead to candidate A (or B)
getting seven votes. This is still above the threshold. No voter is pivotal and the Duverger’s
Law equilibrium exist.
When the total number of voters equals fourteen (MC6, MU6, FC6 and FU6) the majority
threshold is seven. If candidate A (or B) gets eight, a single deviation will lead to candidate A
(or B) getting seven votes. This is now equal to the majority threshold so they do not pass it.
In MC6 and MU6: There is no 40% threshold so round two will occur. In FC6 and FU6: The
40% threshold is 5.6 and candidate C will pass it so round two will occur.
Then in round two:
In MC6 and FC6: Candidate A (or B) will win with 8 so the deviation has no effect. In MU6
and FU6: Candidate C now has 34.2% chance of victory. This round two is strictly worse than
candidate A (or B) winning in round one.
In all six treatments, there is no incentive to deviate and the Duverger Law is an equilibrium.
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The Sincere Equilibrium
When all voters are sincere this is an equilibrium in all treatments.
In MC6, MU6 and MU5 there is no 40% threshold. The only way to win in round one is to
pass the majority threshold. In MC6 and MU6 this is seven, in MU5 it is six and a half. Both
candidate A and candidate B have four votes. No single deviation can take a candidate above
the majority threshold.
The only other effect deviation can have is to change who progresses to round two. No single
deviation can lead to candidate A and candidate B reaching round two against each other. A
voter can only change who faces candidate C. All voters currently vote for their most preferred
candidate. If they deviate, this candidate will never progress to round two as their total will
go down to three, which is strictly worse than the other candidate who must have at least four.
Therefore, no voter has an incentive to deviate and the sincere equilibrium exists.
In FC6, FU6 and FU5 there is a variable threshold. For FC6 and FU6 this threshold is five
point six and for FU5 it is five point two. In all cases, a candidate needs six to pass the variable
threshold. Candidates A and B both have four votes. Therefore, no single deviation can lead to
candidate A or B passing the variable threshold.
In FC6 and FU6 candidate C does pass the variable threshold. The outcome is that candidate
C wins the election. This still holds as an equilibrium as no voter can deviate to force round two.
In FU5 candidate C does not pass the variable threshold. The election goes to round two
where candidate C has a 24.9% chance of victory. This is a sincere equilibrium as voters for
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candidate A (or B) will not deviate to B (or A) as currently candidate A and candidate B both
have a 37.5% of victory as they will be randomly selected to progress to round two. If an α (or
β) type voter deviated then candidate A (or B) would have three votes. They never reach round
two and have no chance of victory. Candidate B (or A) now has a 75.1% chance of victory. This
is strictly worse for α (or β) type voters.
So while the outcomes may not be favourable in some treatments, there is always a sincere
equilibrium.
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The non-symmetric Equilibrium
Outcomes in the Experiment
For an equilibrium to be non-symmetric all voters must either be unable to change the outcome
of the election or when they can change it not want to.
The first set of non-symmetric equilibria are where candidates A or B have seven votes. This
is a non-symmetric equilibrium in MC6, MU5, FC6 and FU5.
In MC6 and FC6 if candidate A (or B) has seven votes, they equal the majority threshold
but do not pass it. They then progress to round two along with candidate C. In round two,
candidate A (or B) wins with certainty eight votes to six. A voter can deviate such that candidate
A (or B) wins in round one. The outcome of the election is the same in either case. They have
no incentive to deviate. In MU5 and FU5 if candidate A (or B) has seven votes they pass the
majority threshold. Candidate A (or B) wins the election in round one. In MU5 if they deviate
such that candidate A (or B) has six votes, the election goes to round two and here candidate A
(or B) wins, so they do not change the result. In FU5 if they deviate candidate A (or B) has six
votes while candidate C has five, so candidate A still wins in round one. These four cases are all
non-symmetric equilibria.
The second set of non-symmetric equilibria are when candidate A or B have six votes. This
is a non-symmetric equilibrium in MC6, MU6, FC6, FU6 and FU5.
In MC6 and MU6 there is no variable threshold and the majority threshold is seven. So, for
148 Appendix I. The non-symmetric Equilibrium Outcomes in the Experiment
a candidate to win in round one they need eight votes. Therefore, no voter can deviate to lead
to a candidate winning in round one. Additionally, if candidate A (or B) has six votes, then B
(or A) has two votes. Therefore, no voter can deviate and change the candidate that progresses
to round two. No voter is pivotal so the election is in a non-symmetric equilibrium.
In FC6, FU6 and FU5 there is a variable threshold. In FC6 and FU6 it is five point six and in
FU5 it is five point two. So, in all three cases candidate A (or B) passes the variable threshold. In
FC6 and FU6 candidate C also passes the variable threshold. In FC6 candidate A beats candidate
C with certainty in round two. In FU6 candidate C’s odds of winning are 34.2%. A deviation that
leads to candidate A (or B) only getting five will lead to candidate C being the only candidate
above the variable threshold and candidate C will win with certainty. This is strictly worse. In
FU5 candidate A (or B) is the only candidate above the variable threshold so candidate A (or
B) wins with certainty. A deviation that reduces candidate A’s (or B’s) vote share to five, leads
to a round two between candidate A (or B) and candidate C. Candidate C’s odds of victory
are 24.9%. This is strictly worse. All pivotal voters prefer to not deviate so the election is in a
non-symmetric equilibrium.
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The non-equilibrium events
A non-equilibrium event is any where there is a deviation that a voter can make that leads to a
preferred outcome.
The first set of events are when candidate A or B has five votes. This is not an equilibrium in
any treatment.
In MC6, MU6 and MU5 if candidate A (or B) has five votes then at least one β (or α) voter
must be insincere. The election goes to round two between candidate A (or B) and candidate
C. In MC6 candidate A (or B) wins in round two. In MU6 and MU5 candidate C’s chances of
victory are 34.3% and 24.9%. If the β (or α) voter deviates this does not change candidate C’s
odds. They still reach round two. However, both candidate A and candidate B have four votes.
One will be randomly selected to progress to round two. Therefore in MC6 candidate B’s (or
A’s) chance of victory rises to 50%. For MU6 and MU5 candidate B’s (or A’s) chance of victory
rises to 32.9% and 37.5% respectively. This outcome is preferred for the β (or α) type voter. This
is therefore not an equilibrium.
In FC6, FU6 and FU5 it takes six votes to pass the variable threshold. Currently neither
candidate A nor B passes the threshold. In FC6 and FU6 candidate C will pass the variable
threshold. Candidate C wins with certainty. In FU5 no one passes the variable threshold. Can-
didates A (or B) and C progress to round two. Candidate C has 24.9% chance of victory. If
candidate A (or B) has five votes then any voter that currently votes B (or A) has an incentive to
deviate. If they deviate to A (or B) then candidate A (or B) now has six votes. In FC6 and FU6
the election goes to round two. Here candidate C now has a 34.2% chance of victory. In FU5
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candidate A (or B) now wins with certainty. In both cases there is an incentive to deviate and
this is not an equilibrium.
The second set of events are when candidate A or B is less than one vote below the majority
threshold in the uncertainty treatments, MU6, MU5 and FU6. This is not an equilibrium in
MU5. In MU5 there is no variable threshold. The majority threshold is six point five. When
candidate A (or B) has six votes no candidate is above the majority threshold. Candidates A
(or B) and C progress to round two and candidate C has a 24.9% chance of victory. A single
deviation by either of the voters that voted B (or A) to A (or B) takes candidate A (or B) above
the majority threshold with seven votes. They now win with certainty. Both types prefer this.
This is not an equilibrium in MU6 and FU6. When candidate A (or B) has seven votes no
candidate is above the majority threshold. Candidates A (or B) and C progress to round two
and candidate C has a 34.2% chance of victory. A single deviation by the one voter that voted B
(or A) to A (or B) takes candidate A (or B) above the majority threshold with eight votes. They
now win with certainty. Both types prefer this.
The final set of events are when candidate A and candidate B have four votes but not all
voters are sincere. This is not an equilibrium in MC6, MU6, MU5 and FU5. It is necessary that
candidate C is not above the variable threshold. This is true in these four treatments. Therefore
no candidate passes the variable threshold. Candidate A or B is randomly selected to progress
to round two. In MC6 candidate A and candidate B have a 50% chance of victory. Then in MU5
and FU5 it is 37.5% and for MU6 it is 32.9%. At least one α type voter is insincere. If they deviate
from B to A then candidate A has five votes. They then reach round two in all cases. Now their
chance of victory is double. This is therefore preferable for the α voter. The same rationale
means that any β voter will deviate to being sincere. Therefore any case where candidate A and
candidate B have four votes but not all voters are sincere, this is not an equilibrium.
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Preference order of the lottery TIE only
depends on the relationship between
lotteries B and AC
It will be assumed that the voter i’s strict utility relationship over the singleton lotteries is:
Ui(A) > Ui(B) > Ui(C)
Therefore their strict utility order is (ABC). It is known that for a voter with utility order (ABC)
the lotteries that have a known position are:
Ui(A) > Ui(AB) > Ui(B) > Ui(BC) > Ui(C)
The position of AC is then ambiguous but takes one of three positions
B i AC , B ∼i AC or AC i B
Theorem K.1. The utility relationship for the lottery TIE is known if the relationship between AC and
B is known.
Proof: The utility from TIE is:
Ui(TIE) =
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3
The utility from a two way tie for example AB is:
Ui(AB) =
Ui(A)
2 +
Ui(B)
2
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The utility from lottery A is always higher than lottery TIE regardless of the relationship be-
tween AC and B:
Ui(A) > Ui(B) and Ui(A) > Ui(C)
∴ 2 ∗Ui(A) > Ui(B) +Ui(C)
Divide both sides by 3
2∗Ui(A)
3 >
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3
Add Ui(A)3 to both sides
Ui(A) >
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3
Ui(A) > Ui(TIE)
The utility from lottery C is always lower than lottery TIE regardless of the relationship between
AC and B:
Ui(A) > Ui(C) and Ui(B) > Ui(C)
∴ Ui(A) +Ui(B) > 2 ∗Ui(C)
Divide both sides by 3
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 >
2∗Ui(C)
3
Add Ui(C)3 to both sides
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3 > Ui(C)
Ui(ABC) > Ui(C)
The utility from lottery AB is always higher than the utility from lottery TIE
Ui(A) > Ui(C) and Ui(B) > Ui(C)
∴ Ui(A) +Ui(B) > 2(Ui(C))
Add 2 ∗ (Ui(A) +Ui(B)) to both sides
3 ∗ (Ui(A) +Ui(B)) > 2(Ui(A) +Ui(B) +Ui(C))
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Divide both sides by 6.
Ui(A)
2 +
Ui(B)
2 >
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3
Ui(AB) > Ui(TIE)
The utility from lottery BC is always lower than the utility from lottery TIE
Ui(A) > Ui(B) and Ui(A) > Ui(C)
∴ 2 ∗ (Ui(A)) > Ui(B) + (Ui(C)
Add 2 ∗ (Ui(B) +Ui(C)) to both sides
2 ∗ (Ui(A) +Ui(B) +Ui(C)) > 3 ∗ (Ui(B) +Ui(C))
Divide both sides by 6.
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3 >
Ui(B)
2 +
Ui(C)
2
Ui(TIE) > Ui(BC)
As such there is no ambiguity in regards to TIE and any of the 4 lotteries, A, C, AB and BC.
Additionally these all hold regardless of the relationship between AC and B. This just leaves the
relationship between TIE, B and AC. All give lower utility than A and AB and all give greater
utility than BC and C. Now the specific cases must be considered.
assume: Ui(B) > Ui(AC)
Ui(B) >
Ui(A)
2 +
Ui(C)
2
Add Ui(B)2 to both sides
1.5 ∗Ui(B) > Ui(A)2 + Ui(B)2 + Ui(C)2
Divide both sides by 1.5.
Ui(B) >
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3
Ui(B) > Ui(TIE)
Doing the same thing to compare TIE and AC
Ui(B) >
Ui(A)
2 +
Ui(C)
2
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Add Ui(A) +Ui(C) to both sides.
Ui(A) +Ui(B) +Ui(C) >
3∗Ui(A)
2 +
3∗Ui(C)
2
Divide both sides by 3.
Ui(A)
3 +
Ui(B)
3 +
Ui(C)
3 >
Ui(A)
2 +
Ui(C)
2
Ui(TIE) > Ui(AC)
Therefore When Ui(B) > Ui(AC) then Ui(B) > Ui(TIE) > Ui(AC).
The same logic holds such that if Ui(B) = Ui(AC) then Ui(B) = Ui(TIE) = Ui(AC). Similarly
when Ui(B) < Ui(AC) then Ui(B) < Ui(TIE) < Ui(AC).
Therefore the relative position of TIE is solely dependent on the utility relationship between B
and AC. 
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Numerical examples of results for
Chapter Three
Assume δ = 0.01 (this is for simplicity of the example. It can be smaller if the candidate needed
it to be)
L.1 Plurality: Small Incumbent divergence with candidate C’s opti-
mal strategy being an outside position.
Take h = (0.49, 0.52) as an example.
When λC = (λA − δ); VC = 0.49− δ2 = 0.485
When λC = (λB + δ); VC = 1− 0.52− δ2 = 0.475
Therefore the vote share is greater when candidate C takes the position just outside candidate A
which is the candidate that is closer to the centre.
When λC ∈ (λA,λB); VC = 0.52−0.492 = 0.015
When λC = λA; VC = 0.49+0.524 = 0.2525.
When λC = λB; VC = 0.5− 0.49+0.524 = 0.2475.
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Therefore the vote share is greater on the outside than the inside/copying so candidate C will
take the outside position. The vote shares are:
VA = 0.02, VB = 0.495 and VC = 0.485
Candidate B wins with certainty.
Candidate A now has an incentive to deviate so the new history is for example h = (0.47, 0.52).
The new vote shares are:
VA = 0.495, VB = 0.03 and VC = 0.475
Candidate A now wins with certainty. This process of increased divergence will continue until
candidate C no longer takes the outside position.
L.2 Plurality: Incumbent divergence with candidate C’s optimal strat-
egy being an inside position.
h = (0.25, 0.75) is the equilibrium policy position. At this history:
When λC = (λA − δ); VC = 0.25− δ2 = 0.245
When λC = (λB + δ); VC = 1− 0.75− δ2 = 0.245
Candidate C gets a vote share, VC = 0.245 taking the outside positions.
When λC ∈ (λA,λB); VC = 0.75−0.252 = 0.25.
When λC = λA; VC = 0.75+0.254 = 0.25.
When λC = λB; VC = 0.75+0.254 = 0.25.
L.3. Majority Run-off: Candidate C winning against non-symmetric incumbents with the
inside option
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Candidate C gets a vote share of VC = 0.25 taking the inside position or copying one of the two
incumbents. So their optimal strategy is λC ∈ [λA,λb]
Candidate A and candidate B both get VA = VB = 0.375 on average and each has a 50% chance
of victory. Candidate C will take a random position within the range [0.25, 0.75]
Assume Candidate A tries to deviate away from this point.
If λA = 0.24; candidate C randomises in the range [0.24, 0.75], the vote shares are: VC = 0.255
and the average for VA = 0.37 and VB = 0.375. Candidate A now has a less than 50% chance of
victory and is worse off.
If λA = 0.26; candidate C moves to λC = 0.25, the vote shares are: VA = 0.25, VB = 0.495 and VC =
0.255. Candidate B wins with certainty and candidate A is worse off.
This is then the only equilibrium.
L.3 Majority Run-off: Candidate C winning against non-symmetric
incumbents with the inside option
Take h = (0.4, 0.65) as an example.
To win with certainty candidate C can play λC = 0.39 and the vote shares in round one are;
VA = 0.13, VB = 0.475 and VC = 0.395
Candidate A is eliminated and then the vote shares in round two are;
VB = 0.48 and VC = 0.52.
Therefore candidate C wins with certainty.
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L.4 Majority Run-off: Candidate C winning against non-symmetric
incumbents with the outside option
Take h = (0.25, 0.8) for example:
To win with certainty candidate C can play λC = 0.26 the vote shares in round one are;
VA = 0.255, VB = 0.47 and VC = 0.275
Candidate A is eliminated and then the vote shares in round two are;
VB = 0.47 and VC = 0.53.
Therefore candidate C wins with certainty.
L.5 Majority Run-off: Candidate C always loses against symmetric
incumbents with the outside option.
Take h = (0.45, 0.55) for example.
If candidate C plays λC = 0.44 the vote shares in round one are:
VA = 0.055, VB = 0.5 and VC = 0.455
Candidate A is eliminated and then the vote shares in round two are;
VB = 0.505 and VC = 0.495.
Candidate B therefore wins.
L.6. Majority Run-off: Candidate C always wins against symmetric incumbents with the inside
option.
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L.6 Majority Run-off: Candidate C always wins against symmetric
incumbents with the inside option.
Take h = (0.2, 0.8) for example
To win with certainty candidate C can play λC = 0.21. The vote shares in round one are:
VA = 0.205, VB = 0.495 and VC = 0.4
Candidate A is eliminated and then the vote shares in round two are;
VB = 0.495 and VC = 0.505
Candidate C wins with certainty.
L.7 Flexible Run-off: Candidate C wins against incumbents that are
too far from the centre.
Take for example τ = 0.4 and h = (0.2, 0.8)
Candidate C will take position; λC ∈ {0.4, 0.6}. Take λC = 0.6 1, the vote shares are;
VA = 0.4, , VB = 0.3 and VC = 0.3.
In half the elections candidate C is eliminated, candidate A and candidate B are equally close to
the centre and have a 50% chance of victory each. In the other half candidate B is eliminated.
Candidate C is closer to the centre than candidate A and wins with certainty. The odds of victory
for candidate A and B are 25% each and for candidate C the odds are 50%.
This is not an equilibrium. If either candidate A or B moves towards the centre (assume for the
example A) then h = (0.21, 0.8); if λC = 0.6 then:
VA = 0.405
1The result is mirrored with λC = 0.4
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Candidate A passes the threshold and wins with certainty. If candidate C moves towards A to
stop them winning in round one e.g. λC = 0.59 the vote shares are:
VA = 0.4, VB = 0.305 and VC = 0.295
No candidate wins in round one but candidate C is eliminated and the vote shares are:
VA = 0.505 and VB = 0.495
Candidate A wins in round two.
L.8 Flexible Run-off: Candidate A moves to the centre until candidate
C takes an outside position.
Take τ = 0.4 and h = (0.21, 0.75); candidate C cannot win;
When, λC = 0.71 ⇒ VC = VB and VA = 0.46
Candidate A passes the threshold and then wins in round one.
Alternatively λC = 0.59 ⇒ VA = 0.4, VB = 0.33 and VC = 0.27
No candidate passes the threshold but candidate C comes last and is eliminated and candidate
B wins in round two.
Candidate C can not stop both other candidates passing the threshold and come second. So they
can not win and instead vote maximise. They take λC ∈ (0.21, 0.75).
When 0.59 ≥ λC > 0.21 candidate B wins the election in either round one by passing the thresh-
old (When 0.45 > λC > 0.21 ) or winning in round two (when 0.59 > λC ≥ 0.45).
When 0.75 > λC > 0.59 candidate A wins in round one. So candidate A’s probability of winning
is roughly 30%. This is not optimal for them as if they move to for example λA = 0.25 then their
odds of victory are 50%2. The same logic holds with symmetry.
2Due to symmetry and the fact that C can not win
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